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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the new networking and cooperation phenomenon known 
as grid owner companies in Germany, in which electricity and gas distribution are 
governed by rights-of-way contracts. A process began ten years ago to phase out 
more than 20,000 rights-of-way contracts throughout Germany. Often, a grid 
owner company is established whose shareholders are the current energy 
company and the municipality. Moreover, large numbers of rights-of-way contracts 
between municipalities and energy companies contain options to set up grid owner 
companies. 
The main aims of this thesis are to contribute to the understanding of the practical 
phenomenon of grid owner companies from a financial and legal perspective by 
identifying the population of German grid owner companies and by analysing the 
relationships between the firm size, the legal form, the ownership structure and 
performance of these companies, measured by the Return On Assets ratio (ROA).  
Based on the philosophical stance of positivism, multiple linear regression analysis 
using ordinary least squares is applied to sample data from 2010 to 2015 in order 
to analyse the relationships between the firm size, the legal form, the ownership 
structure and performance of German grid owner companies.  
According to the findings, a total of 170 German grid owner companies have been 
identified. The findings of the research indicate that population and area as proxies 
for firm size, private participation quota and the legal form of a limited partnership 
with a limited liability company as a general partner have a positive and significant 
influence on ROA. 
This thesis is the first comprehensive study that is solely dedicated to the new 
phenomenon known as grid owner companies in Germany and provides 
fundamental financial insights. In particular, municipalities and energy companies 
that are faced with the decision on the design of a grid owner company are 
recommended to choose large grid owner companies with the legal form of a 
limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner to achieve a 
high level of firm performance.  
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1 Introduction and background of the research 
 
1.1 New phenomenon of grid owner companies  
 
In Europe, as in the rest of the world, the electricity and gas distributing industries 
are vital industry sectors. In Germany, electricity and gas distribution is regularly 
governed by rights-of-way contracts. According to German Law (section 46 (2) 
German Energy Industry Act), these are contracts between energy companies and 
municipalities on the use of public roads for installation and operation of mains that 
form part of an energy supply grid for general supply in a municipal area. Rights-
of-way or concession contracts are of significant economic importance for 
municipalities and energy companies. Whereas municipalities in Germany charge 
a concession levy of about 6 billion €, grid operators demand use-of-system 
charges of approximately 20 billion € per year (Heim, 2015a). 
 
A process began ten years ago to phase out more than 20,000 rights-of-way 
contracts in numerous cities and municipalities throughout Germany 
(Bundeskartellamt & Bundesnetzagentur, 2015). As rights-of way contracts have a 
term of not more than 20 years (section 46 (2) German Energy Industry Act) and 
most of the rights-of-way contracts were first awarded in the 1990s, their 
renegotiations are pending. With the expiry of the concession contracts, many 
municipalities are faced with the strategic decision whether they should renew 
their rights-of way contracts with private energy companies or decide on a partial 
or complete remunicipalisation. Often, a cooperation model in the form of a grid 
owner company is established whose shareholders are the current energy 
company and the municipality (Kinkel, 2014). Then, a rights-of-way contract 
between the municipality and the new grid owner company is negotiated. The grid 
is sold from the previous concessionaire to the grid owner company (asset owner) 
and the private energy company leases it back. In light of huge budget deficits and 
dramatic declines in municipal revenues, cooperation models in the form of grid 
owner companies could become an attractive option to resolve municipal financial 
problems (Deutscher Städte- und Gemeindebund (DStGB), Deutscher Städtetag 
(DST), Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband e. V. (DSGV), & Verband 
kommunaler Unternehmen e. V. (VKU), 2013). 
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1.2 Decision-making situation 
 
The remunicipalisation of energy grids is one of several options for municipalities. 
Their commitment to a decentralised energy supply is not dependent on the 
municipal operation of an energy distribution network (DStGB, 2017). If a new 
municipal utility has acquired the concession, it will have to purchase the network 
from the former concessionaire. The determining factor for the calculation is the 
capitalised earnings method. The network fees are regulated by law (incentive 
regulation) and generate a reasonable return on the capital of between 5 and 7 
percent. The long-term interest rates on corporate debt are significantly lower than 
the returns on investment. The purchase of the existing distribution network is a 
profitable and low-risk investment (Wagner & Berlo, 2015). Due to the long-term 
effects of the decision, a careful decision process is necessary. Furthermore, the 
decision has many facets, including economic, financial and political dimensions 
(Fellenberg, Rubel, & Meliß, 2012). 
 
In general, the expiry of a rights-of-way contract opens up the following options for 
municipalities (Fellenberg et al., 2012): 
 
First, the municipality renews the rights-of-way contract with the previous 
distribution network operator or private energy company. The new contract is 
negotiated with a duration of no longer than 20 years (section 46 (2) German 
Energy Industry Act). Then, the municipality receives the concession levy from the 
energy company and if applicable allocated trade tax. 
 
Second, the municipality awards the rights-of way contract to another energy 
company that purchases the grid from the former concessionaire. According to the 
German Federal Supreme Court, the earnings value is suitable for the purchase 
price of an energy grid (Bundesgerichtshof, 1999). As in the first case, the 
municipality receives the concession levy from the energy company and if 
applicable allocated trade tax. 
 
Third, the municipality purchases the distribution network and becomes the 
distribution network operator. Often, the municipal utility acquires the grid. In order 
to finance the acquisition of the grid, a security by the municipality is common 
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practice. The security is restricted to a maximum value of 80 percent of the credit 
amount (DStGB et al., 2013). 
 
Fourth, the municipality awards the rights-of-way contract to a grid owner company 
as a cooperation model. Then, the grid owner company purchases the grid from 
the former concessionaire and becomes the new concessionaire. In turn, the 
distribution network operator or energy company leases the grid back. Apart from 
this basic model, a variety of structures of grid owner companies are conceivable. 
These structures are influenced by different underlying business objectives, 
energy-economic policies, financial agreements, accounting rules and other 
relevant factors, which can lead to highly complex cooperation models (Kunze, 
2012). The earnings value is suitable for the purchase price of an energy grid 
(Bundesgerichtshof, 1999).  
 
A grid owner company usually starts with the process of selecting a private partner 
for a grid owner company as a cooperation model. In practice, the process is often 
linked to the formal concession procedure. Regularly, an established private 
energy company with a traditional history as distribution network operator is 
selected. The choice of the cooperation partner is primarily based on the 
necessary draft contracts of the potential partners with regard to the cooperation 
model. In most cases, the bundle of contracts comprises drafts of rights-of-way 
contracts, company agreements, consortium agreements, lease contracts and 
loan contracts (Heim, 2015a). 
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Figure 1: Establishment of a grid owner company  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(DStGB et al., 2013) 
 
Finally, after the municipality has decided upon a cooperation model in the form of 
a grid owner company, the design of the grid owner company has to be 
determined. The design will involve particular decisions relating to firm size, 
ownership structure and the legal form of the grid owner company. Thus, a 
framework that examines the critical drivers of firm performance in German grid 
owner companies is required. Firm size, ownership structure and the legal form 
are identified as critical factors that influence the performance of grid owner 
companies, measured by the Return on Assets (ROA) ratio. 
 
In addition, many recently renewed rights-of-way contracts between municipalities 
and private energy companies contain options to establish grid owner companies 
(Tugendreich, 2014).  
 
1.3 Economic environment of grid owner companies 
 
1.3.1 German energy market 
 
According to section 3 no. 18 of the German Energy Industry Act, energy 
companies are defined as natural persons or legal entities that supply energy to 
others, operate a power grid or have power of control as owners of a power grid. 
The operation of a customer facility or a customer facility for self-supply does not 
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make the operator an energy supply company. As German grid owner companies 
normally have power of control as owners of power grids, they constitute energy 
companies too.  
 
The German energy market can be characterised by three sectors: generation, 
transport and distribution (Meyer-Gohde, P., Meinshausen, S., Schiereck, D., & 
von Flotow, P., 2013). The transport of energy to consumers is done via powerful 
transport and distribution grids. The costs of construction, maintenance and 
modernisation of grids are paid by the energy customers. In general, power grids 
are electricity or gas grids over one or more voltage or pressure levels (section 3 
no. 16 German Energy Industry Act). In particular, grids of general supply are 
energy supply networks that serve the distribution of energy to third parties and 
are basically open to the supply of a final customer (section 3 no. 17 and 29c 
German Energy Industry Act).  
 
Concerning the technical structure of the electricity grids in Germany, transport, 
transmission and distribution of electricity take place via a hierarchical system of 
network levels that are separated by their voltage. Connected by transformers, a 
distinction is made between extra-high voltage networks (380 kV), high voltage 
networks (110 kV), medium-voltage networks (10 kV) and low voltage networks 
(400 volts). The transport network level is used to transmit large volumes of 
electricity between the place of production, for example a coal-fired power station, 
and metropolitan areas. Then the electricity is distributed by smaller distribution 
networks. At that level, medium-sized power stations like gas, hydroelectric power 
plants and wind farms also feed in electricity (Heil, 2018). German electricity grid 
owner companies normally own medium-voltage and low voltage networks.  
Concerning the structure of the German gas grids, two market areas exist, namely 
Gaspool and NetConnect Germany, with sixteen transmission system operators 
(Bundesnetzagentur & Bundeskartellamt, 2017). In this context, German gas grid 
owner companies normally own local distribution grids. 
 
Since 2005, the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways has been in charge of the regulation of 
grids in Germany. The agency is responsible for the unbundling of network 
operations from energy generation or distribution and the non-discriminatory 
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access to grids. The levels of transmission charges or tariffs have to be approved 
by the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, 
Post and Railways, too (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2013). 
According to section 11 of the German Energy Industry Act, distribution network 
operators are obliged to optimise, enhance and enlarge their grids in order to 
maintain a high distribution standard. The expansion of renewable energy 
generation facilities and the compulsory connection to energy grids mean 
enormous challenges for the distribution network operators (Bundesnetzagentur & 
Bundeskartellamt, 2017). 
  
In Germany, the distribution of energy was the original responsibility of local 
government. However, local government has the choice of whether to distribute 
energy or to assign the task to a third party by rights-of-way contracts (Meyer-
Gohde et al., 2013). Thus, the energy sector in Germany developed as a mix of 
municipal and private companies from the late nineteenth century (Hall, Lobina, & 
Terhorst, 2013). Still four large power companies dominate the German power 
market: E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall. They operate across the generation, 
distribution, and retail supply sectors. Moreover, the ownership of Germany’s 
energy system is concentrated in the hands of these four companies. Whereas 
regional energy companies, often in the hands of the big four companies and thus 
largely privately owned, hold and dominate the transmission and distribution 
assets, municipal companies hold only a minor share of local distribution networks 
(Wagner & Berlo, 2017). 
 
The energy distribution system in Germany is the most complex in Europe, with 
around 900 distribution system operators serving about 20,000 municipalities. 
Apart from many small distribution network operators, the number includes the 
four large companies as well as about 700 municipally owned utilities and a 
number of regional companies. The four large distribution network operators in 
Germany, RWE, EnBW, E.ON, and Vattenfall, operate a significant portion of the 
distribution grid through concession contracts with municipalities. Under the 
German Energy Industry Act, these concession agreements have to be 
renegotiated under non-discriminatory rules and can be cancelled (Bayer, 2015). 
According to section 46 of the German Energy Industry Act, municipalities are 
obliged to make public roads available for installation and operation of mains for 
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the immediate supply of electricity to final customers in the territory in a non-
discriminatory manner. 
 
1.3.2 Renewable energies and Germany’s energy transition 
 
The promotion of renewable energy sources plays a major role in Germany’s 
energy policy. According to section 1 of the German Energy Industry Act, the 
supply of energy has to be increasingly based on renewable energies. Renewable 
energy sources like wind, water, biomass and solar energy are privileged under 
the German Renewable Energy Sources Act and the German Combined Heat and 
Power Act. For example, grid owners have to connect renewable energy systems 
as a priority to their grids and distribution network operators have to purchase 
energy from renewable energy systems at defined prices (section 3 German 
Renewable Energy Sources Act). Already the introduction of the feed-in-tariff 
system through the German Renewable Energy Sources Act in the year 2000 has 
promoted an enormous buildup of wind, solar and biomass facilities (Becker, 
2017). 
 
The development of renewable energies and the atomic disaster in Fukushima in 
2011 led to further political initiatives to phase out the use of nuclear energy, to 
increase the percentage of renewables in energy consumption and to 
remunicipalise energy activities (Becker, 2017). By the end of the year 2050, 80 
percent of the German energy consumption should be provided by renewables 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2013). Already more than 95 
percent of the electricity produced by renewable energies is supplied by local grids 
and therefore they are a critical factor of success (Clemens & Ohrem, 2014; 
Kinkel, 2014).  
 
In general, electricity grids play an important role in the integration of renewable 
and other local energies like the electricity produced from cogeneration (Wagner & 
Berlo, 2015). With the decision of the energy transition in Germany in 2011, 
electricity is becoming increasingly decentralised. As a consequence, in the 
course of the energy transition, the grids also become a central element of energy 
supply as they match large numbers of small decentralised renewable energy 
systems (DStGB et al., 2013). As the renewable energies are characterised by 
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fluctuating power generation, grids become smarter. This means that they 
combine generation, storage and consumption and compensate for power 
fluctuations by using information and communication technologies 
(Umweltbundesamt, 2013).  
 
Overall, local distribution networks are essential for the integration of renewable 
energies and other decentralised energy types such as electricity produced from 
combined heat and power units. Therefore, the distribution networks are the 
backbone of a turnaround in German energy policy towards sustainable energy 
systems (Wagner & Berlo, 2015). The foundation of municipal companies and the 
reacquisition of expiring rights-of-way contracts in the context of remunicipalisation 
provide local political actors with the opportunities to participate in and to 
determine the process of the German energy transition (Heil, 2018). 
 
1.3.3 Trend towards remunicipalisation of energy sector 
 
1.3.3.1 Remunicipalisation 
 
After the liberalisation or privatisation of the energy markets, a trend towards                  
remunicipalisation was identified (Wollmann, 2013). Due to financially stressed 
situations, budget deficits and austerity policies of municipalities in Germany in the 
1980s and early 1990s, it became increasingly popular to privatise and to 
outsource local public services. As virtually all rights-of-way contracts in the 
German energy sector were up for renewal between 2012 and the end of 2016, 
more than 60 percent of all German municipalities considered remunicipalising 
their local energy infrastructure (Berlo, Templin, & Wagner, 2016). 
 
The prevailing view was that private businesses were more efficient and cost 
effective than the public sector. While tax revenues declined, municipalities were 
faced with an expansion of tasks. In order to reduce the enormous debt burden 
and to generate short-term revenues for maintaining cultural and social 
infrastructure, the municipalities sold off the “crown jewels of municipal property”. 
The trend was fostered by the conservative political and economic movement in 
the realm of neo-liberalism. Today, there are numerous indications for a 
countermovement to the paradigm of privatisation, especially in the municipal 
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energy sector (Wagner & Berlo, 2017). Still faced with financial problems and 
budget deficits, municipalities began to appreciate municipal utilities and influence 
on local infrastructure with the aim of generating benefits from municipal utilities, 
companies and public ownership. The development has led to a renaissance of 
municipal companies in Germany. Furthermore, the spirit of the times speaks in 
favour of a continuation of the trend in remunicipalisation. Since the global 
economic and financial crisis of 2008, private-sector solutions and models have 
been regarded critically. Especially in Germany, the large energy companies have 
lost their reputation as they have abducted the energy transition. By contrast, state 
action has regained legitimacy and reputation in the eyes of many German citizens 
(Bauer, 2012).  
 
As a reaction to the wave of privatisation of the 1990s (Heim, 2015a), the 
expression “remunicipalisation” is the opposite of privatisation of municipal duties 
and responsibilities. It denotes the return or re-nationalisation of formerly 
privatised services of general interest and functions or infrastructure back into 
municipal hands, either wholly or in part (Lichter, 2015; Monopolkommission, 
2013; Ronellenfitsch, 2004; Wagner & Berlo, 2017). Municipal functions and 
services were previously under private management or long-term concessions 
(Wagner & Berlo, 2017). Beyond the return of services, an expansion of municipal 
activities also in previously privately organised sectors is identified, for example 
the foundation of public utilities (Monopolkommission, 2013). So the term 
remunicipalisation is used (Berlo et al., 2016). Some authors speak of “a 
renaissance of the municipal economy”, meaning that the cases of 
remunicipalisation are significant beyond the energy sector (Bauer, 2012; Becker, 
2017).  
 
From the perspective of a municipality, the generic term “remunicipalisation” 
comprises the following procedures (Libbe, Hanke, & Verbücheln, 2011): 
 
• Founding of municipal companies 
• Retransfer of services to municipality or municipal companies 
• Retransfer of companies under private legal forms into municipal legal 
forms 
• Increase in municipal participation quota of semi-public companies 
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With regard to the energy sector, the expression remunicipalisation denotes the 
expansion of economic activities of municipalities in that sector (Lichter, 2015). It 
could mean that energy is supplied by municipalities again whereas before it had 
been supplied by private energy companies. The supply of energy and the 
operation of distribution networks are services of general interest and the original 
duties of the municipalities in Germany (Heim, 2015a). However, they can affect 
parts of the value chain or the entire value chain, from power generation to 
distribution and network operation (Monopolkommission, 2011). Several new 
public utilities were founded and large numbers of rights-of-way contracts have 
been signed between local government and public utilities (Berlo & Wagner, 
2013a) or still have to be renewed. To sum up, a trend towards takeovers of 
electricity and gas grids by municipalities and municipal companies can be 
observed (Verband kommunaler Unternehmen e. V., 2012). 
 
Although the engagement of local authorities as distribution network operators is 
relatively high, the whole amount of distribution network operators is rather stable 
at a high level (Bundesnetzagentur & Bundeskartellamt, 2017). Due to a lack of 
competition, there cannot be a purely market-based solution in the area of natural 
monopolies. Hence, the remunicipalisation debate does not focus on the question 
of market or state. In fact, the question is whether a service has to be provided by 
a municipal or a private enterprise (Höffler, 2013). 
   
According to Arnold (2012) public authorities try to strengthen their influence on 
the energy sector and to improve their public budgets by the management of grids. 
They realise that the element of common interest and public value is an important 
field for local decision-makers (Wagner & Berlo, 2017).  
 
Apart from political objectives, the proponents of remunicipalisation see the 
following economic objectives and expectations:   
 
• Positive budgetary implications by the transfer of profits from municipal 
companies 
• Low energy prices for citizens 
• Maintenance and creation of local employment 
• Greater influence of the municipality on energy policy  
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• Support of local added value, especially orders of local companies 
   
Moreover, large German energy companies, like E.ON in North-Hesse, sold their 
grids to municipalities to reduce their enormous net debts (Kinkel, 2014). Grid 
owner companies are potential buyers of grids formerly owned by such energy 
companies. However, the monopoly commission in Germany examined that the 
actual influence of municipalities on the energy markets in the context of 
remunicipalisation is lower than expected by them. The scope for setting prices 
after the (re-)purchase of grids is limited, because the tariffs are regulated by the 
Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and 
Railways. The monopoly commission in Germany is of the opinion that 
municipalities always have the opportunity to set up conditions, even without their 
own entrepreneurial activities. To sum up, the monopoly commission criticises the 
entrepreneurial activities of municipalities, because it cannot be justified by 
efficiency arguments (Monopolkommission, 2011). 
 
Often, municipalities enter into partnerships or cooperations with private energy 
companies and other municipalities. In particular, the operation of energy 
distribution networks in cooperations between municipalities and private energy 
companies has a more than 150-year tradition in Germany (Theobald & Templin, 
2018). 
 
Apart from generating profits, the main reasons for searching for a strategic 
partner are gaining access to additional know-how with regard to the operation of 
grids and competence as well as minimising economic and financial risks from 
private energy companies. In general, municipalities do not have the necessary 
employees or know-how. The involvement of private energy companies as 
strategic partners facilitates the recovery of municipal influence without losing the 
advantages of a private participation (DStGB, 2017). 
 
There are no general requirements for the possible forms of strategic partnerships. 
In practice, depending on the desired degree of involvement of the private partner, 
cooperation agreements, management models, lease models and private 
participation models can be distinguished. In general, the highest degree of 
involvement of the private partner is in the form of a participation model, for 
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example in the form of a grid owner company (Essing & Kürten, 2015). 
Establishing a private-public cooperation can have several purposes. For example, 
the private energy partner could invest additional capital in a joint company that is 
required for a grid acquisition.  
 
With regard to the operation of grids, complex regulatory issues, e.g. change of 
supplier processes, network balance or calculations of the efficiency value, are 
provided by private partners of a cooperation with municipalities (DStGB et al., 
2013). Often, the private strategic partner performs the commercial and technical 
management of the network company due to its necessary know-how in terms of 
network operation (Essing & Kürten, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, the complexity of the concession award procedure or little 
experience with the operation of grids encourages small municipalities to enter into 
municipal or private cooperation projects. Sometimes one company acts as a 
cooperation partner for several different municipalities, providing them with 
professional experience and operational know-how (Wagner & Berlo, 2017). An 
important requirement for the profitability of a grid owner company is the expertise 
to operate a grid and economic power of the private energy company. In general, 
large numbers of German municipalities have neither capital nor know-how or 
experience to operate a grid (Heim, 2015a). Overall, knowledge gaps may be 
closed by entering into close strategic partnerships (DStGB, 2017). 
 
According to DStGB et al. (2013), remunicipalisation can be a successful forward-
looking strategy for municipalities. However, the political stance of local decision-
makers on the issue of public ownership defines how conflictual remunicipalisation 
processes are (Becker, 2017). 
 
Overall, Becker (2017) emphasises that the remunicipalisation trend in the 
German energy sector rests on a convergence of local service traditions with the 
dynamics of the energy transition combined with ending rights-of-way contracts. 
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1.3.3.2 Motives and objectives of municipalities  
 
1.3.3.2.1 Fiscal and tax-related interests  
 
The desire of municipalities to participate in profits from distribution network 
operation and the recovery of lost influence of municipalities on local infrastructure 
are often important drivers of remunicipalisation. However, most of the 
municipalities do not have the required staff and know-how to operate the grids. 
Hence, they have the possibility to establish cooperation models together with 
private energy companies as strategic partners (Essing & Kürten, 2015).  
 
According to an empirical study by Lenk, Rottmann, and Albrecht (2011), almost 
half of the interviewed municipalities with a budget deficit are planning a 
remunicipalisation. Thus, financial aspects play an important role in the decision of 
a municipality to remunicipalise local infrastructure and public services (Dietl, 
2018; Wagner & Berlo, 2015). Whereas selling off their networks seemed like an 
attractive source of revenue for municipalities in the past, many municipalities 
have changed their minds (Diermann, 2010). Often, the municipalities are no 
longer satisfied with the concession levy on grids in their districts. Moreover, they 
intend to participate in the profits from the operation and maintenance of energy 
grids as well as related local business taxes (Heim, 2015b). This requires direct or 
indirect capital participation of the municipality in the acquisition of the energy grid. 
For this purpose, frequently grid owner companies are founded that lease the grid 
to a lessee. Then, the municipal budgets benefit from the lease payments, but are 
faced with finance costs (DStGB et al., 2013).   
 
First, there is the idea that the long-term investment in grids by the establishment 
of a grid owner company opens a new and recurrent source of income for 
municipalities and contributes to the reduction of their budget deficits (DStGB et 
al., 2013). Not only do third parties benefit from the operation of the grids, but also 
municipalities that are indirectly owners of the grids (Lichter, 2015; Verband 
kommunaler Unternehmen e. V., 2012).   
 
Second, the operation of a grid allows for steady and predictable revenues 
according to the regulations of the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, 
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Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways over several years. Apart from that, 
the energy grids have to be maintained on a regular basis and the grids have to be 
state-of-the-art technology (DStGB et al., 2013)  
 
While in the past, mainly private energy companies benefited from the network 
operation, municipalities profit from the net income of a grid owner company as a 
shareholder and also from the trade tax as far as it is operated in the borders of 
the municipality. However, due to the development of different parameters like 
depreciations, interests, etc. of the grid owner company, positive income is not   
self-evident (Heim, 2015a; Verband kommunaler Unternehmen e. V., 2012). 
 
Whereas private energy companies primarily serve private shareholder interests, 
from the perspective of municipal authorities, grid owner companies should 
contribute to the municipal budget, i.e. the degree of success is measured by the 
amount of money that remains within the community. In contrast to the grid 
operator who is responsible for the maintenance, grid owner companies refer to 
the ownership of a distribution infrastructure for delivering power to customers 
aiming at local control over the energy infrastructure (Wagner & Berlo, 2017).  
 
Furthermore, the establishment of a cooperation model in the form of a grid owner 
company facilitates the consolidation of municipal enterprises into fiscal units 
(“steuerlicher Querverbund”) (Fellenberg et al., 2012). Sections 4 and 8 of the 
German Corporate Income Tax Act form the basis of the consolidation of 
municipal enterprises into fiscal units (DStGB, 2017). The income of profitable grid 
owner companies is offset with the losses of other municipal activities (public 
transportation, energy supply, port and airport) (Rosenberger, 2012), and reduces 
the tax burden of the municipality (Wagner & Berlo, 2015). Often, municipal 
swimming baths and public transport belong to important infrastructures and 
services that can be offered in spite of significant losses (Wagner & Berlo, 2015).  
 
1.3.3.2.2 Control and influence over local infrastructures 
 
Municipalities not only benefit financially from the revenues of municipalisation, but 
they are also interested in gaining or securing control over their local 
infrastructure. Often, municipalities had lost control or general influence over their 
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energy issues (Becker, 2017). On the one hand, they become more and more 
independent from private energy groups and on the other hand, they gain more 
populism (Fellenberg et al., 2012). In general, new strategic opportunities are 
expected by municipalities (Heim, 2015a; Verband kommunaler Unternehmen e. 
V., 2012). 
 
In contrast to a concessionaire that is not a local private energy company, grid 
owner companies offer the possibility to better coordinate the maintenance and 
investment activities with the municipalities (Heim, 2015a). However, the influence 
of local authorities with regard to the local distribution networks seems to be 
overestimated, because rights-of-way contracts simply refer to the right to use the 
municipal ways. For example, municipalities cannot determine the energy mix 
(Fellenberg et al., 2012; Heim, 2015a).  
 
Apart from the general interest of the municipalities in gaining or securing control 
over their local infrastructure, they strive for control under company law in the case 
of a grid owner company. A shareholding of more than 50 percent and the right to 
determine the majority of members of the shareholders’ meeting, supervisory 
board and/or management of the company are typical examples (Heim, 2015a). 
 
1.3.3.2.3 Limitation of liability and economic risks 
 
Municipalities are taking on responsibility for a business that offers opportunities, 
but that also has technical and economic risks. From the view of the municipalities, 
limited liability companies (“GmbH”) and limited partnerships with a limited liability 
company as general partner (“GmbH & Co. KG) are the preferred legal structures 
as they offer protection from the liabilities and the financial risks of a grid owner 
company (Heim, 2015a).  
 
1.4 Legal environment of grid owner companies 
 
1.4.1 European and German energy law 
 
The EU-directives on the deregulation of the European electricity and gas markets 
aim at lowering prices to a competitive level and creating competitive electricity 
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and gas markets in Europe. This should be achieved by the unbundling of the 
value chain in energy companies, i.e. the separation of network operation and 
energy distribution to avoid cross-subsidisation, and the discriminatory network 
access for third parties (sections 6 to 10 German Energy Industry Act; Verband 
kommunaler Unternehmen e. V., 2012). The electricity and gas distribution 
networks or grids and the concessions are natural monopolies and are thus 
subject to market failure. Characteristic of a natural monopoly is the combination 
of high fixed and low marginal costs, i.e. the production costs are at its lowest level 
when only one market player exists (Mühlenkamp, 2007).   
 
Based on EU law, the German Energy Industry Act of 1998 is the legal basis of the 
energy regulation and the liberalised electricity and gas markets in Germany 
(Meyer-Gohde et al., 2013; Wagner & Berlo, 2017). A key legislative objective in 
this context was to separate distribution network operation from energy supply, the 
so-called unbundling (Wagner & Berlo, 2017). In accordance with the EU-
directives, it presents objective and non-discriminating principles for the taking up 
of energy supply and the construction of power plants and power lines (Rudo, 
2018). According to section 1 of the German Energy Industry Act, its purpose 
being federal law is to ensure the safe, reasonably-priced, consumer-friendly, 
efficient and ecologically harmless public supply of electricity and gas, which is 
increasingly based on renewable energy. The central policy goal in this context 
was to separate grid operation from other energy supply activities. To sum up, the 
amendment of the German Energy Industry Act opens up the German power 
market for competition. Every customer shall have a free choice of energy supplier 
(Wagner & Berlo, 2017). Furthermore, the deregulation and liberalisation of the 
energy market are subject to the German Act Against Unfair Competition and the 
German Act against Restraints of Competition (Heim, 2015a).  
 
1.4.2 German municipal law 
 
Economic activities by municipalities are subject to municipal law of the 16 
German federal states and have to satisfy general requirements (DStGB et al., 
2013). The regulations aim at protecting municipalities from risks that diminish 
their performance. In general, a municipality has the right to carry out an economic 
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activity if the following requirements are satisfied (for example section 121 of the 
Hessian Municipal Code): 
(1) the public purpose justifies the economic activity, 
(2) the nature and extent of the activity corresponds to the financial 
performance of the municipality and the expected demand and 
(3) the purpose is not fulfilled as well by a private third party.  
According to section 122 of the Hessian Municipal Code, a municipality may only 
establish or participate in a private company if the following requirements are met: 
(1) the requirements of section 121 of the Hessian Municipal Code are met, 
(2) the liability and the contribution obligation of the municipality are limited to 
an amount that corresponds to its performance, 
(3) the municipality has an appropriate influence, particularly on the 
supervisory board,  
(4) it is ensured that the annual financial statements and the management 
report are prepared and audited in accordance with the provisions of the 
German Commercial Code for large corporations. 
However, the economic activities with regard to the energy sector as part of public 
services are privileged in some federal states of Germany. For example, contrary 
to sections 121 and 122 of the Hessian Municipal Code, municipalities may 
operate generation, storage, distribution and supply of electricity, heat and gas 
from renewable energies when the activities take place within the municipality or in 
the regional environment in the form of intermunicipal cooperations (section 121 
(1a) Hessian Municipal Code). By the rule, economic activities of municipalities in 
Hesse with regard to distribution networks are facilitated (Morber & Dietl, 2014). 
 
It has to be emphasised that the economic activity or participation of the 
municipality must be particularly subject to the economic principle (section 121 
(1a) Hessian Municipal Code). As the engagement of the municipalities requires 
significant investment, the expected profitability plays an important role (Dietlein & 
Ogorek, 2018). The economic principle means that the greatest possible return is 
to be reached with as little effort and expense as possible. However, to protect the 
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municipal budget, liability and financial risks of the municipality have to be limited 
(Heim, 2015a). So, economic activities of municipalities are not an end in itself. 
They are rather subject to the economic principle and must be profitable (Theobald 
& Templin, 2018) 
 
Section 121 (6) of the Hessian Municipal Code governs that before deciding on the 
establishment, acquisition or substantial expansion of economic enterprises, as 
well as direct or indirect participation, the municipal council must be fully informed 
about the opportunities and risks of its intended business activities and of their 
expected impact on the craft and the market to teach medium-sized businesses. 
Before referral to the municipal council, the local chambers of trade, chambers of 
industry and commerce as well as associations should be given the opportunity to 
comment on their business. The statements are to be communicated to the 
municipal council (section 121 (6) Hessian Municipal Code). 
 
1.4.3 Rights-of-way contracts 
 
Public services or services of general interest may be operated as a concession. 
Usually, a private or public company enters into a fixed-term temporary agreement 
with the municipality and is awarded the right to operate and maintain a public 
service. It could also mean that existing public infrastructure can be used. Contrary 
to a concession, a lease contract also gives the right to operate and maintain a 
public service, but the municipality is still responsible for the investments. In turn, 
the concessionaire has to pay either a fixed or variable remuneration (Heim, 
2015a).     
 
Rights-of-way contracts play an important role in the remunicipalisation of 
distribution grids as the connection of citizens to energy networks is only possible 
through mains laid below public streets (Heim, 2015a). Rights-of-way contracts in 
the electricity and gas sectors are governed by section 46 of the German Energy 
Industry Act. These are “contracts between energy utilities and municipalities on 
the use of public roads for installation and operation of mains that form part of an 
energy supply grid for general supply in a municipal area” (section 46 (2) German 
Energy Industry Act). With the amendment of the German Energy Industry Act in 
2005, rights-of-way contracts no longer govern the transfer of supply rights in a 
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municipal area, but only the transfer of rights-of-way. Furthermore, the municipal 
authority is no longer responsible for determining the basic supplier. 
 
With the amendment to the German Energy Industry Act in 2005, connection and 
supply obligations now directly arise from this act: The grid operator is only obliged 
to connect final consumers, peer or downstream electricity and gas supply grids as 
well as lines, generation and storage facilities to its grid on certain terms and 
conditions (section 17 (1) German Energy Industry Act). Moreover, grid operators 
must publish general terms and conditions for grid connection in municipal areas 
in which they operate energy supply grids for the general supply of final 
consumers and connect anybody to the grid on these terms and conditions 
(section 18 (1) German Energy Industry Act). The same applies to grid access 
(section 20 German Energy Industry Act). 
 
The basic supplier is the energy utility that supplies the greatest number of 
domestic customers in a grid area of general supply (section 36 (2) German 
Energy Industry Act). Every three years, the grid operator must identify the basic 
supplier in a grid area and notify the competent authority accordingly (section 36 
(2) German Energy Industry Act). In case of termination of a rights-of-way 
contract, the current concessionaire is obliged to surrender the distribution 
facilities necessary for grid operation to the new concessionaire, i.e. the new 
energy utility, against payment of an economically adequate fee (section 46 (2) 
German Energy Industry Act).  
 
Rights-of-way contracts do not specify what service the energy utility is to provide, 
who the recipient of the service is nor at what price the services are provided. The 
contracts do not specify an obligation to connect consumers or other energy 
utilities to the electricity or gas grid or to supply them with energy; as a 
consequence, prices for services are not determined either. The concessionaire 
(grid operator) is not necessarily identical to the basic supplier in terms of function. 
The operator of an energy supply grid is only responsible for distributing electricity 
or gas and operating, maintaining and, if applicable, expending the supply grid 
(section 3 German Energy Industry Act), but not for supplying a specific area. 
Supply of a specific area lies in the hands of the basic supplier, i.e. the energy 
utility that uses the grid operator’s supply grid for supplying energy to customers. 
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Consequently, it is the grid area that is of relevance, not the municipal area. Thus, 
there is no connection between rights-of-way contracts or concession contracts 
and energy supply. 
 
According to section 48 (3) of the German Energy Industry Act, energy companies, 
including grid owner companies, who have signed rights-of-way contracts with 
municipalities are obliged to pay concession levies to municipalities. The basis of 
the permissible amount of the concession levy is the German Concession Tax 
Ordinance. Section 2 (2) of the German Concession Tax Ordinance sets maximum 
amounts per kilowatt hour, based on the number of inhabitants of a municipality. 
The energy company is free to charge concession levies below the maximum 
amounts. For special contract customers, the German Concession Tax Ordinance 
also admits deviating conditions (Heil, 2018).  
 
Overall, rights-of-way or concession contracts have significant economic 
importance for municipalities and private energy companies. Whereas 
municipalities in Germany charge a concession levy of about 6 billion €, the grid 
operators demand use-of-system charges of approximately 20 billion € per year 
(Heim, 2015a). 
 
1.4.4 Concession award process 
 
According to German energy law, rights-of-way or concession contracts are 
generally restricted to a term of no longer than 20 years (section 46 (2) German 
Energy Industry Act). When such a contract expires, municipalities will carry out a 
formal concession procedure to determine the future owner of the electricity and/or 
gas grid. Often, public companies compete with private companies in such 
procedures.  
 
Before carrying out a concession award process, the municipality should decide 
whether it wishes to carry out a conventional concession award process or to 
request cooperation models in order to remunicipalise the grid. The choice of a 
cooperation partner can already be made before the concession award process 
(two-stage procedure) or connected to it (one-step procedure) (DStGB, 2017). The 
concession award process is subject to regulation (section 46 German Energy 
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Industry Act) and periodically competition for the grids is intended (DStGB et al., 
2013). Due to the dominant position of the municipalities with regard to rights-of-
way contracts, the concession award process is also subject to antitrust law 
forcing the municipalities to have a transparent and non-discriminatory procedure. 
Even municipal companies may not be given preferential treatment 
(Bundesgerichtshof, 2013). However, the German Act against Restraints of 
Competition is not applicable to rights-of-way contracts and concession 
procedures as section 46 of the German Energy Industry Act conclusively governs 
all relevant issues and the municipality acts as an offeror (Kermel, 2012).  
 
According to section 46 (3) of the German Energy Industry Act, municipalities have 
to announce the expiry of their electricity or gas rights-of-way contracts at the 
latest two years in advance and to publish their announcement in the German 
Federal Gazette and the Official Journal of the European Union.  
 
The process of granting a concession is divided into a series of steps (DStGB, 
2017): 
 
• All potential concessionaires are requested to provide evidence of their 
fundamental suitability to operate the grid 
• Suitable potential concessionaires are asked to submit indicative offers 
• Individual discussions are held with the tenderers 
• A request for final offers to be submitted is made 
• Choice of the best offer by applying defined selection criteria 
• Approval of the decision by the municipal council 
In principle, the concession award procedure comprises two steps. First, the 
municipality grants a concession to an energy company, i.e. the municipality and 
the energy company enter into a rights-of-way contract. The rights-of-way contract 
governs the right of the energy company to use the public ground and the duty to 
pay the concession levy in return. With regard to the choice of an energy 
company, the municipality has to take the objectives of section 1 of the German 
Energy Industry Act into account. Thus, a safe, reasonably-priced, consumer-
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friendly, efficient and ecologically harmless public supply of electricity and gas, 
which is increasingly based on renewable energy, is aimed at (sections 1 and 46 
(4) German Energy Industry Act).  
 
Second, in case the rights-of-way contract is granted to a new concessionaire, it 
has to buy the grid from the former concessionaire at an adequate remuneration 
(section 46 German Energy Industry Act). 
 
After having conducted a transparent and non-discriminatory concession process 
according to section 46 (2) of the German Energy Industry Act and made the 
decision in favour of the cooperation company between the municipality and a 
private energy company, the rights-of-way contract between the municipality and 
the cooperation company could be closed. Then, the cooperation company 
purchases the energy grid from the former concessionaire and operates it. With 
regard to the operation of the grid, several types of cooperation models are 
possible (DStGB, 2017).    
 
However, cooperation companies in Germany are subject to German and 
European Antitrust Law as well as the law of the home country of the parties if 
they fulfill certain requirements with regard to the turnover and market shares of 
the undertakings concerned. They may be subject to merger control as well as to 
the prohibition on cartels (Heim, 2015a). 
 
1.4.5 Regulation 
 
From the perspective of the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways, the purpose of regulation is to establish 
fair and effective competition in the supply of electricity and gas. In order to 
achieve these goals, the German Federal Network Agency has to ensure non-
discriminatory third-party access to energy networks and to monitor the use-of-
systems charges levied by distribution network operators (Bundesnetzagentur, 
2018a).  
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In general, energy policy in Germany is developed and implemented at the federal 
and regional level. Within the government, the responsibility for energy policy is 
divided between the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy and the 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. 
Since 2014, the responsibility for the power sector has been mainly concentrated 
in the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, with the exception of 
nuclear safety and climate protection. On the federal level, the German power 
sector is chiefly regulated by the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, 
Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways, and by the German Federal Cartel 
Office. Both authorities are assigned to the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
The power to regulate the power sector arises from the German Energy Industry 
Act (section 29 et seq. German Energy Industry Act). The Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways is 
responsible for the development of the electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal, 
and railway markets. This comprises regulation of competition and unbundling of 
the electricity and gas transmission and distribution grids. Thus, the German 
Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and 
Railways ensures non-discriminatory network access and controls the use-of-
system charges levied by the transmission system operators and distributers. 
Furthermore, in Germany 11 state regulatory authorities exist and they also play 
an important role in the regulation of the energy sector. They are also responsible 
for the regulation of revenues. In general, grids covering more than one state and 
networks with more than 100,000 customers are regulated by the Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways, others by the 
state regulatory authorities. The Federal Cartel Office is charged with ensuring 
market competition in Germany, primarily through the control of abusive practices 
by dominant companies. On the federal level, the cartel authorities and civil courts 
address allegations of excessive rates for end customers in their states 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2018b).  
 
1.4.6 Incentive regulation of electricity and gas networks  
 
In contrast to the majority of sectors with competition in Germany as a free market 
economy, a few sectors like electricity and gas grids are natural monopolies, in 
which competition is limited or does not exist (Lichter, 2015). However, the 
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operation of energy networks is a capital-intensive business and the network 
operators need a long-term planning horizon as well as reliable economic 
framework conditions for investments. An important feature of the German 
regulation system is that the costs of grids and thus the use-of-system charges 
vary from one distribution territory to another (Bayer, 2015).  
 
With the specific regulatory approach known as incentive regulation, the German 
Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and 
Railways prevents network operators from making monopoly profits, and cares for 
fairly calculated prices for access to electricity and gas networks in Germany in 
favour of the customers. As there is no ultimate regulatory approach for regulated 
sectors, the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways is continuously improving the incentive 
regulation approach for use-of-system charges (Bundesnetzagentur, 2018c). In 
contrast to a pure cost-based approach, incentive regulation means that the 
German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post 
and Railways forces the distribution network operators to operate their grids 
efficiently and provides incentives to reduce unnecessary costs for the future by 
allowing them to collect efficiency gains (section 21a German Energy Industry 
Act). Section 21a of the German Energy Industry Act and the German Incentive 
Regulation Ordinance constitute the legal basis of the periodically performed 
incentive regulation, the determination of the revenue cap and finally the network 
charges. According to section 3 (2) of the German Incentive Regulation 
Ordinance, a regulatory period normally takes five years. The revenue cap and 
finally the network charges of the distribution network operator are calculated as 
follows (Bundesnetzagentur, 2018c): 
 
1. Calculation and examination of the cost base according to section 6 (1) of 
the German Incentive Regulation Ordinance in the third year before the 
incentive regulation period, the so-called base year.  
 
2. Determination of the potential for efficiency gains by comparing efficiency 
levels between distribution network operators and using these for 
reductions in revenue. 
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3. Determination of the individual revenue cap based on the verified costs and 
the results of the efficiency comparison. 
 
4. Determination of the network charges based on the individual revenue cap. 
     
Sections 4 to 10 of the German Electricity and Gas Network Charges Ordinances 
regulate the cost categories that are part of the network charges, especially 
operating costs like personnel expenses, borrowing costs, etc. from the profit and 
loss account and imputed costs like depreciations, trade taxes, etc. Furthermore, 
the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, 
Post and Railways determines the return on equity rates as investments in grids 
are essential. Operating electricity or gas grids offers relatively stable returns on 
equity (Heim, 2015a). The current rates are 6.91 percent for new facilities 
(capitalised after 1st January 2006) and 5.12 percent for old facilities (capitalised 
before 1st January 2006). The rates reflect the interest rates in the capital markets 
and consist of a base rate (2.49 percent), based on the ten-year average for risk-
free investments, and an appropriate risk premium as a compensation for the risk 
that arises from the investment in grids (3.15 percent). The application of the 
return on equity rates is limited to a maximum of 40 percent of the value of 
operating assets. Exceeding amounts are subject to the base rate. Overall, the 
rates guarantee that the distribution network operators are in a position to take on 
the large investments required for the energy transition. Thus, they will remain in 
place for the duration of each five-year regulatory period (Bundesnetzagentur, 
2018c).  
 
1.5 Research motivation 
 
The researcher works in the accounting department of a private energy company 
in the federal state of Hesse in Germany. In the past few years, he has supported 
several concession award procedures that have led to the establishment of new 
grid owner companies in the central and southern parts of Germany. Depending 
on the aims and ideas of municipalities and the private energy company, different 
structures of grid owner companies have evolved. Moreover, these structures are 
influenced by different underlying business objectives, energy-economic policies, 
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financial agreements, accounting rules and other relevant factors, which can lead 
to highly complex cooperation models (Kunze, 2012).  
 
During several founding processes, the researcher concluded that decisions on 
firm size, ownership structure and legal form play an important role for 
municipalities and private energy companies. On the one hand, these critical 
factors are regularly part of a company’s founding process. On the other, German 
municipal law focuses on firm size, ownership structure and legal form of 
municipal companies and requires that economic activity or participation of the 
municipality must be particularly subject to the economic principle (sections 121 
and 122 Hessian Municipal Code). However, the relationships between these 
factors and the financial performance of grid owner companies seem to be widely 
unresearched. Accordingly, it is difficult to recommend a particular structure of a 
grid owner company in order to meet the requirements of the municipal law. 
Furthermore, a comparison between different German grid owner companies is 
difficult as there is no register or compilation that comprises all grid owner 
companies with their characteristics yet. The fact that many recently renewed 
rights-of-way contracts between municipalities and private energy companies 
contain options to establish grid owner companies (Heim, 2015a) also inspires the 
researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the new phenomenon known as grid 
owner companies in Germany.   
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1.6 Purpose of the research 
 
This research focuses on the new practical phenomenon known as grid owner 
companies in Germany from a financial and legal perspective. It aims to identify 
grid owner companies in Germany that were founded in the past few years and to 
analyse the impact of a grid owner company’s firm size, ownership structure and 
legal form on firm performance, measured by the ROA, i.e. the return on assets 
ratio, by applying regression analysis.  
 
Municipalities and private energy companies in Germany should be supported by 
financial analyses when they are faced with the strategic decision of whether they 
should renew their rights-of way contracts or they should establish a grid owner 
company. As large numbers of recently renewed rights-of-way contracts between 
municipalities and energy companies contain options to establish grid owner 
companies (Kunze, 2012), a quantitative aid to decision-making is needed. 
According to German municipal law, for example section 121 (1a) of the Hessian 
Municipal Code, economic activity or participation of the municipality must be 
particularly subject to the economic principle. Hence, profitability of grid owner 
companies is not only an important aspect for private energy companies, but also 
for municipalities. However, this research is not a normative, regulatory analysis 
with regard to the question of whether services of general interest should be 
provided by private or public suppliers. Furthermore, the thesis does not analyse 
the impact of financial performance or design of German grid owner companies on 
the consumer prices for electricity or gas as they are determined by the suppliers 
of energy. 
 
The theoretical foundations as well as the empirical findings should be the basis 
for practical implications and recommendations. Beyond academic interest, the 
research on grid owner companies might provide municipalities, energy 
companies, business associations, research institutes, managers, consultants and 
policymakers with meaningful information on the new phenomenon. 
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1.7 Research objectives and research questions  
 
The purpose of this research as described in the previous section may be 
translated into the following research objectives:  
 
Research objective 1: To determine the population of German grid owner com-
panies. 
 
Research objective 2: To analyse the relationships between firm size, ownership 
structure and legal form as critical drivers of firm performance of grid owner 
companies in Germany. 
 
Research objective 3: To recommend an optimal design for profitable German grid 
owner companies. 
 
Corresponding to the research objectives above, the following research questions 
have to be addressed:  
 
Research question 1: What is the population of German grid owner companies?  
 
Research question 2: How do firm size, ownership structure and legal form affect 
the firm performance of German grid owner companies? 
 
Research question 3: What is the optimal design for profitable grid owner 
companies in Germany?  
 
The research on German grid owner companies has to be distinguished from the 
research on the so-called public-private partnerships. According to Boardman, 
Siemiatycki & Vining (2016), a public-private partnership is a long-term contract 
between a government agency and a consortium of private sector firms that 
comprises the provision of various project services and at least some private 
capital by the private sector partners. Comparable to a grid owner company, the 
private sector partners establish a special-purpose vehicle as a distinct legal entity 
to deliver the services and to limit the financial liability of the parent companies. In 
general, the private consortium is responsible for the construction, financing, 
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operation and maintenance of the new established infrastructure (Boardman et al., 
2016). Whereas public-private partnerships are a worldwide phenomenon, grid 
owner companies are a typical German phenomenon in the context of rights-of-
way contracts.  
 
1.8 Significance of the thesis 
 
Remunicipalisation of energy grids in the context of a rights-of-way award process 
is an extremely practice-relevant topic (Essing & Kürten, 2015). This thesis makes 
enormous contributions to the practical and theoretical research on German grid 
owner companies.  
 
First, local distribution networks owned by grid owner companies and run by 
distribution network operators are important for all citizens, enterprises and 
institutions as they connect customers to the grids and ensure that the citizens, 
enterprises and institutions are provided with vital energies like electricity, gas or 
water. Whereas distribution network operators are responsible for maintenance, 
repair and service of grids, grid owner companies own distribution networks, 
connect new development areas and make investments in grids. This also 
comprises investments in new grid technologies like smart grids and electric 
vehicle charging stations. Thus, grid owner companies with their local distribution 
networks are an essential part of a citizen’s everyday life in Germany and 
important for the development of technologies providing public services.  
 
Second, the phenomenon of grid owner companies is of high financial importance 
for municipalities and energy companies. Municipalities in Germany charge a 
concession levy of about 6 billion euros and grid operators demand use-of-system 
charges of approximately 20 billion euros per year (Heim, 2015a). Often, a rights-
of-way contract is awarded to a grid owner company by the municipality and the 
grids are leased to a grid operator. The lease payments of the grid operator 
usually represent the source of income of a grid owner company. Finally, the net 
income of a grid owner company is distributed to its shareholders or partners, 
namely municipalities and energy companies. In general, municipal budgets profit 
from the dividends of a grid owner company. The dividends of a grid owner 
company could contribute to the reduction of municipal budget deficits or they 
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could be offset with the losses of other municipal activities like public 
transportation, energy supply, port and airport (Rosenberger, 2012), and reduce 
the tax burden of the municipality (Wagner & Berlo, 2015). By its grid construction 
activities, provided by local companies, a grid owner company also contributes to 
regional added value. Furthermore, private or public energy companies profit from 
the dividends of a grid owner company. Although large numbers of energy 
companies as former concessionaires lost rights-of-way contracts in favour of grid 
owner companies (Berlo & Wagner, 2013b), they still benefit partially from the 
dividends paid by grid owner companies as shareholders or partners. Thus, 
energy companies stabilise their income and partially compensate for the profits 
from lost rights-of-way contracts.  
 
Third, the phenomenon of grid owner companies is of high political importance for 
municipalities. They do not only benefit financially from the income of a grid owner 
company. They also regain control over their local infrastructure. Often, 
municipalities had lost control or general influence over their infrastructure and 
energy issues (Becker, 2017). Whereas energy companies as former 
concessionaires were responsible for the investment decisions on local distribution 
networks, municipalities regain influence on local infrastructure through the boards 
of grid owner companies. Besides, grid owner companies offer the possibility to 
better coordinate the maintenance and investment activities with the municipalities 
(Heim, 2015a).   
 
Fourth, the research on grid owner companies is also driven by current policy 
debates. Local distribution networks are essential for the integration of renewable 
energies and other decentralised energy types such as electricity produced from 
combined heat and power units. The development of renewable energies and the 
atomic disaster in Fukushima in 2011 led to further political initiatives to phase out 
the use of nuclear energy, to increase the percentage of renewables in energy 
consumption and to remunicipalise energy activities (Becker, 2017). By the end of 
2050, 80 percent of the German energy consumption should be provided by 
renewables (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2013). More than 
95 percent of the electricity produced by renewable energies is supplied by local 
grids and therefore a critical factor of success (Kinkel, 2014). Therefore, local 
distribution networks owned by grid owner companies are the backbone of a turna-
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round in German energy policy towards sustainable energy systems (Wagner & 
Berlo, 2015).  
 
Fifth, local grids owned by grid owner companies play an important role in the 
expansion of broadband supply in Germany. According to the German Act to 
facilitate the deployment of high-speed digital networks, grid owner companies 
generally have to install glass fibre optic cables when they invest in grids, 
especially when a new residential area is developed. By this, the available 
opportunities for synergies in broadband expansion are better used. Thus, local 
distribution networks owned by grid owner companies are not only the backbone 
of a turnaround in the German energy policy towards sustainable energy systems. 
They are also the backbone of a turnaround in the German broadband supply 
policy towards a nationwide broadband supply in Germany. Thus, the research is 
also interesting for policymakers in the telecommunications sector, the Federal 
Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways, 
German telecommunication enterprises, and broadband customers. 
 
To the researcher’s best knowledge, this thesis is the first comprehensive 
theoretical and practical study that is solely dedicated to the new phenomenon of 
grid owner companies in Germany. It provides fundamental financial insights as no 
one has studied the financial aspects and causal relationships of German grid 
owner companies before. Whereas authors like Heim (2015a) and Tugendreich 
(2014) have described German grid owner companies, studied their legal 
foundations and compared different cooperation models, it is the first time that the 
financial dimension of German grid owner companies has been empirically 
researched. An empirical analysis is conducted that addresses the relationships 
between firm size, ownership structure, legal form and firm performance of 
German grid owner companies. Although for example the Hessian Municipal Law 
requires municipal participation by grid owner companies to adhere to the 
economic principle, no one before has analysed the influence of firm size, 
ownership structure and legal form on the financial performance of German grid 
owner companies.    
 
By providing a new approach to study the phenomenon of German grid owner 
companies from a financial perspective, a new contribution to knowledge is made. 
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Narrative studies are brought together and empirical analyses on the financial 
performance with its critical drivers are carried out.  
 
As German municipal law focuses on firm size, ownership structure and legal form 
of municipal companies and requires that economic activity or participation of the 
municipality must be particularly subject to the economic principle (sections 121 
and 122 Hessian Municipal Code), the economic and financial situation of grid 
owner companies is of general interest. Hence, German municipal law requires 
that grid owner companies meet the economic principle. Thus, the financial 
performance of German grid owner companies seems to be worth investigating. 
Furthermore, the general understanding of German grid owner companies is 
widened.   
 
Based on a systematic literature review, the underlying research is also driven by 
research gaps in the existing theoretical and empirical literature. In general, only a 
few authors have addressed grid owner companies as an object of research and 
the characteristics of existing grid owner companies. This is remarkable as grid 
owner companies have a considerable financial and political impact on 
municipalities, energy companies and other stakeholders. The existing 
contributions to the literature mainly focus on the legal framework of grid owner 
companies, the analysis of different cooperation models and the discussion of 
individual German grid owner companies. Despite the up-to-date nature and the 
financial dimension of the topic, the research on German grid owner companies is 
rather scant. First, the diverse population of German grid owner companies with its 
chronological emergence and geographical dissemination has not been 
determined yet. This also comprises the analysis of different legal forms of 
German grid owner companies. Second, although municipal law requires that grid 
owner companies meet the economic principle, for example sections 121 and 122 
of the Hessian Municipal Code, financial aspects like the performance of German 
grid owner companies and their critical drivers have not been the subject of 
research yet. In this context, the relationship between different critical drivers and 
the firm performance of grid owner companies is of special interest. As the 
economic principle refers to high financial or economic performance, the critical 
drivers and causal relationships between these drivers and firm performance of 
German grid owner companies need further empirical investigation.  
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Furthermore, the findings of the thesis will not only be unique; they will also have 
significant practical and policy implications. 
   
For the first time, the total population of German grid owner companies will be 
determined and data on important characteristics of grid owner companies will be 
gathered. This comprises federal state, legal form, date of foundation, divisions, 
balance sheet and profit and loss account items as well as other characteristics. 
Thus, the distribution and regional concentration of grid owner companies in 
Germany as well as comparisons between different types of grid owner companies 
are possible. According to German municipal law, for example section 121 (1a) of 
the Hessian Municipal Code, economic activity or participation of the municipality 
must be particularly subject to the economic principle. Hence, profitability of grid 
owner companies is not only an important aspect for private energy companies, 
but also for municipalities. As a violation of the economic principle might result in a 
violation of municipal law, the findings of the thesis are of high importance for 
municipalities and their supervisory authorities. Overall, the knowledge of the 
population of German grid owner companies facilitates further research on these 
companies.  
 
The financial performance of grid owner companies is the object of the research. 
Especially, the relationships between critical drivers and financial performance of 
grid owner companies will be analysed by regression analyses. For the first time, 
statistical methods are applied to German grid owner companies. Based on the 
philosophical stance of positivism, for the first time an existing technique, namely 
multiple linear regression analysis using ordinary least squares, will be applied to 
sample data from 2010 to 2015 in order to analyse the relationships between the 
firm size, the ownership structure, the legal form and performance of German grid 
owner companies. Overall, an existing technique is applied to a new context and 
the applicability of regression techniques to the new phenomenon of German grid 
owner companies is shown.  
 
Better and comprehensive information about the population as well as on the 
causes and effects with regard to the financial performance of grid owner 
companies are essential to municipalities when they are faced with the strategic 
decision of whether to renew their rights-of-way contracts or to establish a grid 
  
 34 
owner company. As many recently renewed rights-of-way contracts between 
municipalities and energy companies contain options to establish grid owner 
companies (Kunze, 2012), a quantitative aid to decision-making of municipalities 
as well as energy companies will be made by regression analyses.  
 
The knowledge of the population, their characteristics and the relationships 
between firm size, legal form, ownership structure and firm performance of 
German grid owner companies enable municipalities and energy companies to 
take well-informed decisions on the foundation and the design of grid owner 
companies. Through this thesis, they are provided with an analysis of the impacts 
of their choices of firm size, legal form and ownership structure on the financial 
performance of German grid owner companies. Moreover, the knowledge of 
critical drivers of firm performance of German grid owner companies facilitates the 
approval decisions of regulatory authorities. According to German municipal law, 
for example section 127a of the Hessian Municipal Code, municipalities have to 
submit their decisions on the establishment, the first-time participation as well as 
the substantial increase in participation in an enterprise to the supervision of local 
authorities. The written notification has to be made without delay no later than six 
weeks before the realisation. From the notification, the supervision of local 
authorities has to identify whether the relevant legal requirements have been met 
(section 127a Hessian Municipal Code). Therefore, the notification has to contain 
the relevant supporting documents, for example whether the requirements of 
sections 121 and 122 of the Hessian Municipal Code are met. As these sections 
require that economic activity or participation of the municipality must be 
particularly subject to the economic principle (sections 121 and 122 Hessian 
Municipal Code), the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis may support 
municipalities in preparing the notification and demonstrating that the economic 
principle is met. Furthermore, it can be necessary to include decisions of municipal 
bodies, draft contracts or advisory opinions (Dietlein & Ogorek, 2018). Likewise, 
advisory opinions can be based on the findings of the thesis and finally supervision 
of local authorities can be convinced of the financial performance of relevant 
German grid owner companies. In general, the findings of the thesis will support 
legislators and supervision of local authorities in assessing whether a grid owner 
company meets the economic principle or not. By the ROA a valid measure of 
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financial performance is given and by the firm size, ownership structure and legal 
form three critical drivers or indicators are presented.  
 
As an original contribution to knowledge, the findings of this thesis will also create 
transparency and reveal which models of German grid owner companies currently 
prevail. The chronological development of established grid owner companies is 
presented. Moreover, the geographical distribution of German grid owner 
companies shows which grid owner companies already exist in the respective 
region. This knowledge offers the possibility to think about cooperations with 
existing grid owner companies in order to establish large grid owner companies.  
 
Beyond academic interest, the research on grid owner companies might provide 
municipalities, energy companies, business associations, research institutes, 
managers, consultants and policymakers with meaningful information on the new 
phenomenon. As the economic principle plays an important role with regard to grid 
owner companies, the question of what factors determine profitability might be one 
of high importance for researchers and practitioners like investors, managers, etc. 
In particular, municipalities that are faced with the strategic decision of whether 
they should renew their rights-of-way contracts or establish a grid owner company 
will profit from the findings. The research supports their decision-making 
processes. Furthermore, energy companies could profit from the findings of the 
thesis as they also adhere to the economic principle. 
 
The thesis does not analyse the impact of financial performance or design of 
German grid owner companies on the consumer prices for electricity or gas as 
they are determined by the suppliers of energy. However, as the financial 
performance or design of German grid owner companies might influence the use-
of-system charges and thus consumer prices, the findings of the thesis might be of 
interest for German consumers of electricity or gas supplied by local grids.  
 
Overall, the thesis provides municipalities and energy companies with the 
necessary information to assess which model of grid owner company suits them 
best and what their financial impact is. Moreover, recommendations on the optimal 
design of grid owner companies are made.  
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1.9 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the significant and practice-relevant topic of 
German grid owner companies combined with a contextualisation focusing on the 
economic and legal environment. The thesis is divided into four further chapters. 
Chapter 2 contains a systematic review of the existing literature on grid owner 
companies as well as on the relationships between firm size, ownership structure, 
legal form and firm performance. Moreover, the research hypotheses are derived. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the research methodology and the research methods. 
The most common research designs and research philosophies are discussed and 
the final research design is presented. Then, the chosen methods and types of 
data as well as the data gathering process and data analysis procedures are 
discussed. In Chapter 4, the empirical findings are reported and analysed. Based 
on the findings, chapter 5 offers a discussion of the essential findings and future 
research directions. This includes conclusions and recommendations on German 
grid owner companies.  
 
In general, the research process is structured as follows (Field, 2013): 
 
Figure 2: The research process  
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1.10 Summary 
 
• As a consequence of the expiration of thousands of rights-of-way contracts 
in Germany, grid owner companies have become a new phenomenon in the 
German energy sector. 
 
• Remunicipalisation of municipal energy grids in the context of a rights-of-
way award process is an extremely practice-relevant topic. 
 
• The financial performance and political impact of German grid owner 
companies is of high importance for municipalities, energy companies and 
other stakeholders.   
 
• As more than 95 percent of the electricity produced by renewable energies 
is supplied with local grids, grid owner companies with their local 
distribution networks are the backbone of a turnaround in German energy 
policy towards sustainable energy systems. 
 
• This thesis is the first comprehensive theoretical and practical study that is 
solely dedicated to the new phenomenon of grid owner companies in 
Germany and provides fundamental financial insights. No one has studied 
financial aspects and causal relationships of German grid owner companies 
before. 
 
• Better and comprehensive information about the population as well as on 
the causes and effects of the financial performance of grid owner 
companies are essential to municipalities and energy companies and 
required by municipal law, too. This comprises the relationships between 
firm size, ownership structure, legal form and financial performance of 
German grid owner companies.  
 
• The thesis provides municipalities and energy companies with the 
necessary information to assess which model of grid owner company suits 
them best and what the financial impacts are.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The following systematic literature review focuses on the new phenomenon known 
as grid owner companies in Germany. This chapter gives an account of the 
literature with regard to German grid owner companies, and is divided into two 
main parts. The first section discusses the phenomenon of grid owner companies. 
The second section turns to the concepts of firm size, ownership structure, legal 
form and firm performance. The focus is on the measurement of the influence of 
firm size, ownership structure and legal form on firm performance of German grid 
owner companies. Based on the findings in the literature, the research hypotheses 
are derived.  
 
As many grid owner companies were only established within the last few years, 
the scientific endeavour of describing and analysing the phenomenon of grid 
owner companies is in its early stages. As with any new phenomenon, the first 
phase of research is often descriptive and seeking to categorise in some way. This 
literature review is a systematic, explicit and reproducible method for identifying, 
evaluating and interpreting the existing body of recorded work produced by 
researchers, scholars and practitioners (Fink, 2013). 
 
At first glance, the systematic literature review appears to be more author-based 
than theme-based. On the one hand, the research on grid owner companies and 
in particular on the relationships between firm size, ownership structure and firm 
performance of German grid owner companies is new territory. Therefore, the 
systematic literature review mainly analyses narrative or descriptive work of the 
few authors who conduct research on grid owner companies in the context of 
remunicipalisation. On the other hand, the literature on firm performance and the 
relationships between several critical drivers and firm performance is manifold. 
However, no one has applied the concept of firm performance to German grid 
owner companies or researched the relationships between firm size, ownership 
structure and firm performance of German grid owner companies to date.  
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2.2 Aims 
 
The aim of the following systematic literature review is to undertake a systematic 
review of academic and practice research from 2010 to 2019 on the new 
phenomenon known as grid owner companies as well as on the influence of firm 
size, ownership structure and legal form on firm performance in order to support 
municipalities and energy companies in their decision-making processes.                      
 
Overall, this systematic literature review shows that grid owner companies in 
Germany are already the subject of research by academics and practitioners, but 
rather from a narrative perspective and with regard to the advantages and 
disadvantages of the process of remunicipalisation of public services. However, 
there are neither official nor informal figures on how many German municipalities 
have actually gone the way of remunicipalisation or established a grid owner 
company (Heil, 2018).  
 
Different types of grid owner companies have to be identified and their 
characteristics have to be analysed with regard to the decision-makers, i.e. 
municipalities and electricity or gas companies. This research will contribute to the 
understanding of the practical phenomenon grid owner companies from a general 
theoretical perspective. The author aims to find out whether and how German grid 
owner companies could become an attractive option for private energy companies 
and for municipalities, especially to resolve their financial problems. 
 
2.3 Grid owner companies  
 
2.3.1 Methodology of review 
 
Searches were conducted on the following four online databases: Business 
Source Ultimate, Beck-Online, Google Scholar and SSRN.  
 
Business Source Ultimate is a full-text database that contains the most important 
scholarly business journals. Beck-Online is a German legal expert database by      
C. H. Beck that is one of the oldest and most prestigious publishing houses in 
Germany (Verlag C. H. Beck, 2019).  
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In Google Scholar one can search for scholarly literature: “articles, theses, books, 
abstracts and court opinions, from academic publishers, professional societies, 
online repositories, universities and other web sites” (Google, 2019). According to 
its own statement, SSRN is a “multi-disciplinary online repository of scholarly 
research and related materials” (SSRN, 2019).  
 
The searches were conducted over a period of about 5 years (from 10th November 
2014 to 17th March 2019). 
 
Due to the fact that a grid owner company is primarily a German phenomenon, the 
search terms are mixtures of English and German words.  
 
In general, central key words which refer to the topic are: 
• grid/grid owner company (German: Netz(eigentums)gesellschaft) 
• public private partnership 
• electricity/gas 
• remunicipalisation (German: Rekommunalisierung) 
• cooperation model (German: Kooperationsmodell) 
• rights-of-way contract or concession contract (German: 
Konzessionsvertrag) 
The search for the key word “public private partnership” alone was not conducted, 
because the literature with regard to that topic is manifold and grid owner 
companies in Germany are rather linked to the key word “concession contract”. 
 
Several searches were carried out: 
 
Key words: “Public Private Partnership” and “Netzgesellschaft”  
Time: From 2010 to 2019 
Results: 42 citations (Google Scholar), 0 citations (SSRN), 11 citations (Beck-
Online) 
 
Key words: “Netzgesellschaft” und “Konzession” 
Time: From 2010 to 2019 
Results: 107 citations (Google Scholar), 0 citations (SSRN), 484 (Beck-Online) 
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Key words: “Netzgesellschaft” und “Rekommunalisierung” 
Time: From 2010 to 2019 
Results: 76 citations (Google Scholar), 0 citations (SSRN), 113 (Beck-Online) 
Key words: “Pachtmodell” und “Konzession” 
Time: From 2010 to 2019 
Results: 697 citations (Google Scholar), 0 citations (SSRN), 160 citations (Beck-
Online) 
Key words: “Remunicipalisation” 
Time: From 2010 to 2019 
Results: 12 citations (Business Source Ultimate), 6 citation (SSRN), 2 citations 
(Beck-Online) 
The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied: 
Table 1: Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Parameters Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria 
Location Germany Non-Germany 
Time Frame From 2010 to 2019 Before 2010 
Outcome Literature concerned with 
grid owner companies 
and remunicipalisation 
Literature not concerned 
with grid owner compa-
nies and remunicipalisa-
tion 
Study Type Academic and 
practitioner literature 
Newspaper articles, web-
sites 
 
The time frame from 2010 to 2019 is chosen, because before 2010 only a few 
rights-of-way contracts were phased out and only a few grid owner companies 
were established. Furthermore, literature that dates before 2010 often deals with 
the so-called unbundling of energy companies. The unbundling of energy 
companies is a legal requirement, but in most cases it is not linked to the phase 
out of rights-of-way contracts. So, it is not part of the research questions.  
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While empirical literature from studies undertaken within the last 10 years are 
generally accepted as current (Nenty, 2009), literature from classic and important 
studies in the area should also be reviewed. 
 
Newspaper articles are excluded from the search, because they do not comply 
with general quality criteria of academic or practical literature.   
 
In general, the relevance of a piece of literature to the review depends on the 
relevance of its research questions. The quality of its methodology is not an 
exclusion criterion, because otherwise the scope of literature would have been too 
narrow due to the fact that grid owner companies are a rather new phenomenon.  
 
If a grid owner company was not a new phenomenon, a systematic literature 
review with regard to English literature would be carried out by the quality 
assessment criteria of the ABS journal ranking. In general, a quality assessment 
contributes to a high degree of reliability and validity in the findings. Furthermore, 
the following systematic literature review also focuses on German literature. The 
ABS journal ranking could not be applied, because it does not include German 
literature.  
 
2.3.2 Critical analysis of literature 
 
Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer (2012) focus on the trend of going back to 
municipal utilities in the German energy system from an economic perspective. 
The remunicipalisation of energy companies is linked to the discussion of decision 
options for local authorities in Germany when concession contracts expire. After 
having explained the expression remunicipalisation and possible reasons for 
remunicipalisation, the authors analyse the economic effects of remunicipalisation 
activities. Their economic analysis shows that a general economic favourability of 
remunicipalisation does not exist. Remunicipalisation activities, for example the 
purchase of grids and their valuation, rather than cooperation models or grid 
owner companies are analysed. According to Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer 
(2012), remunicipalisation in practice could be implemented by lots of different 
legal structures, characterised by the ownership structures and the degrees of 
independence. With regard to the economic aspects of remunicipalisation, Menges 
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and Müller-Kirchenbauer (2012) point out that the question of ownership structure 
of grids, i.e. whether a private, a public or a mixed ownership structure, has less 
relevance. From their perspective, the question of whether local government 
remunicipalises or not rather depends on the costs of operating the network and 
tariff regulation.  
 
The analysis of Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer (2012) mainly contains narrative 
arguments. By referring to several empirical studies and verbal arguments, they 
examine remunicipalisation activities and their contribution to welfare. Although the 
journal article deals with economic or welfare effects, it lacks calculations or 
figures. From the empirical studies, citied by Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer 
(2012), just verbal arguments are taken, but no empirical data. Even with regard to 
their final statement that whether local government remunicipalises or not rather 
depends on the costs of operating the network and tariff regulation, no supportive 
data can be found.  
 
But with regard to the content, the statement is comprehensible. The tariffs which 
are approved by the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways represent future cash inflows. The costs 
of operating the network are the payoffs. So, the decision on whether to 
remunicipalise or not could be modeled by the cash flows in a net present value or 
an equilibrium model. However, the statement of Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer 
(2012) that the question of ownership structure has less relevance, neglects the 
owner’s influence on the cash flows. Depending on the owner’s investment 
decisions, cash inflows and cash outflows, for example administrative expenses, 
vary. In conclusion, Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer (2012) primarily focus on 
remunicipalisation as an alternative to the renewal of concession contracts and as 
a basis for grid owner companies, but not on the grid owner company itself.                      
 
Arnold (2012) describes and analyses cooperation models in the context of 
concession contracts. Although Arnold (2012) states that lots of municipalities try 
to increase public revenues and to reduce their budget deficits by purchasing or 
managing energy grids, he does not analyse any economic effects of cooperation 
models. His focus is solely on legal aspects of cooperation models as an 
alternative to concession contracts. He shows the legal boundaries of cooperation 
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models. As a basis of his analysis, Arnold (2012) provides an overview of different 
cooperation models in practice and systematises them by the degree of 
cooperation, ranging from a legal cooperation to a joint venture. He distinguishes 
and evaluates the following forms of cooperation: 
 
• Cooperation model: There is no joint company. Local government is or 
becomes the owner of an energy grid and rents it out to a private energy 
partner. In case the local government is not the owner of the grid yet, it has 
to purchase it from the former owner and it has to take the purchase price 
risk. The private energy partner operates the grid because it has got the 
relevant expert knowledge and manpower. Local government generates 
revenues from the lease payments. The lease payments are often based on 
a formula that transfers all risks, especially the operating risk, to the private 
energy company. Then, the return of local government is comparable to a 
financial investor. In practice, the lease payment formula refers to rates of 
return of the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways, either fixed or variable. According 
to Arnold (2012), the cooperation model is associated with the risk that 
either local government or a private partner tries to enforce its interests 
against the other cooperation partner, because there are no contractual 
agreements. 
    
• Joint venture with a lease contract (= grid owner company case): Local 
government establishes a joint venture with a private energy company. The 
joint venture purchases the grid from the former owner or the private energy 
company as the former owner contributes it in kind in return for corporate 
rights. Then, a lease contract is signed between the grid owner company 
and the private energy company. Moreover, the private energy company 
becomes the new distribution network operator. Arnold (2012) is of the 
opinion that, similar to the cooperation model, local government remains a 
pure financial investor, because the private partner takes all the relevant 
risks as a distribution network operator. In reality, the statement of Arnold 
(2012) can be disproved. Although local government has transferred lots of 
risks to the private partner by the lease contract, it is charged with the risk 
of a real investor, because investments in the grids are financed either by 
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capital from both partners or by borrowed capital and decisions on the 
structure of the grid have to be made. Depending on the company 
agreement and its percentage of ownership, local government eventually 
profits from the revenues of the lease contract. 
 
• Joint venture with a private partner and network operations: Local 
government and a private partner establish a company that receives the 
rights-of-way contract and operates the network, too. In this case, local 
government has the possibility to decide on local infrastructure and to profit 
from the net income as a shareholder of the company. Moreover, local 
government also bears the highest risks of all cooperation models, namely 
the owner risk and the regulatory risks of a distribution network operator in 
accordance with its percentage of ownership.  
 
• Public utility: Local government establishes a public utility with different 
segments. Beyond the role of a grid owner and a distribution network 
operator, local government tries to establish further business segments like 
supply, generation, trading and other activities. Local government has the 
opportunity to establish a company alone or together with a private partner.  
Having described different cooperation models, Arnold (2012) discusses several 
economic and legal decisions to be made with regard to cooperation models. First, 
he analyses the question of which partner provides which part of equity, 
depending on the legal structure of an agreement. He concludes that partnerships 
and private limited companies offer almost unlimited freedom of contract. Second, 
Arnold (2012) analyses the allocation of risks and chances between the partners. 
In general, the partners bear the risks and chances of cooperation according to 
their percentage of ownership. Nevertheless, an almost full release from risks is 
often found in practice by the provision of a fixed guaranteed or a minimum 
guaranteed rate of return on the equity for municipalities. The duration of the 
guarantee either depends on the duration of the lease contract or the period of 
regulation. Arnold (2012) makes clear that the provision of a fixed guaranteed or a 
minimum guaranteed rate of return is an important decision-making factor when 
municipalities have to make a decision on who becomes partner of a cooperation 
model. Unfortunately, the author solely describes without giving best practice 
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examples or calculations of different rates of return. Third, Arnold (2012) deals 
with the influence of both partners, i.e. the allocation of voting rights in different 
boards of a company, like shareholders’ meeting, supervisory board, etc., and the 
rights to appoint management and board members. Whereas in Germany, 
shareholders of private limited companies are almost free in designing board 
structures, the German Stock Corporation Act is quite restrictive, because the 
voting rights are linked to the percentage of shares. The idea behind this is that 
the influence of a single partner should be in accordance with its percentage of 
ownership. Finally, Arnold (2012) states that in practice, local government often 
has the majority in boards of a joint venture, but is relieved of risks by the private 
partner. As before, he does not prove his arguments by statistical data, etc. While 
analysing cooperation models from a legal perspective, Arnold (2012) always 
refers to the arm’s length principle, especially when discussing rates of return and 
the allocation of voting rights.  
 
The practitioner Rosenberger (2012) deals with the tax aspects of rights-of-way 
contracts. He presents the tax effects of rights-of-way contracts in general. His 
emphasis is also on the foundation of grid owner companies by municipalities and 
private partners. Rosenberger (2012) examines different legal structures of grid 
owner companies, especially private limited companies and partnerships. 
According to him, the most important criteria with regard to the choice of the legal 
structure of a grid owner company are contingent liabilities, leadership 
opportunities, participation in net income and net loss, capital structure, tax effects 
and obligations to disclosure. Rosenberger’s qualitative or narrative contribution 
belongs to the legal and tax literature. Concrete financial figures of practical 
examples of grid owner companies are lacking. 
 
The narrative study of Chen (2012) has two primary purposes. Beginning with the 
statement that the supply of power is an important task of municipalities in 
Germany, it mainly focuses on possible forms of organisation of energy companies 
with municipal participation from a legal perspective. The author scrutinises the 
different laws and legal requirements, for example European law, energy law, etc., 
that are relevant for semi-municipal entities. Chen (2012) emphasises the 
municipal freedom of choice of the legal structure and discusses semi-municipal 
organisations with the legal structure “GmbH” (limited liability company) and “AG” 
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(public limited company). He also analyses the various duties as a distribution 
network operator and pricing requirements in the energy sector. Due to the fact 
that Chen’s work is a doctorate in law, financial aspects are hardly addressed. 
Neither grid owner companies nor their financial aspects are part of Chen’s work. 
However, grid owner companies could belong to the category of semi-municipal 
entities. So, they could also have legal structures like private limited companies or 
public limited companies and at least the results of Chen’s doctoral thesis 
concerning legal structures could be applied to grid owner companies. Finally, 
financial data or even key figures of companies, especially grid owner companies, 
are missing.  
 
In his narrative work, Kunze (2012) analyses the fundamental options for local 
authorities when they are faced with the situation that their rights-of-way contracts 
will phase out. The focus of his work is on the aims of municipal activity and he 
also addresses the potential risks that are associated with municipal engagement. 
Kunze (2012) makes clear that the decision is not a Boolean operator. In fact, 
there are many forms of cooperation which are associated with different risks and 
chances. On the one hand, municipalities could sign a rights-of-way contract with 
the former distribution network operator and on the other, local authorities could 
find a new distribution network operator. Furthermore, the author presents three 
common basic cooperation models:  
 
a) Joint venture with a private partner and network operations: Local 
government and a private partner found a company that receives the rights-
of-way contract and operates the network, too. In this case, local 
government has the possibility to decide on local infrastructure and to profit 
from the net income as a shareholder of the company. 
  
b) Joint venture with a private partner, but without network operations: Local 
government and a private partner found a company that receives the rights-
of-way contract, but does not operate the network. The network is operated 
by a third company. Compared to a), local government has less possibility 
to decide on local infrastructure and to profit from the net income as an 
owner of the company.  
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c) Joint venture with a lease contract (= grid owner company case): Local 
government founds a company together with an energy company. These 
companies have primarily an ownership function. The net assets are sold 
from the previous grid operator or grid owner to the new grid owner 
company and then the grid operator leases them back. Compared to the 
other models above, in the case of a grid owner company, municipalities 
are faced with the lowest risk. As far as the lease payment is more than the 
total costs of the company, the net income is positive and municipalities can 
benefit from the company’s payout.    
Kunze (2012) points out that the power of influence of the distribution network 
operator on the energy price is very low. The price consists of different 
components. According to Kunze (2012), generation and distribution amount to 38 
percent, net cost is about 24 percent and the remaining 38 percent are taxes. The 
distribution network operator can only affect the network costs. Although Kunze 
(2012) uses a theoretical or narrative method to analyse the fundamental 
cooperation models, he does not refer to any empirical grid owner company. So, 
his work remains a conceptual description of possible models. Neither financial 
data nor economic effects of grid owner companies are discussed.  
 
After having presented the basics of local energy supply and developed 
arguments for the municipalisation of grids, the study of Meyer-Gohde et al. (2013) 
examines the financial consequences of remunicipalisation measures in the 
German electricity sector. According to the authors, the grid-connect electricity 
sector has got the largest potential for remunicipalisation, because it is a profitable 
sector, and there was a significant increase in privatisation in the past. Moreover, 
Meyer-Gohde et al. (2013) present two case studies of remunicipalisation: the 
public utility in Umkirch (GWU) and the public utility in Landsberg. They have 
gathered their data using interviews. Unfortunately, they do not mention who has 
been interviewed or how many people. In this context, difficulties in determining 
the purchase price of grids are discussed. Besides, the authors empirically 
analyse the cost structure of utilities. Although grid owner companies are not part 
of their work, they identified critical aspects which can be applied to grid owner 
companies, too. According to Meyer-Gohde et al. (2013), the most important risk 
can be seen in determining the purchase price of a grid. They show that an 
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incorrect price determination means a long-term financial burden to local 
government. However, a fair purchase price could lead to a positive contribution to 
the budgets of municipalities. So, they emphasise the financial risks associated 
with a remunicipalisation. Grid owner companies often purchase grids from the 
former energy company. The purchase has to be financed by equity or debt that 
has to be provided by the owners or third parties like banks.  
 
Hall et al. (2013) pay attention to the resurgence of public ownership in municipal 
service delivery. The focus of their article is on the interplay between the political 
and economic determinants of policy change in public service provision by 
especially analysing the remunicipalisation of energy operations in Germany from 
2000 to 2012. They discuss political and economic factors supporting the trend 
towards remunicipalisation. In this context, they distinguish between the 
implications for practice and theory. Two important aspects of the development are 
greater efficiency of public sector provision, and greater degree of control over the 
effective achievement of public policy objectives (Hall et al., 2013). In conclusion, 
they do not refer to grid owner companies as a new phenomenon. They rather 
analyse remunicipalisation as a new trend from a macroeconomic perspective. So, 
neither organisational structures nor financial data of grid owner companies has 
been analysed in their work.  
 
In an empirical survey, Berlo and Wagner (2013a) take stock of the new 
foundation of public utilities in Germany during 2005 and 2012 by analysing 
different characteristics, e.g. place, legal structure or ownership structure. The 
survey is added to by interviews of six experts from academia or practice. The also 
evaluate how the aims of the foundations can be reached. To show how 
opponents of the foundation of new public utilities act, they give the example of the 
foundation of the grid owner company “Münsterland Netzgesellschaft GmbH & Co. 
KG”. As in the academic work described above, the focus is not an accounting or 
financial one.  
 
In another short study, Berlo and Wagner (2013b) deal with the strategies of 
private energy companies when they are faced with expiring concession contracts. 
They emphasise that municipalities could better pursue their political and financial 
interests in their energy engagements when they are partner of a grid owner 
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company or a distribution network operator. Because of the profits from network 
operations, it seems better than awarding the concession for twenty years to a 
private energy company. Due to the fact that concession contracts have to be 
renewed every twenty years, municipalities often do not have the necessary 
knowledge and experience. So, they need economic and legal advice. According 
to Berlo and Wagner (2013b), large national energy companies apply special 
methods and strategies to maintain concession contracts and prevent 
municipalities from founding their own companies. Berlo and Wagner (2013b) 
analyse several examples, but they do not explicitly refer to grid owner companies.  
 
The narrative article of Michaels and Kohler (2013) is a commentary on the 
judgment of the provincial high court of Düsseldorf in Germany (Oberlandesgericht 
Düsseldorf, 2013). The decision of the provincial high court refers to the foun-
dation of a public-private cooperation in the form of a grid owner company before 
the granting of a concession. The foundation of a grid owner company is not 
affected by public procurement law. However, the decision of the court has little 
relevance to the financial analysis of grid owner companies.  
 
In their guide to financing distribution networks, DStGB et al. (2013) deal with the 
financing of takeovers of distribution networks in the context of remunicipalisation. 
Among a variety of financing models, the financing of grid owner companies is 
also part of the analysis. According to DStGB et al. (2013), the financing of grid 
owner companies is manifold. With regard to debt, a grid owner company has the 
possibility to take out a loan from a bank, from the partners or shareholders or 
from a third party. It could be a corporate or a project financing. Among other 
things, economic conditions and risk allocation determine the design of financing. 
The more risks investors are exposed to, the more the expected return on capital 
provision. Due to the regulatory requirements, the equity of a grid owner company 
usually amounts to 40 percent of the earnings value of the grid. The other 60 
percent is debt (DStGB et al., 2013). As the focus of this thesis is not on the 
financing structures of grid owner companies, the statements of the authors do not 
become part of the analysis. 
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Based on the theoretical work of Kunze (2012) and others, Kinkel (2014) analyses 
the process of remunicipalisation of energy supply in North-Hesse in Germany and 
characterises the involved challenges for municipalities. The author uses 12 expert 
interviews. The method grounded theory has been used to analyse the gathered 
data. Referring to Kunze (2012), Kinkel (2014) also describes the different options 
of a municipality to cope with the end of the rights-of-way contract: 
• Renewal of the rights-of-way contract with the former distribution network 
operator 
• New contract with a new distribution network operator without municipal 
participation  
• New contract with a new distribution network operator and municipal 
participation  
Furthermore, she also presents the basic models of cooperation. Concerning a 
joint venture with a lease contract, she states in accordance with Kunze (2012) 
that in a grid owner company political influence and net income is least, because 
the grid operation is provided by a grid operator company (Kinkel, 2014).  
 
With regard to practice, Kinkel (2014) investigates the examples of three public 
utilities in North-Hesse in Germany. She explores how the process of 
remunicipalisation can be designed and to what extent subordinate processes are 
linked to certain challenges. Neither grid owner companies nor financial or 
accounting figures are emphasised by her. In conclusion, the focus of her work is 
on the remunicipalisation of public utilities.  
 
In her journal article that focuses on the legal context, Tugendreich (2014)                
gives an overview of different models of cooperation or strategic partnerships with 
regard to the renewal of rights-of-way contracts. She states that there are no 
general legal requirements concerning the form of cooperation between local 
government and a private partner. Moreover, lots of different ways of cooperation 
exist, depending on the degree of involvement of the private and public partner. 
For example, minority interest of municipal government, minority interest of the 
private partner, 50:50 or silent partnership. According to her, there could be a wide 
spectrum from just a contract of business or technical services up to a partial 
ownership.  
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Tugendreich (2014) distinguishes between the following models of cooperation: 
 
• Management Model: Local government founds its own public legal entity 
and receives the rights-of-way contract. A private partner only provides 
business or technical services for the public legal entity and its energy grid.  
• Rental Model: A private partner rents the local grid from the public company 
that is owned by the local government and he also assumes the rights and 
duties of the rights-of-way contract.  
• Joint venture: Local government founds a company, either alone and then 
sells the shares or together with a private partner. The percentage of 
ownership of the local government and the private partner is manifold. The 
joint venture is also the distribution network operator.  
• Joint venture with a lease contract (= grid owner company case): Local 
government founds a company together with an energy company. These 
companies primarily have an ownership function. The net assets are sold 
from the previous grid operator or grid owner to the new grid owner 
company and then the grid operator leases them back. Compared to the 
other models above, in the case of a grid owner company, the municipality 
is faced with the lowest risk. As far as the lease payment is more than the 
total costs of the company, the net income is positive and the municipality 
can benefit from the company’s payout.    
 
In his narrative bachelor thesis, Busshardt (2014) analyses the remunicipalisation 
of public services in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. He found various underlying causes and a varying degree of 
involvement of citizens and municipal government. The construction of an 
analytically reduced property space of the dimensions “cause” and “actor” has 
been his primary contribution to research. Neither the organisation nor the effects 
of grid owner companies are central topics of his work. 
 
Meier (2014) examines the value of energy grids when local government does not 
renew a concession contract with the former concessionaire and the new 
concessionaire has to buy the grid. The value of an energy grid and hence the 
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purchase price is not legally defined and is highly controversial. Meier (2014) 
analyses the impact of legal norm interpretations on the valuation of energy grids. 
Having established a theoretical framework, he shows empirical examples of 
valuations and applies his theoretical framework to those practical examples. The 
foundation of grid owner companies is also associated with the purchase of grids. 
In his doctoral thesis, Meier (2014) does not explicitly focus on grid owner 
companies when determining the value of grids from a legal perspective.  
 
In his pioneering doctoral thesis in the field of legal studies, Heim (2015a) presents 
and analyses the legal requirements of corporate, energy and municipal law as 
well as the legislation on pricing when municipalities are faced with the strategic 
decision to whom they should grant the concession contract. Heim (2015a) 
emphasises that the aim of the current wave on concession award processes is no 
longer to find a potential distribution network operator, but rather to grant the 
rights-of-way contract to a cooperation company with the municipality as majority 
shareholder and an experienced private energy company as strategic partner. The 
choice of the private energy company as strategic partner is often based on the 
draft contracts of the private energy company, comprising drafts of the rights-of-
way contract, shareholders’ agreement, consortium agreement, lease contract and 
if necessary loan agreement (Heim, 2015a). Different types of cooperation models 
are examined, in particular with regard to the requirements of corporate and 
municipal law: cooperation models of municipalities with their own municipal 
utilities but without their own electricity or gas grid, cooperation models of 
municipalities without their own municipal utilities and cooperation models of more 
than one municipality without their own municipal utilities. In this context, 
cooperation models in the form of grid owner companies are also part of his work. 
He describes the establishment of a grid owner company as follows: The grid 
owner company purchases the grid from the former concessionaire and leases the 
grid to the private energy company. The private energy company operates the 
grid, levies the use-of-system charges, and pays the concession levy to the 
municipality as well as the lease fee to the grid owner company (Heim, 2015a). 
Heim (2015a) points out that grid owner companies are the preferred alternative of 
all available cooperation models. First, the management model is subject to 
procurement law and requires a European-wide tender process. Second, the grid 
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owner company is advantageous for municipalities as the risk of profitability is 
often transferred to the distribution network operator by contract (Heim, 2015a).                
 
As the focus of Heim’s thesis is on legal aspects, several legal characteristics of 
grid owner companies are analysed. From the legal perspective, the establishment 
of a grid owner company is combined with a series of contractual arrangements.   
 
At first, the consortium agreement is discussed. The consortium agreement is the 
fundamental basis of the cooperation between the private energy company and 
the municipality. In general, the municipality and the private energy company 
intend to work together in the field of energy and to guarantee a safe, inexpensive, 
consumer-friendly, efficient and ecologically harmless public supply of electricity 
and gas according to section 1 of the German Energy Industry Act. In most cases, 
the consortium agreement contains assignments, duties and additional services of 
the parties. They must mutually assent to the proposed objectives and make all 
efforts to achieve them. The influence of the municipality on the grid owner 
company is ensured by the right to determine the members of the shareholders’ 
meeting and the supervisory board (Heim, 2015a). Moreover, the following 
objectives are prevalent in consortium agreements of German grid owner 
companies (Heim, 2015a): 
 
• profitability of the grid owner company and the highest possible concession 
levy 
• security of energy supply 
• support of clean technologies 
• tax-optimised and legally compliant company structures  
 
With regard to the cooperation of different municipalities that intend to work 
together in the field of energy, the establishment of a municipal holding company 
is presented. To cooperate with the municipal holding company, the private energy 
company as a cooperation partner often sets up a grid owner company. In the 
consortium agreement, the private energy company usually offers call options: a 
call option with the possibility to purchase 51 percent of the shareholders’ equity of 
the grid owner company. In most cases, the call option is temporarily restricted, for 
example five years (Heim, 2015a). 
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Financial structures could also be part of the consortium agreement. Normally, the 
grid owner company purchases the grid from the former concessionaire. The grid 
owner company enters into an agreement with the municipality and has the 
exclusive right to purchase the grid from the former concession holder according 
to section 46 (2) of the German Energy Industry Act. The purchase of the grid is 
often financed by 40 percent of equity and 60 percent of debt as the German 
regulatory system permits an equity ratio of a maximum 40 percent (section 6 
Electricity and Gas Network Charges Ordinances). In most cases, the municipality 
and the private energy company commit to a capital increase according to their 
share of equity. In addition, the consortium agreement often contains a fixed 
guaranteed or a minimum guaranteed rate of return on the equity for the 
municipality. In case the net income of the grid owner company is not sufficient to 
pay the return, the private energy company is forced to pay it from its own capital 
(Heim, 2015a). 
 
Second, the company agreement of a grid owner company is discussed. In 
general, it contains the nature and purpose of a grid owner company, namely the 
acquisition, development, installation, extension, renewal, operation and use of 
grids and other facilities to store and distribute energy. According to municipal law, 
a public purpose must be fulfilled. Furthermore, the grid owner company is 
authorised to participate in other companies. The amount of share capital is 
variable. The disposal of shares needs approval at the shareholders’ meeting. 
Payments of the shareholders that exceed the company’s share capital become 
part of the company’s reserves. In most cases, the number of members of the 
shareholders’ meeting, responsible for the fundamental decisions of the grid owner 
company, is unequal and depends on the share of equity. The mayor is often a 
designated member of the shareholders’ meeting. The municipal members of the 
shareholders’ meeting have to pursue interests of the municipality (Heim, 2015a). 
 
Depending on the legal structure of a grid owner company, a mandatory or 
voluntary supervisory board is installed. The terms of the members of the 
supervisory board often correspond to the terms of the members of the municipal 
council. In most cases, the number of members of the supervisory board is often 
unequal and determined by the share of ownership. By virtue of his office, the 
mayor is usually a member of the supervisory board. The supervisory board is 
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responsible for issues of fundamental significance for a grid owner company, for 
example: 
 
• Defining and changing the rules of order for the board of management and 
the supervisory board 
• Supervising and advising the board of management 
• Approval of the annual company planning 
• Reviewing the annual financial statements  
• Election of the auditor of the financial statements 
• Proposal for the shareholders’ meeting concerning the appropriation of net 
income 
 
A synchronisation of the consortium agreement and the company agreement is 
required. This means that the sale of company shares to a third party is not 
possible without obliging the buyer to become party of the consortium agreement 
(Heim, 2015a). 
 
Third, the payment for use of the grid is subject to a lease contract between the 
private energy company as distribution network operator and the grid owner 
company. The lease of the grid to the private energy company at a rent based on 
the cost of capital transfers the risk of decreasing use-of-system charges and high 
repairs and maintenance expenses to the private energy company. With the lease 
of the grid at a rent based on the cost of capital to the private energy and a 
regulatory optimised equity structure, the grid owner company has a stable and 
predictable profit situation. Moreover, the maintenance obligation is transferred by 
the lease contract to the private energy company as the lessee (Heim, 2015a). 
In general, in a grid owner company the business and technical management of 
the grids are performed by the private energy company. As a management 
contract is subject to a European call for tenders, a lease contract between the 
private energy company and the grid owner company has become the preferred 
option. Furthermore, a lease contract is often less risky than a management 
contract, because the parties often agree upon lease payments that do not depend 
on use-of-system charges, but rather on the value of the grid (Heim, 2015a). 
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Concerning the research questions, Heim (2015a) presents two remarkable 
statements.  
 
First, preferred legal forms for cooperation models comprising grid owner 
companies are limited liability companies or limited commercial partnerships with 
limited liability companies as general partners and a municipal majority 
shareholding with a cooperation partner as a minority shareholder (Heim, 2015a). 
As Heim’s thesis belongs to the field of legal studies, no empirical evidence is 
given. It rather seems to be a statement in view of his professional practice. He 
also emphasises that the liability of municipalities in the case of public 
corporations cannot be restricted and that the legal form of a public limited 
company is not chosen due to high foundation expenses (Heim, 2015a). According 
to Heim (2015a), cooperation models generally consist of more than one 
shareholder or partner, the municipality and a private energy company as a 
strategic cooperation partner. Compared to the operation model, a grid owner 
company, designed as a typical lease model, is the preferred cooperation model 
by municipalities and private energy companies. In contrast to the operation 
model, a grid owner company is not subject to a Europe-wide tendering-process. 
Moreover, the grid owner company is more advantageous for municipalities as the 
risk of profitability of network operation and the maintenance costs are shifted to 
the private energy company. The private energy company as the official 
distribution network operator receives the use-of-system charges from the 
customers, but the lease payment is often based on the value of the grid (Heim, 
2015a).  
 
Second, Heim (2015a) also comes to the conclusion that the establishment of 
individual grid owner companies all over Germany leads to higher network charges 
due to the fixed costs of the individual grid owner companies. As section 1 of the 
German Energy Industry Act seeks to ensure the reasonably-priced public supply 
of electricity and gas, Heim (2015a) concludes that a minimum size of local grids is 
required and can be achieved by large grid owner companies consisting of the 
local grids of several municipalities.  
 
With their practice-oriented manual, the German Association of Towns and 
Municipalities supports municipalities that are faced with the decision of how they 
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should deal with the expiration of their rights-of-way contracts (DStGB, 2017). As 
rights-of-way contracts in Germany have long durations, the concession award 
process is of high importance for municipalities. The authors point out that 
municipalities have the opportunity either to conduct a conventional concession-
granting process or to establish a cooperation model in order to remunicipalise 
local grids. They emphasise that the establishment of a cooperation model 
between the municipality and a private energy company is often the basis for a 
successful cooperation and the cooperation model itself becomes part of the 
concession award process. In general, the joint venture could be either 
established by the municipality and the private energy company together or one 
partner sets up the company alone and then the other partner joins the company 
(DStGB, 2017).   
 
After the cooperation company takes over the energy grid, the mode of operation 
of the grid, if applicable together with a private energy company, has to be 
determined. In their booklet, the German Association of Towns and Municipalities 
distinguishes and analyses four basic concepts of energy grid operation in 
Germany. Among other aspects, the focus of the analysis is on the distribution of 
control and risks of the models (DStGB, 2017): 
 
• Large distribution network operator model: The basis for this model is a 
cooperation company that is established by the municipality and a private 
energy company. After having concluded a contract with the municipality, 
the cooperation company purchases the local grid and hires personnel to 
operate it. As the cooperation company becomes distribution network 
operator, it is exposed to the risks of incentive regulation. In contrast to 
other cooperation models, there is no supply and service relationship with 
the private energy company that is only party of the consortium agreement. 
 
• Management model: The management model is based on the large 
distribution network operator model. In contrast to that model, the 
cooperation company enters into an operating agreement with a third party. 
In most cases, the operating agreement is concluded with the cooperation 
partner, i.e. a private energy company that takes over the management and 
decision-making power of the cooperation company. In general, the 
  
 60 
operating agreement comprises business and technical services. For 
example, accounting and tax services as well as planning, construction and 
operation of grid assets. The operator operates the grid on behalf of the 
cooperation company, which remains distribution network operator and 
exposed to the risk of incentive regulation. In order to operate the grid, the 
cooperation company hires personnel that are left to the operator or the 
operator’s own employees are used.  
 
• Service model: Again, the service model is based on a cooperation 
company that is established by a municipality and a private energy 
company. After having concluded a contract with the municipality, the 
cooperation company purchases the local grid, but usually hires no 
personnel to operate it. On the contrary, services concerning the technical 
network operations and metering as well as administrative and financial 
functions are carried out by the private energy company based on service 
agreements. The cooperation company becomes distribution network 
operator and exposed to the risk of incentive regulation. In contrast to the 
management model, the private energy company is not responsible for the 
achievement of the company’s objectives. Depending on the volume of the 
service agreement, it is subject to procurement law and to a tender process. 
 
• Lease model: The basis for this model is also a cooperation company that 
is established by a municipality and a private energy company. After having 
concluded a concession contract with the municipality, the cooperation 
company purchases the local grid and leases it to the private energy 
company or a third party. The concession is awarded to the grid owner 
company. The private energy company is both leaseholder and distribution 
network operator. Different types of the lease model can be distinguished, 
especially the pure lease model and the lease model with special services.  
 
• Pure lease model: The pure lease model is a synonym for a classical grid 
owner company. The cooperation company without any of their own 
personnel leases the grid to the private energy company that is the 
distribution network operator at the same time. By the lease contract, the 
cooperation company transfers the rights and obligations of the rights-of-
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way contract and of the grid to the leaseholder. In return for the transfer, the 
cooperation company receives a lease payment that reflects the underlying 
risk distribution and represents the turnover. The lease agreement is not 
subject to procurement law.  
 
• Lease model with special services: The lease model with special services is 
a combination of the pure lease model and the service model. In contrast to 
the pure lease model, the municipality and the cooperation company are 
more involved in the operation of the grid. The private energy company 
becomes distribution network operator, but the cooperation company also 
provides services. Over time, the employees of the cooperation company 
get trained and acquire more and more know-how in order to operate the 
grid.  
 
The German Association of Towns and Municipalities systematically distinguishes 
and describes the different cooperation models with their characteristics. However, 
the advantages and disadvantages of the cooperation models, especially of grid 
owner companies, are not part of their analyses (DStGB, 2017). For example, 
advantages of lease models consist of safe and steady revenues that result from 
lease payments without bearing the economic risks of the network operation 
(Schäfer, 2017).  
 
Concerning the influence of the municipality on local infrastructure, the authors 
recommend a cooperation model wherein the municipality gains the majority of 
shares. Furthermore, the option of the municipality to increase its participation 
quota gradually during the duration of the rights-of-way contract is presented. 
According to the German Association of Towns and Municipalities, the option 
offers the advantage of observing the development of the cooperation company 
before the decision on participation (DStGB, 2017).  
 
Moreover, the authors also point out that all private legal forms that are permitted 
by German municipal law could be suitable for a cooperation company. In 
particular, it is mentioned that the limited partnership with a limited liability 
company as general partner would be preferred by the founders (DStGB, 2017). 
However, no explanation for this statement, i.e. why the limited partnership with a 
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limited liability company as general partner seems to be the most preferred legal 
form, is given. Overall, the statements of the authors are in the form of narratives 
and no financial analyses on grid owner companies, especially with regard to the 
relationship between firm size, ownership structure, legal forms and firm 
performance, are carried out.  
 
Although the focus of the relevant part in the legal commentary of Theobald                           
and Templin (2018) is on the legitimacy of payments and also on the risks and 
chances of participation, they describe the necessary contracts with regard to 
cooperation models of grid owner companies. First, a consortium agreement is 
needed as a basis for the cooperation between the local government and the 
private partner. Second, a company agreement is required to found the company. 
And third, a lease contract between the grid owner company and the private 
partner is common. According to Theobald and Templin (2018), the whole contract 
design depends on the results of the negotiation between the local government 
and the private partner.  
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Table 2: Summary of analysed literature on grid owner companies 
Authors Aim Data 
Gathering 
Method Region Outcome 
Menges & 
Müller-
Kirchen-
bauer (2012) 
Economic 
analysis of 
remunici-
palisation 
activities  
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany Remunici-
palisation 
depends on 
the cost of 
operation and 
tariff 
regulation 
Arnold 
(2012) 
Legal aspects 
of cooperation 
models  
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany All activities 
have to be in 
accordance 
with the arm’s 
length 
principle 
Rosenberger 
(2012) 
Tax aspects of 
rights-of-way 
contracts  
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany Individual 
choice, 
depending on 
the tax effects 
Chen (2012) Legal analysis 
of organisatio-
nal structures 
of energy 
companies 
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany Compli-              
ance with 
legal require-
ments is 
necessary 
Kunze 
(2012) 
Analysis of 
fundamental 
options for 
municipalities 
when faced 
with the phase 
out of rights-
of-way 
contracts  
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany A thorough 
analysis of 
risks and 
chances for 
municipalities 
is needed 
Meyer-
Gohde et al. 
(2013) 
Analysis of 
financial 
conse-
quences of 
remunici-
palisation 
measures in 
the German 
electricity 
sector 
Two 
examples 
of 
remunici-
palisation 
activities 
Narrative Germany Incorrect price 
determination 
means long-
term financial 
burden to 
local govern-
ment 
Hall et al. 
(2013) 
Analysis of the 
remunicipali-
sation of 
energy 
operations in 
Germany and 
water 
Data of 
new and 
remunici-
palised 
energy 
utilities in 
Germany, 
Quantita-
tive 
France/ 
Germany 
Existence of a 
strong trend in 
France and 
Germany 
towards 
remunici-
palisation of 
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operations in 
France 
2007-2012 water and 
energy 
services 
Berlo & 
Wagner 
(2013a) 
Taking stock 
of the new 
foundation of 
public utilities 
in Germany 
during 2005-
2012; 
evaluation of 
the aims of 
foundation 
Secon-
dary data; 
different 
sources  
Quanti-
tative 
Germany 72 new public 
utilities have 
been 
established; 
diverse 
recom-
mendations 
Berlo & 
Wagner 
(2013b) 
Strategies of 
private energy 
companies 
when they are 
faced with 
expiring 
concession 
contracts 
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany Several 
avoiding 
strategies 
were 
identified 
Michaels & 
Kohler 
(2013) 
Commentary 
on the 
judgment of 
the provincial 
high court of 
Düsseldorf 
No 
empirical  
data 
Narrative Germany The 
foundation of 
a grid owner 
company is 
not affected 
by public 
procurement 
law 
DStGB et al. 
(2013) 
Supporting 
municipalities 
faced with the 
financing of 
grids in the 
context of 
remu-
nicipalisation 
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany Several 
financing 
options 
discussed 
Kinkel 
(2014) 
To analyse the 
process of 
remunici-
palisation of 
energy supply 
in North-Hesse 
and charac-
terise the 
involved 
challenges for 
municipalities 
12 expert 
interviews; 
applica-
tion of  
grounded 
theory 
Qualitati-
ve  
Germany Thorough 
analysis of 
risks and 
chances of 
remunici-
palisation 
Tugendreich 
(2014) 
Legal analysis 
of different 
cooperation 
models 
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany Compliance 
with legal 
requirements 
is necessary   
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Busshardt 
(2014) 
Analysis of 
remunicipalisa-
tion activities  
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Coun-
tries of 
the 
Organi-
sation for 
Econo-
mic Co-   
operati-
on and 
Deve-
lopment 
Construction 
of an 
analytically 
reduced 
property 
space of the 
dimensions 
“cause” and 
“actor” 
Meier  
(2014) 
Legally 
compliant 
valuation of 
energy grids  
Empirical 
data 
Stage 
model 
(social 
re-
search) 
Germany Deviations 
from the 
objectified 
capitalised 
earnings 
value 
Heim 
(2015a) 
Legal analysis 
of different 
cooperation 
models with 
regard to the 
requirements 
according to 
municipal, 
corporate and  
energy law as 
well as the 
legislation on 
prices 
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany Minimum size 
of local grids 
recommended 
due to fixed 
costs; 
preferred 
legal forms 
are limited 
liability 
companies or 
limited liability 
partnerships 
with limited 
liability 
companies as 
general 
partners and 
a municipal 
majority 
shareholding 
DStGB 
(2017) 
Supporting 
municipalities 
in their 
concession 
award decision 
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany
/Europe 
Presentation 
of different 
cooperation 
models with 
their 
characteristics 
Theobald & 
Templin 
(2018) 
Description of 
the necessary 
contracts with 
regard to 
cooperation 
models 
No 
empirical 
data 
Narrative Germany
/Europe 
Contract 
design 
depends on 
the results of 
the nego-
tiation 
between 
parties 
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2.4 Critical drivers of firm performance 
 
2.4.1 Firm performance  
 
In general, the literature on firm performance is very wide-ranging. As firm 
performance is a concept, several proxies or measures are found in the literature. 
In this thesis, the terms “firm performance” and “firm profitability” are used 
synonymously. In most cases, firm performance is measured by the financial ratio 
Return on Assets (ROA) with slightly different denominators and numerators 
(Asimakopoulos, Samitas, & Papadogonas, 2009; Goddard, Tavakoli, & Wilson, 
2005; Lazăr, 2016b; Nunes & Serrasqueiro, 2015; Yazdanfar, 2013). Moreover, 
other measures of firm performance are used. For example, share value (Makhija, 
2003), gross profits-to-sales ratio (Brown & Brown, 2001), net income plus 
advertising expenses to total assets ratio (Lee, 2009), ratio of pre-tax profit plus 
interest paid to total assets (Goddard et al., 2005) or net income over total assets 
(Gschwandtner, 2005). 
 
Although there is a large body of literature on firm performance, the literature on 
the critical drivers or determinants of firm performance is even larger. From the 
theoretical perspective, three main categories of critical drivers of firm 
performance can be distinguished: firm-specific characteristics, industry variables 
and market-related variables. Depending on the emphasis of these categories, the 
following theoretical approaches on firm performance have been established: 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP), market-based view (MBV), strategy-
structure-performance (SSP), organisation-environment-structure-performance 
(OESP) and resource-based view (RBV) (Yazdanfar, 2013). First, the market-
based view refers to a firm’s external environment and market characteristics, i.e. 
external variables. Geroski and Masson (1987), Grinstein (2008) and Porter (1979) 
are known representatives of this theoretical perspective. Second, there is the 
resource-based view that focuses on firm-specific resources, i.e. internal variables, 
and their influence on firm performance. Barney (1991), Day (2011) and Peteraf 
(1993) are important authors of the resource-based approach of firm performance 
(Lazăr, 2016b; Yazdanfar, 2013). Resources of the firm can be classified into three 
categories, namely physical capital resources (tangible and intangible assets, 
etc.), human capital resources (information, knowledge, qualification, etc.) and 
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organisational capital resources (processes, etc.) in order to improve their 
performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. By accessing and organising 
a range of resources, firms can gain competitive advantages and higher 
profitability (Barney, 1991; Daft, 1983; Lazăr, 2016b; Wernerfelt, 1984; Yazdanfar, 
2013). 
 
In the literature, a variety of critical drivers and their influence on firm performance 
have been identified and investigated in empirical studies concerning diverse 
industry sectors, countries and periods. Two major streams of studies can be 
distinguished. On the one hand, there are empirical studies that focus on internal 
determinants, for example critical drivers that are determined by management 
decisions. On the other hand, there are empirical studies that focus on external 
determinants, for example the market and economic environment of the firm 
(Yazdanfar, 2013). Typical examples of critical drivers of firm performance are firm 
size, leverage, sales growth, investments and current assets (Asimakopoulos et 
al., 2009), liquidity, tangibility, growth (Nunes, Serrasqueiro, & Sequeira, 2009), 
market share, capital intensity, advertising and research and development 
intensities, bad debt ratio, inventory (Lee, 2009), age, productivity and industry 
affiliation (Yazdanfar, 2013), net working capital, assets mix and firm location 
(Crespo & Clark, 2012). Overall, the impacts of these determinants on firm 
performance are ambiguous (Lazăr, 2016b) and do not clearly indicate which 
critical drivers are most significant with regard to firm performance (Pratheepan, 
2014). For empirical research, cross-sectional and times-series oriented studies 
on firm performance can be distinguished (Lee, 2009).  
 
As the scope of any study is limited by the objective, theoretical framework, and 
data availability (Yazdanfar, 2013), the literature review should focus on recent 
and relevant empirical studies that deal with the relationships between firm size, 
ownership structure, legal form and firm performance. These are possible critical 
drivers of firm performance of German grid owner companies for which public data 
should be available. Furthermore, as there is no market for grid owner companies 
as a natural monopoly, the focus of the research will be on the resource-based 
approach of firm performance. Despite the importance of grid owner companies in 
Germany, to the knowledge of the researcher, no study has dealt with the firm 
performance of German grid owner companies.  
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As only phenomena confirmed by the senses can be warranted as knowledge 
(principle of phenomenalism), concepts have to be translated into measures 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). According to Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 153) “concepts are 
the building blocks of theory and represent the points around which business 
research is conducted”. Once they are measured, concepts can be in the form of 
independent and dependent variables, i.e. concepts may provide an explanation of 
certain aspects of the social world (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
 
The performance of grid owner companies in Germany represents a concept. As 
firm performance is not directly quantifiable, an indicator is needed in order to 
provide a measure of the concept (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The key figures used in 
research on measurement of performance impacts are Tobin’s Q and return 
figures like ROA or ROE (Asimakopoulos et al., 2009; Fessler, 2013; Goddard et 
al., 2005; Yazdanfar, 2013); moreover, profit-cost-margin (McDonald, 1999) or net 
income plus advertising expenses to assets ratio (Lee, 2009). 
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) point out that accounting performance is an 
appropriate indicator for firm performance, because the results of accounting 
performance reflect management actions. Market performance, however, depends 
much on investor expectations. Tobin’s Q is a well-known proxy to measure firm or 
market performance and takes into account the future development of the firm 
(Boonyawat, 2013). It is calculated as the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
the replacement value of assets (Tobin, 1978). As grid owner companies in 
Germany are not listed, Tobin’s Q is not an appropriate proxy to measure their 
market performance. Furthermore, the information used to calculate accounting 
performance seems to be more reliable, because it is normally governed by 
accounting standards (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
 
The abbreviation ROA stands for Return on Assets. The ratio is one of the most 
important financial figures, often forming the starting point for profitability analyses, 
and it measures the return on total capital, i.e. debt and equity. It is an indicator 
about how profitable or successful a company is relative to its total assets and how 
efficient a company’s management is at using its assets or invested capital to 
generate earnings or rather allocating its resources (Wöltje, 2016). As the ROA 
reflects the efficiency of the ways in which assets are allocated and managed, it is 
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often used as a proxy for profitability and in particular accounting performance 
(Boonyawat, 2013; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Compared to the ROE, i.e. return 
on equity, that only refers to the performance with regard to the equity, the ROA is 
independent of the capital structure of a company as it refers to the return on total 
assets. In contrast to the ROA, the ROE neglects financial leverage (Fessler, 
2013). However, the ROE is not a suitable measure for firm performance of 
German grid owner companies. In general, the optimal equity ratio of a grid owner 
company is 40 percent as the German Electricity and Gas Network Charges 
Ordinances limit the application of the return on equity rates to a maximum of 40 
percent of the operating assets. Hence, all German grid owner companies aim at 
an equity ratio of 40 percent and the performance of different grid owner 
companies might not be distinguished. Grid owner companies are defined by their 
grids that are assets. Hence, the ROA as a proxy for firm performance is also 
applicable to grid owner companies that are capital intensive companies.  
 
In literature and professional practice, there are several versions for how the ROA 
is calculated. First, according to the definition of Compustat, the annual ROA is 
calculated as net income divided by the book value of total assets at the balance 
sheet date (Standard & Poor’s Global Market Intelligence, 2018). Second, ROA is 
also calculated as earnings before interests and taxes, divided by the book value 
of total assets at the balance sheet date (Boonyawat, 2013). Third, in some 
calculations of this ratio, the borrowing costs are added to the net income in order 
to use operating returns. The higher the ROA, the better the performance, 
because the company is earning more money on less investment. A company’s 
total assets are the sum of its total liabilities and shareholders’ equity, i.e. the 
assets are either funded by debt or equity (Wöltje, 2016).  
 
Overall, the ROA is the preferred measure for the firm performance of grid owner 
companies in this research.  
 
2.4.2 Firm size 
 
According to Lazăr (2016a), firm size as a concept can be measured by using 
several proxies. However, Dang, Li, & Yang (2018) argue that every firm size 
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measure has its advantages and disadvantages, and no measure can capture all 
characteristics of firm size.  
 
Typical proxies for firm size are total assets, sales, natural logarithm of book value 
of sales and number of employees (Lazăr, 2016a). This corresponds to the 
company size categories according to section 267 of the German Commercial 
Code: balance sheet total, annual net turnover and annual average headcount.  
 
According to section 277 of the German Commercial Code, turnover comprises 
the proceeds from the sale, rental or leasing of products and services, net of sales 
deductions and value added tax. In general, turnover is recorded when goods 
have been delivered or services have been rendered. The turnover is the output 
value of the profit and loss account and an important absolute or relative key figure 
(Schmidt & Peun, 2018). 
 
In general, the annual turnover of a grid owner company consists of the lease 
payments paid by the private energy company. The basis for the lease payments 
is often the regulation on charges for access to electricity or gas supply networks, 
the so-called Electricity or Gas Grid Network Charges Ordinances. Thus, the 
calculation formula is as follows (section 4 Electricity or Gas Network Charges 
Ordinances): 
 
(1)    calculated depreciation 
(2)    + calculated return on equity 
(3)    + calculated taxes 
(4)    + real estate taxes 
(5)    + interest expenses 
(6) -/+ gains/losses from derecognition of assets  
(7)    - income from the reversal of construction costs by customers  
(8)    - interest income 
(9)    + administrative expenses 
= Lease payment 
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In case the lease payment is based on the Electricity or Gas Network Charges 
Ordinances and does not refer to the German Incentive Regulation Ordinance, 
grid owner companies profit from the advantages of the regulatory environment 
without bearing the revenue reduction risks of the German Incentive Regulation 
Ordinance. 
 
In the case of a grid owner company, turnover encompasses not only the turnover 
from the lease of grids, but also contributions in aid of construction and building 
connections that are generally amortised over the useful life of the corresponding 
asset or simply over 20 years. In Germany, distribution network operators are 
obliged to connect the customers to the grid and to keep the grid in good condition 
for a secure energy supply. The customers pay an upfront-payment for the 
connection that is transferred from the distribution network operators to the grid 
owners (section 17 German Energy Industry Act).   
 
However, there is a mechanical correlation between annual turnover and ROA. 
Annual turnover is part of the net income as the numerator of the dependent 
variable. As annual turnover is implied in the measurement of firm performance, it 
is not a suitable proxy for firm size in this thesis. According to Dang et al. (2018), 
the researcher should use total assets if the size refers to the total resources from 
which the company can generate profits. Nonetheless, there is also a mechanical 
correlation with the balance sheet total or total assets as this represents the 
denominator of the ROA. As German grid owner companies regularly do not have 
any employees, with the exception of the members of the management board, the 
number of employees is not a suitable proxy for size of German grid owner 
companies. 
 
Furthermore, variables like management fees, audit fees or contributions in aid of 
construction and building connections are also implied in the measurement of firm 
performance. Whereas management fees and audit fees are part of the net 
income as the numerator of the dependent variable, contributions in aid of 
construction and building connections belong to the total assets as the 
denominator of the ROA. Moreover, according to Kitterer (1989) management fees 
or administrative expenses themselves depend on the size of a company. Thus, 
they are not suitable proxies for firm size in this research.  
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With regard to the choice of a suitable firm size measure in practice, Hart and 
Oulton (1996) claim that choosing which measure to use depends on data 
availability. 
 
According to section 27 (2) of the German Electricity or Gas Network Charges 
Ordinances, German distribution network operators are obliged to disclose the 
following structural features of their grids on their websites by 1st April each year: 
1) the circuit length of each of the cable and overhead lines in the low-voltage, 
medium-voltage, high-voltage and extra-high voltage levels as at                              
31st December of the previous year, 
 
2) the installed capacity of the transmission levels as at 31st December of the 
previous year, 
 
3) the annual work in kilowatt hours per network and transmission level taken 
in the previous year, 
 
4) the number of supply points for all network and transmission levels, 
 
5) the population in the network area of operators of low-voltage electricity 
supply networks as at 31st December of the previous year, 
 
6) the area supplied by the distribution service operator as at 31st December of 
the previous year, 
 
7) the geographical area of the grid as at 31st December of the previous year. 
 
If a municipality is supplied by several network operators, only the corresponding 
parts of the area must be taken into account and specified.  
In contrast to a German distribution network operator, German grid owner 
companies are not obliged to disclose data on their grid structures. Moreover, 
German distribution network operators often operate more than one grid (section 
23a German Energy Industry Act). Thus, it is not possible to draw conclusions 
from the published data of the distribution network operator on the structural grid 
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data of the respective grid owner company. Furthermore, distribution network 
operators are obliged to prepare and submit separate data entry forms for each 
grid owner company that they lease a grid from to the German Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways (section 4 (5) 
German Electricity or Gas Network Charges Ordinances). However, the data entry 
forms are subject to trade and business secrets and are not publicly available. 
Although German grid owner companies are not obliged to disclose specific data 
on population or area like distribution service operators, publicly available data on 
population and area could be gathered and used as proxies of firm size of grid 
owner companies.   
 
Comparable to the number of employees of a company (Glancey, 1998; Lazăr, 
2016a), the population reflects the number of inhabitants living in the supply area 
of a grid owner company. As German grid owner companies normally do not have 
any employees with the exception of the management, the population seems an 
appropriate proxy for the size of a German grid owner company. In general, a grid 
owner company has at least one municipal shareholder (Heim, 2015a). For the 
analysis, the inhabitants of the municipality serve as a measure for firm size. As 
many grid owner companies own grids that are located in several municipalities, 
the population of each municipality has to be added up in order to determine the 
population of a grid owner company. The more people supplied by a grid owner 
company, the larger its own infrastructure or facilities should be.  
 
The area of a grid owner company represents an alternative proxy for firm size 
that is not implied in the measurement of firm performance. In the agricultural 
literature, area is often used as a proxy for firm size (Graskemper, Feil, & Quiring, 
2019). Comparable to the area of an agricultural enterprise as a measure of size 
(Graskemper et al., 2019), area as an independent variable serves as a measure 
of size of German grid owner companies.  
 
The area specified for every municipality is basically the district area (cadastral 
area according to the German surveying authorities) measured in square 
kilometres. As many grid owner companies own grids that are located in several 
municipalities, the areas of each municipality have to be added up in order to 
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determine the area of a grid owner company. In general, the larger the area of a 
municipality and ultimately of a grid owner company, the more grid facilities like 
distribution lines or local network stations are installed and owned by the grid 
owner company. The relationship is supported by the fact that in a closed urban 
area, the energy distribution is easier and fewer grid facilities are necessary to 
supply energy to the customers than in a rural area. Basically, in rural areas longer 
distances have to be covered by additional distribution lines (Bundesnetzagentur & 
Bundeskartellamt (2017). However, it may be that the area of one or more 
municipalities is large, but the grid owner company owns only a few grid facilities. 
This can occur if an area is governed by more than one rights-of-way contract, so 
that there is more than one distribution network operator and thus more than one 
grid owner. In essence, though, the larger the area, the higher the level of firm 
performance of a grid owner company. 
 
Overall, population and area as proxies for the firm size variable seem to be 
suitable figures for measuring the firm size of German grid owner companies.  
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2.4.3 Firm size and firm performance 
 
Key words: “firm performance” and “firm size” 
Time: no restriction                                                                                                                  
Results: 2,850,000 citations (Google Scholar), 1,525 citations (SSRN), 5,900 
(Business Source Ultimate) 
 
The role of firm size in determining firm performance, i.e. whether larger firms are 
more profitable than smaller firms, is the topic of a large amount of literature in the 
fields of business organisation and industrial economics.  
 
The literature on firm size and its effects on firm performance is enormous (Lazăr, 
2016a). Baumol’s theoretical thesis that larger companies have a higher 
performance than smaller ones due to higher credit volumes and lower borrowing 
costs (Baumol, 1967) is the starting point of many empirical studies dealing with 
the research question of the relationship between firm size and firm performance. 
According to him, the firm size-dependent amount of borrowing costs is a decisive 
factor why larger companies have a higher performance than smaller ones 
(Baumol, 1967). Corresponding to the variety of literature on firm size and its 
effects on profitability that originated in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, 
there is a variety of ambiguous empirical findings, ranging from a positive to a 
negative relationship as well no relationship at all between firm size and firm 
performance (Nunes & Serrasqueiro, 2015; Lazăr, 2016a; Schmidt, 1995). Early 
empirical studies, like Hall and Weiss (1967) and Scherer (1973), find a positive 
relationship between firm size and firm performance. They explain the positive 
effect primarily through economies of scale (Lazăr, 2016a). For example, Nanda 
and Panda (2018) explain the occurrence of economies of scale from various 
dimensions. First, there are financial aspects in terms of lower interest rates or 
better discount rates for large companies due to large quantities. Second, a large 
scope of specialisation and division of labour in the context of organisational 
structures of large companies contributes to economies of scale. Third, economies 
of scale could appear for technical reasons, i.e. high fixed costs are distributed 
over a large number of units (Nanda & Panda, 2018). In contrast, Shepherd (1972) 
figures a negative relationship between firm size and firm performance. He 
attributes the negative effect to X-inefficiency. This means a failure to keep costs 
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under control depending on the status of competition (Lazăr, 2016a; Shepherd, 
1972).  
 
The following empirical studies focus on the impact of firm size on firm 
performance and find a positive and significant relationship:  
 
Lee (2009) examines the determinants of firm performance and, in particular, the 
role that firm size plays in profitability. He uses a fixed-effects dynamic panel data 
model for over 7,000 US publicly-held firms during the years 1987-2006 and 
discovers a positive non-linear correlation between firm size, measured by the log 
value of total assets, and firm performance, defined by net income plus advertising 
expenses to total assets ratio. This suggests that profitability decreases once the 
firm size grows too much (Lee, 2009).  
 
In their article “Firm-specific and economy wide determinants of firm profitability: 
Greek evidence using panel data”, Asimakopoulos et al. (2009) examine the 
determinants of profitability for a sample of 191 Greek non-financial firms listed on 
the less developed Athens Stock Exchange for the period 1995-2003 using panel 
data estimation techniques. Apart from other firm-specific and economy wide 
factors that determine firm performance, they find that firm size, measured by the 
natural logarithm of sales, positively affects firm performance. Firm performance is 
measured by the ROA that is calculated as pre-tax profit divided by total assets 
(Asimakopoulos et al., 2009).  
 
In his article “Profitability determinants among micro firms: evidence from Swedish 
data”, Yazdanfar (2013) investigates various variables affecting firm performance 
by applying a seemingly unrelated regression method to a large sample of 
approximately 87,000 observations covering 12,530 non-financial micro firms in 
Sweden operating in four industry sectors, from 2006 to 2007. The empirical study 
considers profitability determinants at the firm as well as industry affiliation levels 
in examining hypotheses developed from resource-based approaches. Among 
other findings, Yazdanfar (2013) points out that firm size as an internal 
determinant, measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s book value of sales, 
positively influences firm performance, measured by the ROA. In his study, the 
ROA is defined as the firm’s book value of net profit after tax divided by total 
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assets. Overall, he concludes that firm performance is mainly determined by 
internal rather than external variables (Yazdanfar, 2013). 
 
In his study “A panel data analysis of profitability determinants: empirical results 
from Sri Lankan manufacturing companies“, Pratheepan (2014) uses a balanced 
panel data set of 55 Sri Lankan listed manufacturing companies with 550 
observations over the period of 2003-2012 in order to examine the determinants of 
profitability of manufacturing companies by applying static panel models. The ROA 
as the ratio between profit and total assets measures profitability and represents 
the dependent variable whereas firm size is one of the independent variables. 
According to Pratheepan’s findings, firm size is statistically significant and 
positively related to the profitability of selected listed manufacturing companies in 
Sri Lanka (Pratheepan, 2014).  
  
Zaid, Ibrahim and Zulqernain (2014) investigate the determinants of public based 
construction companies' profitability in Malaysia from 2000-2012. They use the 
ROE to measure firm performance and the natural logarithm of total sales to 
measure firm size. Overall, the findings show that firm size has a significant 
positive relationship with firm performance.  
 
Nunes and Serrasqueiro (2015) study profitability determinants of knowledge-
intensive business services by considering a sample of 187 Portuguese 
knowledge-intensive business services for the period 2002 to 2009 using panel 
data models. Among other findings, the results indicate that firm size, represented 
by the logarithm of sales, has a positive influence on firm performance, measured 
by the ratio between earnings before tax and interest and total assets, of 
Portuguese knowledge-intensive business services. Thus, the authors make the 
suggestion for policymakers and for the owners and managers of Portuguese 
knowledge-intensive business services to support services that are profitable, but 
small in size, aiming to help them diversify their activities and in this way 
preventing their limited size from contributing to diminished profitability (Nunes & 
Serrasqueiro, 2015). 
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Nanda and Panda (2018) provide new evidence about firm-specific (internal) and 
macroeconomic (external) determinants of profitability of 173 Indian manufacturing 
firms listed in S&P BSE Industrials Index in the period from 2000 to 2015 by using 
advanced panel data regression analysis techniques (random effects design). 
Among the variety of firm-specific parameters, firm size, measured in terms of total 
assets, positively and significantly influences firm performance. The ROA and the 
net profit margin are used as proxies for firm performance. Thus, the empirical 
study confirms the relative importance of size on firm performance (Nanda & 
Panda, 2018).  
 
However, Goddard et al. (2005) find a negative relationship between firm size and 
firm performance. They research the determinants of profitability for manufacturing 
and service sector firms in Belgium, France, Italy and the UK, for the period 1993-
2001. Panel data in the form of pooled cross-sectional and time series data are 
used. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and 
profitability by the ROA. They come to the conclusion that a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between firm size and firm performance exists 
(Goddard et al., 2005). 
 
Using all non-financial companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange for a 
twelve year period from 2000 to 2011 with 668 observations, Lazăr (2016a) 
investigates whether firm size has any influence on firm performance. He uses a 
fixed effects panel data model. The proxies for firm size are total assets, sales and 
number of employees. Firm performance is measured by the ROA, calculated as 
the ratio of net income to total assets. Overall, he finds a negative effect of firm 
size on corporate performance when size is expressed in total assets and sales 
and no effect at all when the number of employees is used as a proxy for size. 
However, due to the application of the fixed effects model being conditional on the 
sample, the results cannot be extrapolated, particularly not to privately-held 
companies (Lazăr, 2016a). Lazăr (2016a) attributes his findings to the fact that 
Romanian listed companies possess a large amount of real-estate assets that are 
not directly involved in producing goods and thus in generating profits (Lazăr, 
2016a).  
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Furthermore, Glancey (1998) analyses the relationship between company 
characteristics, in particular firm size, and firm performance on the basis of 
accounts data for a sample of 38 small manufacturing firms in a small region in 
Scotland during the period 1988-1990. He applies regression analysis techniques, 
in particular ordinary and two-stage least squares, and uses the employee 
numbers as a suitable measure of firm size in the entrepreneurship context. 
According to Glancey (1998), firm characteristics are of limited value in explaining 
profitability. Thus, no significant relationship between firm size and firm 
performance has been found. 
  
German grid owner companies are not listed companies. They are not subject to 
market economy rules. Moreover, they are subject to regulation. Furthermore, they 
are large in terms of population, area, etc. However, there has been no empirical 
research on the relationship between firm size and firm performance of German 
grid owner companies.   
 
2.4.4 Ownership structure 
 
Another aspect to be investigated is the ownership structure of newly established 
grid owner companies in Germany. Depending on the percentage of participation 
of municipalities and private energy companies in the registered capital of the 
company, a distinction is made between different types. For example, a minority 
interest in the company refers to a situation when a private energy company owns 
less than 50 percent of the shares. In order to determine the private participation 
quota of a grid owner company, the shareholders are assigned to types of 
shareholders, i.e. either private or municipal. When two or more private energy 
companies participate in a grid owner company, their quotas are added together. 
The magnitude of the private participation quota of grid owner companies reflects 
the fact that private energy companies often seek to secure their position on the 
energy market as minority shareholders (Wagner & Berlo, 2017).  
 
2.4.5 Ownership structure and firm performance 
 
Key words: “firm performance” and “ownership structure” 
Time: no restriction                                                                                                                  
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Results: 2,600,000 citations (Google Scholar), 543 citations (SSRN), 1,238 
(Business Source Ultimate) 
 
The literature on the impact of ownership structure, more precisely state versus 
private ownership, on firm performance is also extensive. In particular, welfare 
economics and property rights theory have produced a large number of theoretical 
contributions to the literature. The spectrum of potential effects of state ownership 
on firm performance is very broad. A popular postulation is that privately-owned 
companies are more efficient and more profitable than state-owned companies or 
in turn state ownership may adversely affect firm performance (Chan, Chen, & 
Wong, 2018; Megginson & Netter, 2001). Whereas ordinary shareholders usually 
strive for profit and wealth maximisation, a high degree of state ownership could 
lead to pursuing competing goals, for example social or political objectives, 
suffering from high agency cost or lacking private property rights to facilitate 
efficient resource allocation (Alfaraih, Alanezi & Almujamed, 2012; Boardman & 
Vining, 1989; Capobianco & Christiansen, 2011; Chan et al., 2018; Martin & 
Parker, 1997; Phung & Mishra, 2016; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Villalonga, 2000). The supporters of the property rights theory claim that property 
rights are more clearly defined in the private sector than in the public sector. 
Hence, the incentive for maximising profits of private shareholders leads to more 
effective monitoring of management performance (Alchian, 1965; Chan et al., 
2018; McCormick & Meiners, 1988). However, there are theoretical studies that 
identified circumstances in which state ownership might be superior to private 
ownership. For example, Shapiro and Willig (1990) conclude that public ownership 
addresses informational asymmetry issues. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
assume that state ownership is superior when output is less specifiable like quality 
of service. 
 
With regard to the relationships between mixed ownership and firm performance, 
in their fundamental empirical study Boardman and Vining (1989), applying OLS 
regression analyses, point out that mixed companies have a slightly higher 
performance than publicly owned companies. Moreover, they argue that private 
companies are the most efficient.     
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Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no statistically significant relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance of companies in the US. According to 
their empirical study applying ordinary and two-stage least squares regressions, 
ownership structures differ across firms due to differences in their circumstances. 
For example, scale of economies, regulations and environment stability (Fauzi & 
Locke, 2012). 
 
The results of recent empirical studies on the relationship between state 
ownership and firm performance are also mixed (Alfaraih et al., 2012). 
 
Hess, Gunasekarage and Hovey (2010) investigate the relationship between 
ownership structure and performance for a sample of Chinese listed firms over the 
period from 2000 to 2004 (balanced panel data). The focus is on the impact of 
dominance of state, measured by the proportion of shares held by the various 
levels of the state, and private blockholders on firm performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q. By applying ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares 
analysis, they find a U-shape of the state ownership-performance relationship. As 
states put more effort into state companies, a higher level of state ownership 
improves firm performance (Hess et al., 2010). 
 
Based on multiple regression analysis over the period of 2001-2006, Najid and 
Rahman (2011) discover a positive and significant influence of government 
ownership on the performance of Malaysian enterprises. The study compares 
financial and market performance measures like ROE or ROA of 47 government-
linked companies with 47 non-government-linked companies. The authors 
suppose that government-linked companies will be supported by the government 
in times of trouble (Najid & Rahman, 2011). 
 
Le and Buck (2011) analyse more than 1,000 Chinese listed firms over the period 
2003-2005 by using multiple regression analysis. They find a positive association 
between state ownership in terms of the percentage of ownership by the state, and 
firm performance. This demonstrates that companies with higher state ownership 
generally have higher firm performance. The independent variable firm 
performance is measured by the ROA, calculated as net income divided by 
average total assets. Among other explanations, Le and Buck (2011) attribute the 
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findings to governmental support and the lower cost of capital for state-owned 
companies.  
 
Alfaraih et al. (2012) empirically explore the effects of institutional and state 
ownership on the performance of firms listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. They 
used Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm performance of a sample of 134 listed 
companies in the year 2010 by applying regression analysis. Whereas the analysis 
shows a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance, a negative relationship between government ownership and firm 
performance is detected (Alfaraih et al., 2012). 
 
Yu (2013) applies in her study “State ownership and firm performance: Empirical 
evidence from Chinese listed companies“ panel data regression techniques to 
10,639 firm-year observations on non-financial Chinese publicly listed firms over 
the period 2003-2010. Yu (2013) shows that state ownership, measured by the 
percentage of state ownership, has a U-shaped relationship with firm performance, 
calculated by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Overall, the study demonstrates that a 
higher level of state ownership positively influences firm performance. Moreover, 
the findings reveal that a higher level of state ownership is preferred to dispersed 
ownership structures due to governmental support and political connections (Yu, 
2013).  
 
In their article “Ownership and Performance in a Lightly Regulated Environment“, 
Bradbury and Hooks (2015) analyse the relationship between ownership and 
performance, measured by the ROA as earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets, for New Zealand electricity lines firms over the period 1998 to 2006. 
The focus is on local distribution or line businesses, i.e. regulated companies 
being natural monopolies that are responsible for the design, development and 
maintenance of the electricity line network that delivers power to the customers. In 
Germany, distribution network operators in contrast to grid owner companies are 
responsible for the maintenance of the electricity networks. Overall, their 
hypothesis that private ownership results in higher performance than forms of 
public ownership, e.g. council ownership, is not supported by the regression 
analyses (Bradbury & Hooks, 2015).  
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Phung and Mishra (2016) examine the effect of ownership structure on firm 
performance for firms listed on Vietnamese stock exchanges. By using panel data 
of 2,744 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2012, they find a convex relationship 
between state ownership and firm performance, i.e. firm performance increases 
beyond a 28.67 percent level of state ownership. The findings suggest that at first, 
state ownership does not contribute to high firm performance due to the 
adherence to social or political goals. With an increase of state ownership, the 
state increases its influence on managers and forces them to pursue social and 
political goals (Phung & Mishra, 2016). 
 
Szarzec & Nowara (2017) investigate the impact of state ownership on firm 
performance in the largest non-financial enterprises operating in 13 post-socialist 
Central and Eastern European countries over the period 2007-2013. Applying 
descriptive statistics and financial analysis indicators, they identify 69 enterprises 
out of 500 as state-owned enterprises, holding a dominant position in energy 
supply, the oil and gas sector and transport. On average, the performance of the 
largest state-owned companies, measured by profit margin and ROE as 
profitability ratios, is similar to the performance of the analysed private companies 
(Szarzec & Nowara, 2017). 
 
In their empirical study, Chan et al. (2018) analyse the effects of state ownership 
on the performance of state-owned enterprises in New Zealand by applying cross-
sectional (years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010) and time-series approaches 
(state-owned enterprises privatised between 1988 and 2010). They come to the 
conclusion that state ownership, measured by an indicator variable, unlike private 
ownership is negatively and significant associated with firm performance. In the 
study, firm performance is measured in several ways, for example ROA, defined 
as earnings before interest and tax divided by average operating net assets and 
ROR, measured by earnings before interest and tax divided by net revenue.   
 
In his empirical study, Eforis (2018) explores the influence of state ownership on 
the firm performance of state-owned enterprises, i.e. business entities that are 
wholly or primarily owned by the state, in Indonesia listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange between 2011 and 2015. He comes to the conclusion that state 
ownership has a positive influence on firm performance, measured by ROA.  
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Overall, there is a huge amount of literature that focuses on the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance. However, the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance of grid owner companies in 
Germany has not been analysed yet.  
 
2.4.6 Legal form  
 
2.4.6.1 Introduction 
 
To operate local grids, municipalities in Germany can choose between all forms of 
private and public law (Wagner & Berlo, 2017). On the one hand, there could be 
owner-operated municipal enterprises, so-called “Eigen- oder Regiebetriebe” and 
on the other hand companies according to public and private law are available, so-
called “Eigengesellschaften”. In most cases, third parties can take a share in those 
companies according to public and private law (Lormes, 2016). In general, owner-
operated municipal enterprises or companies can operate the grids themselves or 
assign the task to a third party by means of a management or a lease contract. As 
municipalities’ liability has to be restricted to the share in the company they have 
paid by German municipal law (for example section 122 (1) Hessian Municipal 
Code), only limited liability companies, public limited companies, limited 
partnerships or limited partnerships with a limited liability company as general 
partner are permitted legal forms for grid owner companies in Germany (Heim, 
2015a). Moreover, a municipality shall only establish, take over, substantially 
expand or participate in a public limited company if the public purpose of the 
enterprise cannot be fulfilled equally well in another legal form (section 122 (3) 
Hessian Municipal Code). Thus, only limited liability companies or limited 
partnerships with a limited liability company as general partner are available legal 
forms for grid owner companies in Germany (Heim, 2015a). Due to the legal 
restriction, municipalities are not allowed to become general partner 
(Rosenberger, 2012). Overall, with regard to the chosen models since the mid-
2000s, the preferred legal structures belong to the private law and they distinguish 
themselves by a limitation of liability. Whereas limited liability companies and 
limited partnerships are predominant, public limited companies are not chosen as 
they require a lot of effort to establish (Heim, 2015a). Grid owner companies by 
public law are not chosen by the municipalities, because neither liability nor 
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financial risks can be limited (Heim, 2015a). Furthermore, section 122 (1) no. 3 of 
the Hessian Municipal Code requires that the municipality has an appropriate 
influence on the company, in particular on the supervisory board or a 
corresponding body.    
 
The choice of a company’s legal form is a long-term, but not irreversible decision 
and needs revision from time to time if key framework conditions change 
(Rosenberger, 2012). The most important criteria in the choice of legal form might 
be the following (Rosenberger, 2012): 
• Liability 
• Control and voting rights 
• Distribution of profits, losses and assets 
• Financing options 
• Tax burden 
• Disclosure requirements 
In order to substantiate the research on German grid owner companies, the 
characteristics of public limited companies, limited liability companies, limited 
commercial partnerships with a limited liability company as general partner and 
limited commercial partnerships with a public limited company as general partner 
as permitted legal forms of grid owner companies are discussed in the following 
sections. The focus is on company-specific features, company organs, liability, 
shareholders’ agreement, share contributions and profit participation, accounting, 
auditing and disclosure as well as taxation. As grid owner companies with the legal 
form of public limited companies are not chosen due to their great effort to 
establish (Heim, 2015a), the public limited company is only presented with its 
essential features. 
 
2.4.6.2 Public limited company  
 
The public limited company is a publicly held company. It was intended as the 
appropriate form for entities owned by a large number of shareholders and under 
the control of employed managers (PwC, 2018). The German Stock Corporation 
Act (“Aktiengesetz”) governs the bodies, structures and organisation of this legal 
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form. The shares of a public limited company may be publicly traded on a stock 
exchange (PwC, 2018). The minimum share capital is 50,000 euros divided into 
ordinary shares of equal nominal value of at least 1 euro (sections 7 and 8 
German Stock Corporation Act). The public limited company may issue shares of 
different classes, for example preference shares with no voting rights but with a 
preferential dividend entitlement (section 140 German Stock Corporation Act; 
PwC, 2018). The directors of a public limited company meet as a board (section 
76 German Stock Corporation Act) and a supervisory board of at least three 
members has to be appointed (section 95 German Stock Corporation Act). 
Compared to a limited liability company, the formation of a public limited company 
and shareholders’ meeting procedures are more cumbersome (PwC, 2018). 
 
2.4.6.3 Limited liability company  
 
2.4.6.3.1 Company-specific features 
 
The limited liability company is a popular type of private business organisation in 
Germany. In contrast to the public limited company, the limited liability company 
was designed to suit the circumstances of an owner-managed business with its 
own legal personality (PwC, 2018). The legal basis for the limited liability company 
in Germany as a trading company is the Limited Liability Companies Act (“GmbH-
Gesetz”). According to section 1 of the Limited Liability Companies Act, the limited 
liability company as a capital company can be established for any admissible 
purpose and it is an independent legal entity. The entry into the Register of 
Commerce is constitutive (section 11 (1) Limited Liability Companies Act) and 
requires the following information: corporate name, registered office, business 
purpose, amount of share capital, list of shareholders, shareholders’ agreement in 
a notarial form and managing director(s) (section 8 Limited Liability Companies 
Act) 
 
As the shareholders’ agreement provides a high degree of individuality (section 3 
Limited Liability Companies Act), this legal form is famous for its flexibility and 
scalability to lots of enterprises. Compared to a public limited company (section 23 
(5) German Stock Corporation Act), the limited liability company is subject to less 
strict directives. In contrast to a partnership, the limited liability company is a trade 
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company with its own legal personality and is liable to creditors for corporate debts 
(section 13 Limited Liability Companies Act). It has a share capital determined by 
the shareholders’ agreement; the minimum share capital amounts to 25,000 euros 
(section 5 Limited Liability Companies Act). According to section 4 of the Limited 
Liability Companies Act, the company name must always contain the designation 
“company with limited liability” or an appropriate abbreviation. 
 
In the context of remunicipalisation, limited liability companies are recognised as 
flexible and adaptive to changing market situations by local decision-makers. In 
contrast to public sector organisations, limited liability companies offer the 
possibility to affiliate third parties as strategic partners and are separated from 
municipal assets. Whereas municipalities with a public legal form are fully liable for 
their financial obligations, the liability of municipalities as shareholders of a limited 
liability company towards their creditors is limited to the company’s capital stock. 
With regard to the ownership transfer of grids, e.g. disputes with the former 
concessionaire over the purchase price, etc., the limitation of liability seems to be 
an advantage (Wagner & Berlo, 2017). 
 
2.4.6.3.2 Company organs 
 
The limited liability company has at least two independent executive organs: the 
managing director(s), recorded in the German Register of Commerce, (section 6 
Limited Liability Companies Act) and the shareholders’ meeting (section 48 
Limited Liability Companies Act). One or more managing directors are appointed 
by the shareholders’ agreement or by a resolution of the shareholders’ meeting 
(section 6 Limited Liability Companies Act). The managing directors have to carry 
out the resolutions of the shareholders, to manage the business of the limited 
liability company and to represent it to the outside (section 35 Limited Liability 
Companies Act). By law, the representation power of the managing director 
towards third parties cannot be limited (section 37 (2) Limited Liability Companies 
Act). Thus, they are subject to various liability risks. For example, the managing 
director is responsible for a proper accounting and drawing up of the financial 
statements.  
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A breach of duties leads to personal liability of the managing director towards the 
company and the creditors as well as criminal punishment (section 69 German 
Fiscal Code, section 331 German Commercial Code). The shareholders’ rights 
and obligations are primarily determined by the shareholders’ agreement (section 
45 Limited Liability Companies Act). They normally pass their resolutions at the 
shareholders’ meeting where one euro grants one vote (section 48 (1) Limited 
Liability Companies Act).  
 
Typical responsibilities of the shareholders’ meeting are as follows (section 46 
Limited Liability Companies Act): 
• approval of the annual financial statements 
• allocation of the profits 
• appointment, recall and approval of the managing directors 
• approval of the supervisory board 
• measures for auditing and monitoring of the management 
• change of company agreement 
Normally, a supervisory board is not mandatory, except for enterprises with worker 
participation (section 1 One-Third Participation Act). In such cases, the provisions 
of the German Stock Corporation Act apply accordingly to the supervisory board 
(section 52 Limited Liability Companies Act). The supervisory board is responsible 
for monitoring and advising the management, auditing the annual financial 
statements and the proposal for the allocation of the profits. In addition, the 
shareholders’ agreement can make certain transactions dependent on the 
approval by the supervisory board. Usually, the supervisory board is directly 
involved in all fundamental decisions of the company (section 52 Limited Liability 
Companies Act, section 111 (4) German Stock Corporation Act).  
 
2.4.6.3.3 Liability 
 
According to the term “limited liability”, the shareholders’ liability towards creditors 
is limited to the company’s share capital as far as the share contribution has been 
paid in (Ryan & Collett, 2017; section 13 (2) Limited Liability Companies Act). 
However, acting before entry into the Register of Commerce could lead to a 
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personal liability of the shareholders. In some cases, for example financial 
difficulties of the enterprise, claims of the shareholders could be satisfied by 
ranking below the other claims of insolvency creditors (section 39 Insolvency 
Statute).  
 
2.4.6.3.4 Shareholders’ agreement 
 
Notarial certification of the shareholders’ agreement is mandatory (section 2 
Limited Liability Companies Act). According to section 3 of the Limited Liability 
Companies Act, the following items have to be part of the contract: company 
name, registered office, business purpose, amount of share capital and share 
contribution. Moreover, the following items are often found in a shareholders’ 
agreement: distribution of votes, preparation of annual financial statements, 
allocation of profits and terms of termination. Finally, the formal directives with 
regard to the shareholders’ meeting are simpler than those for a public limited 
company (Heim, 2015a).  
 
2.4.6.3.5 Share contributions and profit participation 
 
A share contribution must amount to at least one euro (section 5 Limited Liability 
Companies Act). The share contributions can be provided either in cash or in kind. 
According to section 7 of the Limited Liability Companies Act, the entry in the 
German Register of Commerce can only be made if at least one quarter of each 
share contribution to be provided in cash is paid in and the payments together 
amount to 12,500 euros. In the case of a contribution in kind, the contribution has 
to be at the free disposal of the management at the time of application (section 7 
(3) Limited Liability Companies Act) and must be proven in a valuation report 
(section 5 (4) Limited Liability Companies Act). Furthermore, every change in 
share capital requires notarial certification and is to be declared to the German 
Register of Commerce (section 53 (2) Limited Liability Companies Act). 
 
According to section 46 no. 1 of the Limited Liability Companies Act, the 
distribution of profits requires a shareholder resolution and is based on the 
proportion of shares, unless the shareholders’ agreement governs a different 
allocation formula (section 29 (3) Limited Liability Companies Act). 
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2.4.6.3.6 Accounting, auditing and disclosure 
 
As a trading company, the limited liability company is subject to the German 
Commercial Code by virtue of its legal form (section 13 (3) Limited Liability 
Companies Act). It is obliged to keep accounting records and to draw up annual 
financial statements comprising balance sheet, profit and loss account and notes 
in the German language (section 242 German Commercial Code). The annual 
financial statements must present fairly the financial position and financial 
performance of an entity (section 264 German Commercial Code) and they must 
be drawn up under the assumption of a going concern (section 252 German 
Commercial Code). Depending on the size of a limited liability company or on the 
requirements of municipal law, the annual report also includes the management 
report. Small capital companies are those that do not exceed at least two of the 
three following features: 6,000,000 euros balance sheet total; 12,000,000 euros 
annual net turnover, and with an annual average of 50 employees. Medium-sized 
companies exceed at least two of the three features mentioned, but not at least 
two of the following three concerning large companies: 20,000,000 euros balance 
sheet total; 40,000,000 euros annual net turnover, and an annual average of 250 
employees (section 267 German Commercial Code). 
 
The management report contains the business situation, the major risks and 
opportunities as well as the future outlook and development of the company 
(section 289 German Commercial Code). The fiscal year is generally a twelve 
month period. However, the first fiscal year may be shortened (section 240 (2) 
German Commercial Code). According to section 316 of the German Commercial 
Code, auditing of the annual financial statements is mandatory for large and 
medium-sized limited liability companies. Through the audit, the limited liability 
company receives an audit report by the auditor certifying the correspondence of 
the accountancy with the German Commercial Code and the statutory directives 
(section 321 German Commercial Code). The disclosure of annual financial 
statements is also prescribed within twelve months of the balance sheet date in 
the Federal Gazette (section 325 German Commercial Code).  
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2.4.6.3.7 Taxation 
 
In Germany, all limited liability companies are subject to two taxes, namely trade 
tax and corporate income tax (PwC, 2018). Concerning trade tax, under national 
rules each local authority charges its share of the overall basis at its own local rate 
within the range of 7 and 20 percent (PwC, 2018). A company’s profit is also 
subject to corporation tax that is levied at 15 percent (section 23 German 
Corporate Income Tax Act). The basis of the tax computation is the business 
income, i.e. the net result for the year as shown in the Commercial Code financial 
statements, adjusted by specific expenses and tax-free income (section 7 German 
Corporate Income Tax Act). Moreover, the corporate income tax is subject to a 
solidarity surcharge of 5.5 percent of the amount due (section 4 Solidarity 
Surcharge Act).  
 
Furthermore, corporation and trade tax arrangements between a parent company 
and a grid owner company as a subsidiary company are possible (Rosenberger, 
2012). By the corporation and trade tax arrangement, the grid owner company is 
obliged to transfer all its profits to the parent company and the parent company is 
obliged to offset all the losses of the grid owner company. From the tax 
perspective, the outcomes of both companies can be offset (Rosenberger, 2012).   
 
2.4.6.4 Limited partnership with a limited liability company  
 
2.4.6.4.1 Company-specific features 
 
Whereas general rules on partnerships are found in sections 705 to 740 of the 
German Civil Code, mercantile partnerships are governed by the German 
Commercial Code. The limited commercial partnership with a limited liability 
company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG) is a special form of the limited 
commercial partnership. A suffix notifying this specific formation must always be 
part of the company name (section 19 (2) German Commercial Code). Instead of a 
natural entity, a limited liability company is the personally liable partner in the 
business partnership. It combines the advantages of a capital company, e.g. 
limitation of liability, with those of a partnership of people, e.g. no minimum share 
capital. According to section 161 of the German Commercial Code, the typical 
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purpose of business of a limited commercial partnership is to operate a trading 
business. However, all other legitimate business purposes can be pursued (IHK, 
2019). 
    
A limited commercial partnership distinguishes itself by at least one partner who is 
liable without limitations, whereas the liability of the other partner towards the 
corporate creditors is limited to the amount of a certain asset contribution (section 
161 (1) German Commercial Code). Whereas each personally liable partner has 
the authorisation to represent the company alone, the limited partners have no 
representation power to the outside (section 170 German Commercial Code). As a 
legal entity, the limited commercial partnership can sue and be sued before a court 
of law, acquire rights and enter into liabilities and acquire possession (sections 
124 and 161 German Commercial Code). The legal basis for all forms of limited 
commercial partnerships are sections 161-177 of the German Commercial Code. 
Thus, the law of limited commercial partnerships is to be applied to a limited 
commercial partnership with a limited liability company as general partner (IHK, 
2019). 
 
2.4.6.4.2 Company organs 
 
To establish a limited commercial partnership with a limited liability company as 
general partner, at least two partners are necessary. On the one hand, the so-
called general partner, a limited liability company, that is liable without limitation. 
On the other hand, the limited partner whose liability is limited to their contribution 
(section 171 German Commercial Code). Apart from the partners, no specific 
executive organs exercising management exist (IHK, 2019). The limited liability 
company as general partner, represented by the managing director of the limited 
liability company who does not need to be a partner, manages and represents the 
company alone (sections 125, 161 and 164 German Commercial Code). In 
general, the limited partner has been excluded from management and has no 
power of representation (section 164 German Commercial Code). However, 
deviating regulation can be part of the partnership agreement. In contrast to the 
general partners that have comprehensive information and inspection rights, 
limited partners only have limited control rights (sections 118 and 161 German 
Commercial Code). 
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2.4.6.4.3 Liability 
 
In general, a limited commercial partnership is liable for corporate debts with its 
corporate assets. In addition, the general partners are personally liable.                      
A limitation of the general partners’ liability to the corporate assets is not possible. 
In contrast, a limited partner is only liable to corporate debtors with their 
contribution as long as it has not been paid (section 171 German Commercial 
Code). However, the limitation of liability of the limited partner depends on the 
entry into the Register of Commerce. If the company has already started business 
and the creditor is not aware of the capacity as limited partner, they are liable 
without limitation (section 176 (1) German Commercial Code). As the limited 
liability company is only liable with its own assets (section 13 (2) Limited Liability 
Companies Act), the liability of the limited commercial partnership with a limited 
liability company as general partner is limited.  
 
2.4.6.4.4 Partnership agreement 
 
The limited commercial partnership with a limited liability company as general 
partner is established with the conclusion of the partnership agreement between 
the general partner, a limited liability company, and the limited partner. Moreover, 
it is to be notified to the Register of Commerce. The designation of the limited 
partners and the amount of contribution are to be stated (sections 106 and 162 
German Commercial Code). In general, the entries in the Register of Commerce 
are made known by publication (IHK, 2019). Compared to a limited liability 
company, changes of the partnership agreement are subject to notification to the 
Register of Commerce, but not subject to notarial certification (section 162 
German Commercial Code).  
 
An existing limited liability company is required. In contrast to the shareholders’ 
agreement of the limited liability company, the partnership agreement of a limited 
commercial partnership with a limited liability company as general partner neither 
requires notarial certification nor any form. Nevertheless, a comprehensive written 
partnership agreement is recommendable in order to avoid disputes between the 
partners. The following items are usually part of the agreement: object, corporate 
name, nature and scope of the partners’ contributions, amount of limited liability of 
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each limited partner, management and representation power, allocation of profits 
and losses and termination of the company. Normally, a change of partners is only 
possible with the consent of all partners unless the partnership agreement 
provides otherwise (IHK, 2019).  
 
2.4.6.4.5 Partnership contribution and profit participation 
 
The contributions of each partner can comprise cash, contributions in kind or the 
rendering of services. The modalities of payment can be freely agreed.                          
In general, the corporate assets jointly accrue to all partners, including the limited 
partners. The specific amount of money of each partner can be seen from the 
balance sheet (IHK, 2019). 
 
According to sections 121 and 168 of the German Commercial Code, each partner 
has the right to claim annual profit amounting to four percent of its contribution. 
More profit has to be distributed according to the number of partners. Furthermore, 
the partnership agreement can stipulate a different profit distribution (section 121 
German Commercial Code). In practice, partnership agreements often contain 
different profit distribution clauses. For example, results of tax balance sheets that 
are caused by one partner often justify different profit distribution (Rosenberger, 
2012).  
 
Where the limited partners are also shareholders of the limited liability company 
with the same participation quota, the limited liability company often has no 
participation quota and no voting rights. Therefore, the limited commercial 
partnership with a limited liability company as a general partner has to 
compensate the expenses of the limited liability company (section 670 German 
Civil Code). However, the general partner with unlimited liability is not obliged to 
make capital contributions at all (Heim, 2015a). 
 
2.4.6.4.6 Accounting, auditing and disclosure 
 
As a trading company, the limited commercial partnership with a limited liability 
company as general partner is required to keep accounting records and to draw up 
annual financial statements in the German language (section 252 German 
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Commercial Code), extended by notes with explanations (section 264 German 
Commercial Code). The annual financial statements of large and medium-sized 
limited commercial partnerships with a limited liability company as general partner 
have to be audited by an auditor (section 316 German Commercial Code). The 
limited liability company as general partner has to draw up separate annual 
financial statements. Furthermore, the annual financial statements and further 
documents of the limited commercial partnership with a limited liability company as 
general partner and of the limited liability company have to be disclosed within 
twelve months of the balance sheet date in the Federal Gazette (section 325 
German Commercial Code). Whereas small limited commercial partnerships with 
a limited liability company as general partner are obliged to disclose summarised 
balance sheets with notes, medium-sized and large companies have to disclose a 
balance sheet, a profit and loss account, notes, a management report, the audit 
certificate and the report by the supervisory board (sections 326 and 327 German 
Commercial Code). According to section 326 of the German Commercial Code, 
certain small companies can also fulfill their disclosure obligations by submitting 
the balance sheet in electronic form for permanent deposit with the operator of the 
Federal Gazette. Small companies that do not exceed at least two of the following 
three characteristics are called the smallest companies (section 267a German 
Commercial Code): Balance sheet total of 350,000 euros, sales in the twelve 
months preceding the balance sheet date of 700,000 euros and an annual 
average of ten employees.  
 
As the limited commercial partnership with a limited liability company as general 
partner consists of two companies, the costs of operating two companies are 
higher compared to a limited liability company. 
 
2.4.6.4.7 Taxation 
 
Concerning the taxation of the limited commercial partnership with a limited liability 
company as general partner, it is necessary to distinguish between the taxation of 
the limited commercial partnership, the limited liability company and the partners. 
As a partnership, the limited commercial partnership with a limited liability 
company as general partner is not subject to income or corporation tax. Moreover, 
the taxable profit is directly attributed to the partners and, depending on their legal 
  
 96 
form, it is subject to income or corporation tax. However, the limited commercial 
partnership with a limited liability company as general partner is obliged to pay 
trade tax. The basis of the taxation is the company profit, adjusted by special 
amounts and a tax allowance of 24,500 euros (sections 1-11 German Trade Tax 
Act). Then, each local authority charges its share of the overall basis at its own 
local rate within the range of 7-20 percent (PwC, 2018). Furthermore, the limited 
commercial partnership with a limited liability company as general partner is 
subject to German value added tax (section 1 German Value Added Tax Act). With 
regard to the taxation of the limited liability company as general partner, reference 
is made to paragraph 2.4.6.3.7. Where the limited liability company is solely limited 
partner of a limited commercial partnership, it does not have to pay trade tax (IHK, 
2019). The main advantage of a limited commercial partnership is that assets can 
be transferred to the company in a neutral way with regard to taxation (section 6 
German Income Tax Act). Moreover, partners of a limited commercial partnership 
with a limited liability company as general partner could treat their refinancing 
costs of equity contributions and shareholder loans as special business expenses 
and thus reduce their tax burden (section 15 German Income Tax Act). Compared 
to a limited liability company, this advantage makes the limited commercial 
partnership with a limited liability company as general partner more attractive for 
municipalities. 
 
2.4.6.5 Unified limited partnership  
 
The unified limited commercial partnership with a limited liability company as 
general partner is a special type of the limited commercial partnership with a 
limited liability company as general partner. In the so-called unified limited 
commercial partnership with a limited liability company as general partner, the 
limited commercial partnership is the only shareholder of the limited liability 
company. In turn, the limited liability company is the general partner of the limited 
commercial partnership. However, the limited partners are not shareholders of the 
limited liability company. The corporate form facilitates the change of partners as 
the limited partners are indirectly shareholders of the limited liability company 
(Heim, 2015a). 
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2.4.6.6 Limited partnership with a public limited company   
 
2.4.6.6.1 Company-specific features 
 
The limited commercial partnership with a public limited company as general 
partner is a combination of a limited commercial partnership and a public limited 
company. The public limited company as the only general partner with its 
management represents the limited commercial partnership with a public limited 
company as general partner. With regard to the legal and economic design, the 
limited commercial partnership with a public limited company as general partner 
corresponds more to a limited commercial partnership with a limited liability 
company as general partner than an original public limited company. There are 
only a few limited commercial partnerships with a public limited company as 
general partner in Germany, approximately between 500 and 1,000. Tax 
advantages and the independence of the management board of the public limited 
company from the influence of the shareholders are reasons for choosing this 
legal form (Werner, 2008). 
 
2.4.6.6.2 Taxation 
 
From the perspective of corporate taxation, the limited commercial partnership 
with a public limited company as general partner does not exist and municipalities 
as limited partners do not have to pay any taxes on the income from the grid 
owner company. In turn, the public limited company has to pay all income taxes. 
However, it requires that the municipalities only receive fixed returns on their 
equity contribution, do not carry any risks and do not participate in hidden reserves 
or hidden charges. Compared to a limited commercial partnership with a limited 
liability company as general partner, the participation and co-determination rights 
of the municipalities do not differ. The position of the municipality as a limited 
partner is comparable to a lender. According to the German Federal Fiscal Court, 
municipalities that do not participate in current or total profits of a partnership are 
not partners from the tax perspective (Bundesfinanzhof, 1993). The possibility of 
losing the capital contribution is not harmful. In return for the tax-free profits, 
municipalities are not allowed to deduct borrowing costs for capital contributions 
(Rosenberger, 2012). 
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Where the municipality and a private energy company as the former 
concessionaire establish a grid owner company, the financial risk is lower as the 
purchasing price of the grid is moderate compared to the sale to a third party or 
the grid being transferred to the grid owner company in exchange for 
shareholders’ equity. Moreover, the former revenue cap remains unchanged 
(Heim, 2015a). According to municipal law, for example section 122 of the Hessian 
Municipal Code, limited liability and limited participation in financial risks as well as 
securing influence on a grid owner company are required when choosing a private 
legal structure. 
 
2.4.7 Legal form and firm performance 
 
Key words: “firm performance” and “legal form”  
Time: no restriction 
Results: 2,330,000 citations (Google Scholar), 34 citations (SSRN), 317 (Business 
Source Ultimate) 
 
Research on the relationship between legal form as the independent variable and 
firm performance as the dependent variable is very rare. With the exception of 
three publications, the researcher has not identified any relevant contributions to 
the literature.  
 
First, in his journal article “Market Success and Factors of Success of 
Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms: An Interfirm Comparison of German 
Dairies on the Basis of Key Performance Indicators”, Zieseniß (2014) analyses the 
business performance of the German dairy industry based on the annual account 
data of the years from 2005 to 2007. The empirical work examines critical factors 
for the financial security and for the potential yield of the dairy industry. One 
research question focuses on the influence of the legal form as the independent 
variable on the firm performance of dairy companies as the dependent variable. 
The interfirm comparison of dairy-cooperatives and investor-owned dairies shows 
significant differences between the performances of the two groups. Among other 
tests, Mann-Whitney-U-tests are applied and the dependent variable is also 
measured by the ROA. According to the author, cooperatives have a higher 
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performance with regard to stability ratios and a lower performance with regard to 
earnings ratios (Zieseniß, 2014).  
 
Second, Ruester & Zschille (2010) investigate the impact of governance structure 
on firm performance, measured by retail prices, using a database of 765 German 
water suppliers. The authors use different econometric techniques to assess the 
impact of governance choice on firm performance, especially a simple OLS 
regression and a switching regression model. However, the explanatory power of 
the governance choice model has been very low.   
 
Third, Pudil, Pirozek, Somol & Komarkova (2016) examine the influence of legal 
form on firm performance, assessed by ROA. They gathered data from 222 
companies with various legal forms over the period 2011-2013 and applied a non-
linear regression model. Overall, the authors come to the conclusion that the 
independent variable legal form, with the characteristics of joint-stock companies, 
limited liability companies or other, has no significant influence on firm 
performance as the dependent variable.  
 
2.5 Conclusions and derivation of research hypotheses 
 
2.5.1 Conclusions on the literature review 
 
As a result of the systematic literature review, in this section the research gaps in 
the existing literature are identified with regard to the research questions 
formulated at the beginning of the thesis. They also form the basis for the 
derivation of the research hypotheses.  
 
Concerning research question 1 “What is the population of German grid owner 
companies?”, the systematic literature review on academic and practitioner 
literature from 2010 to 2019 on the new phenomenon known as grid owner 
companies shows that grid owner companies in Germany are already the subject 
of research by academics and practitioners, but from a narrative or qualitative 
perspective and with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of the process 
of remunicipalisation of public services. As with any new phenomenon, the first 
phase of research is often descriptive and seeking to categorise in some way. 
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Berlo and Wagner (2013b) state that public services in Germany are well 
researched. However, nobody has systematically taken stock of the grid owner 
companies already founded in Germany. 
Whereas for example Arnold (2012), Chen (2012), Kunze (2012), Rosenberger 
(2012), Tugendreich (2014) and Heim (2015a) have already discussed 
cooperation models or joint ventures theoretically, they do not refer to empirical 
cooperation models or joint ventures. Especially Kinkel (2014) investigates 
selected examples of newly established public utilities in the sense of a descriptive 
case study, but she does not refer to the population of German grid owner 
companies and especially their legal and financial characteristics.  
 
Overall, the systematic literature review shows that only a few authors have 
identified individual grid owner companies in Germany, but no one has determined 
the population of German grid owner companies yet. Prior studies mainly examine 
the advantages and disadvantages of remunicipalisation in combination with a 
general discussion of available cooperation models, including grid owner 
companies. In order to conduct further empirical research with the use of 
sampling, the total population of German grid owner companies has to be 
determined. In this context, the population of German grid owner companies as a 
concept comprises all elements of established grid owner companies in Germany. 
The research aims at identifying all grid owner companies (statistical units) at a 
specific date (temporal identification) in Germany (local identification). A partial 
investigation or an investigation on a random basis by means of descriptive 
statistics is out of the question. Thus, the fact that the population of German grid 
owner companies has not been determined yet constitutes the first identified 
research gap. To the researcher’s best knowledge, this is the first study that aims 
at determining the population of German grid owner companies. Simply, the 
researcher intends to fill this research gap by determining the population of 
German grid owner companies.  
 
With regard to research question 2 “How do firm size, ownership structure and 
legal form affect the firm performance of German grid owner companies?” the 
systematic literature review comes to the conclusion that neither the financial 
performance nor the relationships between firm size, ownership structure, legal 
form and firm performance of German grid owner companies have been 
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empirically researched yet. Whereas for example Arnold (2012), Chen (2012), 
Kunze (2012), Rosenberger (2012), Tugendreich (2014) and Heim (2015a) 
theoretically examine legal and ownership structures of cooperation models, they 
do not refer to empirical cooperation models or joint ventures, especially grid 
owner companies. Although Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer (2012) maintain that 
the question of ownership structure is not a decisive factor with regard to the 
success of remunicipalisation, the structure of ownership could be very important 
for net income and other financial outcomes of municipalities and energy 
companies as shareholders or partners of a grid owner company. In general, the 
percentage of ownership of municipalities or energy companies determines their 
influence on the relevant decisions in the grid owner company. The relevant 
decisions are decisions on the budget, the investment in the grids and the capital 
structure of the grid owner company. In particular, Heim (2015a) examines 
aspects of firm size, ownership structure and legal form with regard to grid owner 
companies. He concludes that a minimum size of local grids is required and can 
be achieved by large grid owner companies consisting of the local grids of several 
municipalities. According to him, preferred legal forms for cooperation models 
comprising grid owner companies are limited liability companies or limited liability 
partnerships with limited liability companies as general partners and a municipal 
majority shareholding with a cooperation partner as a minority shareholder (Heim, 
2015a). However, as Heim’s thesis belongs to the field of legal studies, no 
empirical evidence is given. The authors of the literature found mainly apply a 
narrative style to deal with the problems. Empirical data is rarely used. This could 
be the basis for further research, also to support the narrative arguments. 
Financial data from the Federal Gazette in Germany, official statistical data 
provided by the Statistical Offices of the German States in cooperation with the 
Federal Statistical Office or other sources could be used to analyse the 
phenomenon known as grid owner companies in Germany.  
 
Apart from the literature on grid owner companies, the research on critical drivers 
determining firm performance provides an extensive body of knowledge. In 
particular, the impacts of firm size, ownership structure and legal form on firm 
performance have been examined theoretically and empirically in numerous 
studies. However, there is no consensus on the effects as they are complex and 
empirically ambiguous: positive linear, negative linear, curvilinear or no relation at 
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all. With regard to the chosen research methods, most often quantitative empirical 
studies with regression methods were applied to measure the relationships 
between lots of different critical drivers and firm performance, especially panel 
data regression. 
  
Overall, the systematic literature review shows that the relationships between firm 
size, ownership structure, legal form and firm performance of German grid owner 
companies have yet to be examined. Therefore, the empirical analysis of the 
relationships between firm size, ownership structure, legal form and firm 
performance constitutes the second identified research gap. The researcher 
intends to fill this research gap by conducting empirical analyses on the 
relationships between firm size, ownership structure, legal form and firm 
performance of German grid owner companies. 
 
As a result of the preceding research gaps and research questions, a practical 
recommendation would enrich the research on German owner companies. 
However, with regard to research question 3 “What is the optimal design for 
profitable grid owner companies in Germany?” the relevant literature is rather 
limited. To the researcher’s best knowledge, nobody has addressed the question 
of the optimal design of German grid owner companies in order to achieve a high 
level of firm performance yet. Heim (2015a) is the only author who refers to the 
firm size, ownership structure and legal forms of grid owner companies. First, he 
argues that a minimum size of local grids is required and can be achieved by large 
grid owner companies comprising the local grids of several municipalities. Second, 
he claims that preferred legal forms for cooperation models consisting of grid 
owner companies are limited liability companies or limited partnerships with limited 
liability companies as general partners and a municipal majority shareholding with 
a cooperation partner as a minority shareholder (Heim, 2015a). However, due to 
the legal background of the thesis neither an empirical analysis is conducted nor a 
recommendation with regard to the level of firm performance made.  
 
Thus, the research gap is that there is no literature that focuses on the optimal 
design of profitable grid owner companies in Germany with regard to the level of 
firm performance. This is astonishing for three reasons. First, German municipal 
law, for example in Hesse, requires adherence to the economic principle when 
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operating an enterprise (sections 121 and 122 of the Hessian Municipal Code). 
Second, due to the fact that in the future further rights-of-way contracts will phase 
out and local as well as private energy companies have to make a decision to 
renew rights-of-way contracts or to establish grid owner companies, a quantitative 
aid to decision-making is needed. Third, many recently renewed rights-of-way 
contracts between municipalities and private energy companies contain options to 
establish grid owner companies (Tugendreich, 2014).  
 
To sum up, the determination of the optimal design for profitable grid owner 
companies in Germany represents a research gap. The researcher intends to 
close the research gap by conducting an empirical analysis on the relationships 
between firm size, ownership structure, legal form and firm performance of 
German grid owner companies. At the end, a recommendation on the optimal 
design of German grid owner companies from a financial perspective will be made.  
 
2.5.2 Derivation of research hypotheses 
 
2.5.2.1 General remarks 
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 715), a research hypothesis is “an 
informed speculation, which is set up to be tested, about the possible relationship 
between two or more variables”. Kerlinger (1968, p. 27) goes even further and 
points out that “hypothesis is the most powerful tool man has invented to achieve 
dependable knowledge”. In contrast to a normal speculation, a hypothesis must be 
amenable to being confirmed or disconfirmed through gathering and analysing 
empirical data (Nenty, 2009). Based on the theoretical background, especially the 
systematic literature review, the expected influence of firm size, private 
participation quota and legal form on firm performance of German grid owner 
companies is derived in the following section. In other words, the expected 
relationships between firm size, ownership structure, legal form as independent 
variables and firm performance of German grid owner companies as the 
dependent variable are developed. Moreover, the relevant hypotheses are 
formulated. 
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2.5.2.2 Firm size and firm performance 
 
The results of the systematic literature review form the basis of the expectation 
about the relationship between firm size and firm performance of German grid 
owner companies. In general, the literature on firm size and its effects on firm 
performance is enormous (Lazăr, 2016a). The theoretical work of Baumol (1967) 
represents the starting point of the research on the relationship between firm size 
and firm performance. According to him, the firm size-dependent amount of 
borrowing costs is a decisive factor why larger companies have a higher 
performance than smaller ones (Baumol, 1967). As a result, numerous empirical 
studies have been carried out, ranging from no relationship at all to a negative 
relationship as well as a positive relationship between firm size and firm 
performance (Nunes & Serrasqueiro, 2015; Lazăr, 2016a; Schmidt, 1995). 
 
First, according to the empirical study of Glancey (1998), situated in the 
entrepreneurship context, there is no significant relationship between firm size and 
firm performance. Glancey (1998) uses employee numbers as a measure of firm 
size. In another empirical study concerning the relationship between firm size and 
firm performance, Lazăr (2016a) also finds no effect at all when the number of 
employees is used as a proxy for firm size. As German grid owner companies 
normally do not have any employees with the exception of the management, the 
results of both empirical studies could not be applied to German grid owner 
companies. Hence, it is not expected that there is no relationship between firm 
size and firm performance of German grid owner companies.   
 
Second, in their empirical study Goddard et al. (2005) come to the conclusion that 
a negative and statistically significant relationship between firm size and firm 
performance exists. Thereby, firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets and profitability by the ROA (Goddard et al., 2005). Lazăr (2016a) also 
finds a negative effect of firm size on corporate performance when size is 
expressed in total assets and sales. However, due to the application of the fixed 
effects model being conditional on the sample, the results cannot be extrapolated, 
certainly not to privately-held companies (Lazăr, 2016a). On the one hand, 
German grid owner companies are not listed companies and belong to privately-
held companies. They are not subject to market economy rules. Moreover, they 
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are subject to regulation. On the other hand, they are large in terms of population, 
area or annual turnover. To measure firm size by the natural logarithm of total 
assets in combination with the measurement of firm performance by the ROA 
seems to be a circular argument as total assets are the denominator of the ROA. 
Hence, it is not expected that there is a significant negative relationship between 
firm size and firm performance of German grid owner companies.   
 
Third, the systematic literature review shows that several empirical studies, in 
particular the research of Asimakopoulos et al. (2009), Lee (2009), Nanda and 
Panda (2018), Nunes and Serrasqueiro (2015), Pratheepan (2014), Yazdanfar 
(2013) and Zaid et al. (2014), discover a positive and significant relationship 
between firm size and firm performance by applying regression analyses. Thereby, 
the natural logarithm of sales as the independent variable and the ROA as the 
dependent variable are often applied. Thus, a positive relationship between firm 
size and firm performance of grid owner companies is expected. In fact, there is no 
empirical research on the relationship between firm size and firm performance of 
German grid owner companies yet. In the context of grid owner companies, only 
one author comments on their size. Heim (2015a) comes to the conclusion that the 
establishment of individual grid owner companies all over Germany leads to higher 
network charges due to the fixed costs of the individual grid owner companies. As 
section 1 of the German Energy Industry Act seeks to ensure the reasonably-
priced public supply of electricity and gas, Heim (2015a) concludes that a 
minimum size of local grids is required and can be achieved by large grid owner 
companies consisting of the local grids of several municipalities. Based on the 
argumentation, a positive relationship between firm size and firm performance of 
German grid owner companies is expected. This leads to the following hypothesis 
that shall be verified by the empirical evidence of this thesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between firm size and firm 
performance of grid owner companies. 
 
2.5.2.3 Ownership structure and firm performance 
 
The literature on the impact of ownership structure, more precisely municipal or 
state versus private ownership, on firm performance is also extensive. The results 
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of the impact of ownership on firm performance are diverse. A popular postulation 
is that privately-owned companies are more efficient and more profitable than 
state-owned companies or in turn state ownership may adversely affect firm 
performance (Chan et al., 2018; Megginson & Netter, 2001). Whereas ordinary 
shareholders usually strive for profit and wealth maximisation, a high degree of 
state ownership could lead to pursuing competing goals, for example social or 
political objectives, suffering from high agency cost or lacking private property 
rights to facilitate efficient resource allocation (Alfaraih et al., 2012; Boardman & 
Vining, 1989; Capobianco & Christiansen, 2011; Chan et al., 2018; Martin & 
Parker, 1997; Phung & Mishra, 2016; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Villalonga, 2000). Based on the findings in the literature, a positive influence of 
private ownership on firm performance of German grid owner companies is 
expected. An interesting aspect is introduced by Heim (2015a). He argues that an 
important requirement for the profitability of a grid owner company is the expertise 
to operate a grid and the economic power of the private energy company. In 
general, municipalities have neither capital nor know-how or experience to operate 
a grid (Heim, 2015a). Consequently, the participation and contribution of the 
private energy company in a grid owner company seems to generate value and 
firm performance. Therefore, the ownership structure should be analysed in terms 
of private ownership percentage. As a consequence, the research hypothesis is as 
follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the percentage of private ownership, the higher the level 
of firm performance of German grid owner companies. 
 
2.5.2.4 Legal form and firm performance 
 
Research on the relationship between legal form and firm performance is very 
rare. With the exception of three publications, the researcher has not found any 
relevant empirical contribution to literature.  
 
Zieseniß (2014) focuses on the influence of the legal form (independent variable) 
on the firm performance of dairy companies (dependent variable). He argues that 
cooperatives have disadvantages in earnings indictors compared to other legal 
forms, particularly a lower level of ROA. First, as the focus of the study is on 
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cooperatives that are not the subject of the research on grid owner companies, the 
results are not applicable. Second, whereas the dairy industry has market-based 
structures, grid owner companies as part of the German energy sector belong to 
the regulated environment. Hence, the results of Zieseniß (2014) with regard to 
the relationship between legal form and firm performance cannot be applied to grid 
owner companies.  
 
Although the German water distribution sector is more comparable to the energy 
sector, the results of Ruester & Zschille (2010) who investigate the impact of 
governance structures on firm performance do not help in indicating the possible 
relationship between legal form and firm performance of German grid owner 
companies as firm performance is measured by retail prices that grid owner 
companies do not have.  
 
In their empirical study, Pudil et al. (2016) come to the conclusion that the 
independent variable legal form, with the characteristics of joint-stock companies, 
limited liability companies or other, has no significant influence on firm 
performance, assessed by the ROA as the dependent variable. Actually, the 
assumption should be that legal form has no significant influence on firm 
performance of German grid owner companies. However, Pudil et al. (2016) do 
not refer to grid owner companies at all.  
 
Heim (2015a) points out that preferred legal forms for grid owner companies are 
limited liability companies or limited partnerships with limited liability companies as 
general partners and a municipal majority shareholding with a cooperation partner 
as a minority shareholder (Heim, 2015a). As Heim’s thesis belongs to the field of 
legal studies, no empirical evidence is given. It rather seems to be a statement in 
view of his professional practice. Moreover, the publication of the German 
Association of Towns and Municipalities points out that all private legal forms that 
are permitted by German municipal law could be suitable for a cooperation 
company. In particular, it is mentioned that the limited partnership with a limited 
liability company as general partner would be preferred by the founders (DStGB, 
2017). However, no explanation for this statement, i.e. why the limited partnership 
with a limited liability company as general partner seems to be the most preferred 
legal form, is given.  
  
 108 
Although there is no evident theoretical or empirical basis for the relationship 
between legal form and firm performance of German grid owner companies in the 
literature, the statement of the German Association of Towns and Municipalities 
indicates that the limited partnership with a limited liability company as general 
partner would be preferred by the founders (DStGB, 2017). Furthermore, it should 
be noted that limited partnerships with a limited liability company as general 
partner have a lower overall tax burden than limited liability companies (sections 
2.4.6.3.7 and 2.4.6.4.7). This could be the starting point for the following research 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Grid owner companies in Germany that are limited partnerships 
have a higher firm performance than grid owner companies that are limited liability 
companies. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The methodology chapter of this thesis addresses two important aspects. On the 
one hand, the research philosophy or research paradigm as a basic belief system 
or worldview that guides the researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) is presented 
(methodology part). The researcher examines how adopting realist, 
constructionist, interventionist and positivist research approaches might affect the 
understanding of the research questions and shape the creation of a research 
design to address these questions. Therefore, the four research approaches and 
their adaptations are discussed. The discussion is mainly focused on the 
differences between the four approaches, the role of the researcher’s values for 
different approaches and the required skills needed for different approaches. This 
also comprises a critical evaluation and adaptation of the most suitable approach 
with regard to the selected research topic and the specific research questions. On 
the other hand, the procedures of gathering, analysing and presenting data on grid 
owner companies in Germany are outlined (methods part). The total population of 
grid owner companies in Germany as well as the relevant characteristics and 
variables are determined with regard to the research questions. The procedures 
for obtaining the data and the obtainable types of data are presented, including the 
relevant methods. In this step, the researcher is concerned with using a number of 
techniques of quantitative data analysis to reduce the amount of data gathered, to 
test for relationships between variables and to develop ways of presenting the 
results of the analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2011). It also involves looking at the data 
graphically to identify general trends (Field, 2013). Moreover, analysing data 
means fitting statistical models to the data and seeing whether or not it supports 
the hypotheses that are defined in statistical formulas. It is important to be fully 
aware of what techniques will be applied at an early stage, because one cannot 
apply any technique to any variable and the size and the nature of a sample could 
impose limitations on the techniques that can be used (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
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3.2 Research designs and research philosophies 
 
3.2.1 Definitions 
 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the researcher has to make decisions 
about how research should be conducted or how research activities have to be 
organised. The so-called research designs also include the gathering of data.                        
In short, it is making choices about what will be observed and how it will be 
observed (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012). The choices of research 
objectives and methods are often determined by philosophical views on the world. 
This means that the approach chosen by the researcher depends on their 
perspective on and underlying assumptions about the world. According to Moses 
and Knutsen (2012), any given research design and choice of methods is 
underpinned by a researcher’s understanding of the nature of the world. Ryan, 
Scapens & Theobald (2002) point out that our values determine the way we 
conduct research. This understanding is typically expressed in the terms 
“ontology” and “epistemology” (Davies & Hughes, 2014). Ontology is a theory of 
the nature of social entities and deals with the nature of reality and existence 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011); this means “the study of being” (Moses & Knutsen, 2012, 
p. 4). The relevant questions are how the researcher views and perceives the 
social world, its rules and its structures (Davies & Hughes, 2014). Thus, “the world 
can be perceived in different and contrasting ways” (Moses & Knutsen, 2012, p. 
6). The philosophical concept of epistemology denotes a theory of knowledge or 
the philosophical study of knowledge (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). It is a stance on 
what should be seen as acceptable knowledge (Bryman & Bell, 2011) and refers 
to assumptions about the best ways of inquiring into the nature of the physical and 
social worlds (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). The relevant questions are what 
constitutes knowledge and how knowledge can be developed (Davies & Hughes, 
2014). Finally, a methodology in the sense of a framework has to be chosen, 
namely research techniques and methods are grouped together to provide a 
coherent research picture (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). In fact, the two terms 
“methods” and “methodology” are not synonyms. While the term method denotes 
research techniques, the term methodology refers to concepts, theories and 
principles of reasoning on a subject (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). Moses and 
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Knutsen (2012) recommend thinking of methods as tools and methodologies as 
toolboxes.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to understand the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. On the one hand, quantitative research methods 
can be fast and economical. On the other, they seem to be inflexible and artificial. 
Moreover, they are not very effective in understanding processes or the 
significance that people attach to actions. They make it hard for policymakers to 
infer what changes and actions should take place in the future. In contrast, data 
gathered can be used to support the covert goals of decision-makers (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012).  
 
Thus, in the following section, four common philosophical positions are discussed 
and their application to this research is challenged.  
 
3.2.2 Realist perspectives on the research problem 
 
Realism is a philosophical stance that originates from the traditions of the natural 
sciences (Davies & Hughes, 2014). The underlying assumption is that the physical 
and social worlds exist independently of any observations or perceptions made 
about them by the researcher (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2011). In short, there is a reality with objects that is independent of the 
human mind and is influenced by the context (Saunders et al., 2011).  
 
In contrast to realism, relativism assumes that scientific laws are created by 
people (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Several manifestations of realism can be 
distinguished, in particular traditional realism, transcendental realism, critical 
realism, empirical realism or internal realism (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012). The supporters of traditional realism assume that the world is 
material and external and observations have a direct linkage to the real 
phenomena being examined (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). A further modification 
of realism is transcendental realism. According to this philosophical position, 
research refers to real objects in the natural or social worlds that act quite 
independently of the researcher (Bhaskar, 1989; Bryman & Bell, 2011). Combining 
elements of naturalism and constructionism, Moses and Knutsen (2012) point out 
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that critical (or scientific) realism is a response to the critique that social 
phenomena cannot be approached in the same manner as phenomena in natural 
sciences. Critical realism deals with the identification of structures that generate 
the social world being studied. In other words, it focuses on providing an 
explanation for organisational events by examining the underlying causes and 
mechanisms (Saunders et al., 2011). In general, the supporters of critical realism 
aim at identifying structures and changing them in order to overcome inequalities 
and injustices. Whereas positivism is empiricist, critical realism is not, because 
structures identified may not be amenable to the senses as they are internal 
representations of the external world (Bryman & Bell, 2011). According to 
Saunders et al. (2011, p. 136) critical realists argue that “our knowledge of reality 
is a result of social conditioning and cannot be understood independently of the 
social actors involved in the knowledge derivation process”. This means that 
researchers will only be able to understand the social world if they understand the 
social structures of the relevant phenomena; there is a bigger picture. To 
experience the world, two steps are needed. First, there is an object of the real 
world that we perceive and second, there is a mental processing afterwards 
(Saunders et al., 2011).  
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012, p. 29) describe that critical realism “recognises social 
conditions (such as class or wealth) as having real consequences whether or not 
they are observed and then incorporates a relativist thread, which recognises that 
social life is both generated by the actions of individuals, and also has an external 
impact on them”. Moreover, the structure of critical realism is characterised by 
three levels. First, the empirical domain that refers to the experiences and 
perceptions that people have. Second, the actual denotes events and actions that 
take place whether or not they are observed. Third, the real represents 
mechanisms that cannot be detected directly, but which have real consequences 
for people and society (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). As supporters of critical 
realism argue that social facts are social constructions agreed on by people rather 
than existing independently, critical realist notions of causality cannot be reduced 
to statistical correlations and quantitative methods (Saunders et al., 2011). 
Moreover, critical realism corresponds with a range of research methods; 
nevertheless, specific choices of research methods should depend on the object of 
study (Moses & Knutsen, 2012).  
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Another development of realism is empirical realism. The underlying assumption of 
empirical realism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) is that reality can be understood 
through the use of appropriate methods (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Bhaskar (1989) 
criticises that empirical realism seems to be superficial, because it does not 
recognise that there are enduring structures and generative mechanisms 
underlying what can be observed. The representatives of internal realism point out 
that reality is independent of the observer, but that scientists can only access that 
reality indirectly by gathering evidence in fundamental physical processes. In 
short, it is impossible to gain objective information about an object, because the 
experiment itself determines the state of the object being studied. However, the 
representatives of internal realism accept that scientific laws once discovered are 
independent of further observations (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Putnam, 1988). 
Qualitative methods such as case studies and convergent interviews are often 
applied in realism research (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
 
Applied to the research topic of German grid owner companies, a qualitative 
based realist approach to research provides the opportunity to investigate causal 
relationships in a case study without the need to control for variables as they are 
less appropriate for explaining the social structures that underlie such patterns 
(Roberts, 2014). The authors featuring in the systematic literature review, for 
example Arnold (2012), Kunze (2012), Rosenberger (2012) and Heim (2015a), 
mainly apply a narrative approach to deal with the topic. Words rather than 
quantification in the gathering and analysis of data are emphasised by qualitative 
researchers (Bryman & Bell, 2011). This way of conducting research is compatible 
with the idea of (critical) realism. The research with regard to grid owner 
companies as well as critical realism deal with the identification of structures. The 
skill of the researcher could be demonstrated by exploring new relationships and 
patterns within a single grid owner company (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). The 
supporters of critical realism aim at identifying structures and changing them in 
order to overcome inequalities and injustices (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The 
advantage of research on grid owner companies from a critical realist perspective 
could be that structural and cultural conditions could be seen as having an 
existence independent of social interaction. The structures or conditions of a grid 
owner company and the accounting practices exist, but they are not wholly 
determined by management, supervisory board members or shareholders of a grid 
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owner company. In general, critical realists claim that an entity could exist 
independently of our knowledge of it (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The researcher 
remains detached from the object to be investigated and is able to look for 
patterns or causal relations which are not directly accessible (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012).  
 
However, as the researcher is interested in determining the population of German 
grid owner companies and analysing the relationships between firm size, 
ownership structure and legal form as critical drivers of firm performance of grid 
owner companies in Germany, the realist paradigm is less suitable. Overall, after 
having determined the population of German grid owner companies and analysed 
the relationships between firm size, ownership structure, legal form and firm 
performance, further research might focus on the social structures that underline 
the patterns with regard to German grid owner companies. Furthermore, as the 
phenomenon of German grid owner companies is relatively new and much of 
critical realist research takes the form of in-depth historical analysis of social and 
organisational structures, and how they change over time (Saunders et al., 2011), 
the researcher does not choose the realist paradigm.  
 
3.2.3 Constructionist perspectives on the research problem 
 
As defined by Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 713), constructionism is an ontological 
position that states that “social phenomena and their meanings are continually 
being accomplished by social actors”, i.e. social phenomena are social 
constructions. Constructionism is an interpretive approach (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012). In contrast to the views of positivism and realism, representatives of 
constructionism believe that reality is socially constructed or determined and given 
meaning by people. The assumption is that there is no absolute truth, and that 
truth becomes constructed (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Famous authors of 
(social) constructionism are Berger and Luckman (1966), Shotter (1993) or 
Watzlawick (1984). They focus on the ways that people make sense of the social 
world, particularly by sharing their experiences with others via language (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012). The patterns of interest are constructed by the observer and 
society (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). Nevertheless, representatives of 
constructionism argue that social phenomena are not only produced through 
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interaction, but that they are in a constant state of revision. This is important, 
because social interactions between actors are a continual process. Therefore, it 
is necessary to study the details of a situation in order to understand the action 
(Saunders et al., 2011). Knowledge is regarded as indeterminate, because the 
researcher always presents a specific version of social reality (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). Driven by the idea that reality is not external, but determined by social 
actions of people, researchers should not gather facts and measure how often 
certain patterns occur. They should rather appreciate the different constructions 
and meanings that people place upon their experience. The focus of research is 
on people’s feelings and thinking and the ways of communication with each other.                                                
In this context, the medium of language plays an important role (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012). People’s behaviour is not explained by external causes or fundamental 
laws, but rather by the sense that people make of different situations. 
Constructionists try to understand the meaning of a social action for a social agent 
(Moses & Knutsen, 2012). The observer is part of what is being researched and 
aims to understand the relevant situation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Because of 
the assumption that there may be many different realities, as understood by 
people, the researcher has to focus on multiple perspectives by a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Easterby-Smith 
et al. (2012) distinguish between “normal” constructionism and “strong” 
constructionism. Whereas normal constructionism allows a difference between 
individual and social knowledge, strong constructionism does not. Often described 
as “triangulation”, normal constructionists gather different views and experiences 
of different people through a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. In 
contrast, strong constructionists aim at understanding how people invent 
structures to help them make sense of what is going on around them, focusing on 
the use of language and conversations between people (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012). Concerning the strengths and weaknesses of constructionism, Easterby-
Smith et al. (2012) emphasise the ability to examine change processes over time, 
to understand people’s meanings, to adjust to new issues and to develop new 
theories (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Furthermore, the gathering of data will be 
more natural (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012), for example by analysing language. In 
contrast, a thorough gathering and interpretation of qualitative data is very time-
consuming and suffers from low credibility from policymakers due to a vast amount 
of subjective opinions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
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A possible research design for constructionists is archival research. In general, 
archival research consists of the “collection and analysis of public documents 
relating mainly to organisational or governmental strategies” by a detached 
researcher (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 339). Its focus is primarily on textual 
information and its analysis (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Smith (2014) applies a 
broad approach to the term archival. According to him, archival research refers to 
research based on historical documents, texts, journal articles, corporate annual 
reports or company disclosures. He distinguishes between primary and secondary 
sources or data. Primary data denotes original research results published for the 
first time and secondary data refers to aggregated information or information which 
has been reworked in databases (Smith, 2014). Preferred sources of archival data 
in business and management research are the annual reports from companies 
that contain statements from management with achievements from the past year 
and plans for the next year (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
 
Another constructionist process is ethnography. Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 714) 
define ethnography as “a research method in which the researcher immerses him- 
or herself in a social setting for an extended period of time, observing behaviour, 
listening to what is said in conversations both between others and with the 
fieldworker, and asking questions”. This strong form of constructionism aims at 
understanding the meanings and behaviour of a group of people under study 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Furthermore, ethnographers can also use narrative 
methods. Narrative methods concentrate on collecting stories told among 
organisational members. By collecting organisational stories, the researcher will 
gain insights into organisational life. On the one hand, the researcher could 
become part of the process of constructing stories and on the other, the 
researcher could ask people for stories they have heard. Depending on the role of 
the researcher, narrative research could be seen as more detached or more 
involved. For example, if the researcher encourages people to invent new stories, 
the research design is more involved (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Concerning 
the weaknesses of narrative methods, the critics argue that they do not provide 
additional value compared to usual qualitative research. Strengths can be seen in 
a holistic perspective towards organisational behaviour, in the development of 
social histories of identity and in the examination of relationships between 
individuals and the wider organisation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
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Applied to the research of grid owner companies, a constructionist would take the 
view that a grid owner company is not objective, but is socially constructed and 
governed by people. In short, a grid owner company can be seen as a social 
phenomenon. The manner in which assets are used and other decisions are made 
in a grid owner company can also be seen as having a constructed meaning that 
depends on the people involved. The different structures of a grid owner company, 
for example the different board structures, depend on the social actors, i.e. the 
board members. All relationships inside and outside the company are determined 
by the social interaction of the people involved. The focus of research is on the 
social actors and their interaction. From a constructionist perspective, different 
motives and experiences of the people involved, could contribute to the variety of 
structures of grid owner companies. Thus, different structures of grid owner 
companies and even different accounting practices are the result of the different 
social interactions of people.  
 
In contrast to the philosophical view of realism, the focus of research is not 
primarily on the legal structures and accounting figures, but on the people’s 
feelings, thinking and the ways of communication (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). In 
a grid owner company, management, supervisory board and shareholders’ 
meeting are typical boards. The members of these committees communicate with 
each other. So, the medium of language plays an important role in grid owner 
companies, too (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Taking the constructionist research 
philosophy to investigate the phenomenon of German grid owner companies from 
a constructionist perspective would require detailed investigations of the 
behaviours, views, motivations and experiences of the social actors in a grid 
owner company. On the one hand, the reasons why shareholders of a grid owner 
company, i.e. representatives of local government and of private energy 
companies, decide to establish a grid owner company could be investigated. On 
the other, the behaviours of social actors in different situations of a grid owner 
company’s daily business could be emphasised. This approach is underpinned by 
the statement of Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) that the constructionist researcher is 
interested in the reasons for decision-making situations and not how often certain 
patterns occur.  
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Another important aspect could be the social context of a grid owner company. 
Even the market requirements of private energy companies, the guidelines of local 
government as well as the requirements of the German Federal Network Agency 
for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways that are important for 
grid owner companies are social constructions. Due to the fact that social 
phenomena are in a constant state of revision (Bryman & Bell, 2011), different 
developments of grid owner companies over time could be investigated. The 
specific research questions could be examined by interviews with the board 
members of a grid owner company. Furthermore, annual reports of grid owner 
companies in Germany that were founded in recent years could be examined. 
Especially the annual reports of grid owner companies which have to be published 
in the Federal Gazette in Germany could be analysed. They contain verbal 
management statements of information, for example financial and legal structures, 
the course of business, the composition of boards, and the development of annual 
net income. So, the relationship between the structure of ownership and the firm 
performance of a grid owner company could be examined by narrative methods. 
Due to the fact that qualitative methods are more effective in understanding the 
significance that people attach to action, in this case management, archival 
research seems to be a suitable approach to address the research topic. Besides, 
a single case study could be used to look in depth at one grid owner company. 
Case method could be defined as a research design that focuses on one, or a 
small number of, organisations, events or individuals, over time (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012). In general, case study methods are recommendable when a 
contemporary phenomenon should be analysed, the researcher has little control 
over events and questions like “how” or “why” are being examined (Yin, 2003). 
  
In contrast to realism, the research quality of constructionist designs and the 
generalisation of outcomes are often questioned (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) point out that the results of constructionist research 
should be believable and they should be reached through transparent methods. In 
this context, the explanations of the researcher and how he or she gained access 
to an organisation, how data was created and how data was analysed are 
emphasised (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Although the research on several board 
members of specific grid owner companies and their feelings could produce useful 
insights into the nature of social interactions, the researcher of this thesis is 
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interested in the relationships between firm size, ownership structure, legal form 
and firm performance of grid owner companies in Germany. In short, due to the 
accounting background of the researcher, he focuses on financial and accounting 
figures, independent of the social actors’ feelings. The generalisation of 
characteristics of grid owner companies, their typologies and their financial 
outcomes are more interesting than the feelings and experiences of the social 
actors of grid owner companies. As financial and accounting figures exist 
independently of social interaction, the constructionist approach will not be applied 
by the researcher. Maybe in future research, social actors with their feelings and 
communication in individual grid owner companies could be examined. 
Nevertheless, in order to support quantitative research on grid owner companies, 
archival research referring to statements of management could contribute to the 
bigger picture. Thus, it could contribute to practitioner knowledge. However, the 
population of German grid owner companies has to be determined in general 
before the involved people become subjects of research.    
 
3.2.4 Interventionist (active) perspectives on the research problem 
 
In contrast to the research perspectives discussed above, the supporters of 
interventionism or active research, especially Lewin (1947), assume that social 
phenomena are continually changing, and are not static. Action research works 
through a cyclical four-step process: planning, taking action, evaluating that action, 
leading to further planning then repeat (Rock & Levin, 2002). Theory building is 
incremental, moving through a cycle of developing theory, to action, to reflection, 
to developing theory, gradually from the particular to the general (Eden & Huxham, 
2007). The researcher is no longer objective and independent from the object of 
study. Action research is participative and demands an integral involvement by the 
researcher (Eden & Huxham, 2007). The researcher becomes part of the research 
process itself, because the best way of learning about an organisation or social 
system is through attempting to change it. This should be an objective of the 
action researcher. According to Coughlan and Coghlan (2002), action research 
aims at taking action and creating knowledge and theory about that action. It is an 
approach to research that seeks understanding by attempting to change the 
situation under investigation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Action research is 
primarily a qualitative approach, although Davies and Hughes (2014) point out that 
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the action researcher can use both, quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
Moreover, it is intended to lead to the solution of specific problems. This means 
that the action researcher and the client collaborate in the diagnosis of a problem 
and in finding a solution based on the diagnosis. The researcher is part of the 
organisation that requires the solution and generates a list of actions to solve a 
problem (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The output of combining action with research 
results from “involvement with members of an organisation” (Eden & Huxham, 
1996, p. 75). Therefore, it is an approach that links researchers and practitioners 
and it is useful in researching and solving problems in organisations such as 
learning and change (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Writing about research outcomes of 
an action research project represents an important aspect of theory exploration 
and development (Eden & Huxham, 2007). Similar approaches are feminism as 
well as collaborative and participative forms of enquiry (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
From a historical view, the idea of action research reached its peak with the 
community development movement and feminist activism in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Radical campaigners built research elements into their 
programmes, with the aim of achieving interaction between the accumulation of 
evidence and the implementation of funded projects. The central idea is that once 
researchers have identified areas of need, change will be more easily achievable 
(Davies & Hughes, 2014). The reflection and data gathering process as well as the 
emergent theories are most valuably focused on the aspects that cannot be 
captured by other approaches (Eden & Huxham, 2007). 
 
According to the definition of Argyris, Putnam, and Smith (1985), action research 
can be defined as follows (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 413): 
 
• “Experiments are on real problems within an organization and are designed 
to assist in their solution. 
• This involves an iterative process of problem identification, planning, action, 
and evaluation. 
• Action research leads eventually to re-education, changing patterns of 
thinking, and action. This depends on the participation of research subjects 
(who are often referred to in action research as clients) in identifying new 
courses of action. 
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• It is intended to contribute both to academic theory and practical action.”  
With regard to the strengths and weaknesses of action research in the context of 
qualitative methods, Bryman and Bell (2011) emphasise that in most cases action 
researchers are already part of the organisations and have a thorough 
understanding of the setting in order to conduct their research. In general, they 
have insights and are used to the object that is being examined (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). However, the close relationship between the researcher and the members 
of an organisation or a project could have a negative impact on the research 
outcomes, too. Critics of action research often consider it as a mere consultancy 
project (Coughlan & Coghlan, 2002). Furthermore, action research can be 
criticised for its lack of repeatability and lack of rigour. Each action research 
project is situational and more or less unique. Therefore, it is difficult to generalise 
the results and to describe how to carry out such projects (Adams, Hoque, & 
McNicholas, 2006). It is important for action research to resist making assumptions 
before the action begins, because alternative interpretations are possible if pre-
understanding is suppressed (Eden & Huxham, 1996). The combination of action 
and research could lead to difficulties of project control and it could be very time-
consuming, because all participants of the project have to be involved substantially 
(Adams et al., 2006).  
 
Because action research is a variant of applied research (Bryman & Bell, 2011), it 
could be a potential research approach to examine research questions concerning 
the new phenomenon known as grid owner companies in Germany. The 
researcher could be involved in a process of setting up a grid owner company in 
Germany, because he is an employee of a company which often founds grid 
owner companies together with local municipalities. While setting up a new grid 
owner company, the author could examine and influence a variety of decisions. 
For example, the author could be involved in the decision on the legal structures of 
a grid owner company, the composition of its boards, the structure of ownership 
and other relevant characteristics that could have an influence on the performance 
or net income of a grid owner company. By this, the author becomes an integral 
member of a team commissioned to bring about some new development, a 
change in policy or a challenge to existing practice. However, the philosophy of 
action research stems from the idea that knowledge is power. So, problems 
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sometimes can arise if the researcher’s findings do not coincide with the ideas of 
the employer. Although action research is suitable while making changes within an 
organisation or its parts in order to understand the dynamic forces within (Bryman 
& Bell, 2011), the employment of the researcher could be prejudicial to the 
outcome. Furthermore, municipalities as potential owners are often skeptical about 
research activities while setting up a grid owner company. A process began ten 
years ago to phase out more than 20,000 rights-of-way contracts for electricity and 
gas grids throughout Germany. So, the idea of establishing cooperation models, 
for example grid owner companies, is relatively new. As the process of setting up 
grid owner companies in Germany is still going on, “an approach to research that 
seeks understanding through attempting to change the situation under 
investigation” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 339) is not suitable. Maybe in future, 
when a steady state of grid owner companies has been reached, action research 
could be applied to change existing situations. Yet, the act of setting up a grid 
owner company could be a possible situation for applying action research design. 
However, whereas in action research qualitative research methods are used, the 
objectives of this research are more compatible with quantitative research 
methods. On the one hand, the determination of the population of German grid 
owner companies as well as the analysis of relationships between firm size, 
ownership structure, legal form and firm performance of grid owner companies in 
Germany from a financial perspective require quantitative approaches. On the 
other hand, the recommendation on the optimal design for profitable German grid 
owner companies will be based on the quantitative findings.  
 
3.2.5 Positivist perspectives on the research problem 
 
Based on the ideas of Comte (1853), the key idea of positivism as an 
epistemological position is that the social world exists externally, and that objective 
methods are required to measure its properties. Bryman and Bell (2011) specify 
the objective methods by asserting that positivism comprises the application of the 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of the social reality and beyond. 
Thereby, epistemology refers to views about the most appropriate ways of 
enquiring about the nature of the world (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Referring to 
the philosophical stance of the natural scientist, positivists gather data about 
observable objects and try to find patterns in the data in order to produce law-like 
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generalisations. This comprises the application of scientific empiricist methods 
designed to yield pure data and facts uninfluenced by human interpretation or bias 
and accessible to replication. However, there are also positivist researchers that 
seek to quantify qualitative data by applying hypothesis testing to data gathered in 
in-depth interviews (Saunders et al., 2011). In general, positivism is difficult to 
outline as it is used in a number of ways by different authors, ranging from a 
descriptive category to a superficial data gathering. With regard to the question of 
what is regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline, positivism postulates 
that only phenomena and knowledge confirmed by the senses can be warranted 
as knowledge. Knowledge is generated by the gathering of facts that provide the 
basis for laws. Science can be conducted in an objective way that is also value 
free (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Pugh (1983) emphasises the distinction between facts 
and values and made systematic comparisons across entities that would enable 
generalisations about the relationship between size, technology and structure. The 
role of research or theory is to generate hypotheses that can be tested and that 
will thereby allow explanations of laws to be assessed and to be developed 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). Either the positivist researcher starts with hypotheses and 
then seeks data to confirm or disconfirm it, or the researcher develops several 
hypotheses and uses data to select the correct one (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
However, it does not mean that the positivist researcher necessarily has to start 
with existing theory (Saunders et al., 2011). 
 
The main philosophical assumptions of positivism are as follows (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2012): 
 
• The observer has to be independent from what is being observed. 
• Objective criteria rather than human beliefs and interests determine the 
manner of the study. 
• Identifying causal explanations and fundamental laws. 
• Hypothesising fundamental laws and then accepting or falsifying 
hypotheses. 
• Facts have to be measured quantitatively. 
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• Reduction of problems into the simplest possible elements. 
• Generalisation by selecting random samples from which inferences can be 
drawn about the population. 
• Making comparisons of variations across samples.  
As the researcher aims to gather quantitative data on the financial performance of 
grid owner companies in Germany and search for patterns or causal relationships 
in the data to create law-like generalisations like those produced by natural 
scientists (Saunders et al., 2011), the philosophical stance of positivism is most 
appropriate for the research. At first, the population of German grid owner 
companies has to be determined or quantified. Then the relationships between 
firm size, ownership structure, legal form and firm performance of German grid 
owner companies have to be analysed by statistical or empirical methods. Finally, 
based on the findings, an optimal design for profitable German grid owner 
companies could be recommended. Furthermore, the academic and practical 
background strongly corresponds to the paradigm of positivism. Having studied 
Business Administration, Economics and Corporate Law and worked for more than 
14 years in the accounting and auditing sectors, the devotion to quantitative data 
and its analysis is obvious. The researcher is used to applying statistical methods 
to produce primary quantitative data and analysing secondary quantitative data. 
Thus, addressing the research questions from the philosophical stance of 
positivism is preferred. 
 
3.2.6 Results 
 
In the context of the research topic, it has been examined how adopting realist, 
constructionist, interventionist and positivist perspectives might affect the 
understanding of the research and shape the creation of a research design to 
address the research questions. The differences between realist, constructionist, 
interventionist and positivist approaches to the research problem and research 
design, the role of researcher values for different approaches and the research 
skills needed have been discussed. 
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First, the discussion shows that the authors in the systematic literature review 
mainly apply a narrative approach belonging to research philosophies that rely on 
qualitative research.  
 
Second, the researcher does not choose the (critical) realist paradigm as the 
phenomenon of German grid owner companies is relatively new and much of 
critical realist research takes the form of in-depth historical analysis of social and 
organisational structures, and how they change over time (Saunders et al., 2011).  
 
Third, whereas constructionism mainly focuses on social actors with their feelings 
and communication, the researcher prefers a quantitative research design with 
regard to German grid owner companies.  
 
Fourth, although action research is a variant of applied research and it could be a 
potential research approach to examine research questions concerning the new 
phenomenon known as grid owner companies in Germany, the novelty of the 
phenomenon is conflicting. When a steady state of grid owner companies has 
been reached, action research could be applied to change existing situations. 
 
Finally, as the researcher aims to gather quantitative data on the financial 
performance of grid owner companies in Germany and search for patterns or 
causal relationships in the data to create law-like generalisations like those 
produced by natural scientists (Saunders et al., 2011), the philosophical stance of 
positivism is most appropriate for the research. At first, the population of German 
grid owner companies has to be determined or quantified. Then the relationships 
between firm size, ownership structure, legal form and firm performance of 
German grid owner companies have to be analysed by statistical or empirical 
methods. Finally, based on the findings, an optimal design for profitable German 
grid owner companies could be recommended. Furthermore, the academic and 
practical background strongly corresponds to the paradigm of positivism. Having 
studied Business Administration, Economics and Corporate Law and worked for 
more than 14 years in the accounting and auditing sectors, the devotion to 
quantitative data and its analysis is obvious. The researcher is used to applying 
statistical methods to produce primary quantitative data and to analyse secondary 
  
 126 
quantitative data. Overall, positivism fits best with the researcher’s own beliefs and 
is chosen to address the research questions.  
 
3.3 Methods  
 
3.3.1 Definitions and types of data 
  
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), a research method is simply a technique for 
gathering data. The process of data gathering comprises the decisions on what to 
measure and how to measure it, i.e. how data are gathered (Field, 2013). In other 
words, data gathering refers to the methods used to gather information and the 
identification of variables to be measured (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
 
In contrast to qualitative data, quantitative data refers to the gathering of numerical 
data. Objective measurements and the statistical, mathematical, or numerical 
analysis of data gathered through questionnaires, and surveys, or by manipulating 
statistical data using computational techniques are employed (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). Quantitative data are usually associated with positivism (Davies & Hughes, 
2014). The underlying assumption of positivist methods is that the job of the 
researcher is either to start with a hypothesis of the nature of the world, and then 
seek data to confirm or reject it, or pose several hypotheses and seek data to 
select the correct one (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). A hypothesis is an informed 
speculation about the possible relationship between two or more variables. A 
variable is an attribute on which cases vary (Bryman & Bell, 2011). To test 
hypotheses, variables have to be measured (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). There 
are a lot of different forms and levels of variables. In general, variables can be 
categorical or continuous. Furthermore, they can have different levels of 
measurement (Field, 2013). An interval variable is defined as “data measured on a 
scale along the whole of which intervals are equal” (Field, 2013, p. 877). A ratio 
variable is “an interval variable with the additional property that ratios are 
meaningful” (Field, 2013, p. 882). 
 
Most hypotheses can be expressed in terms of two variables, namely a proposed 
cause and a proposed outcome. One main goal of research is to determine the 
relationship or association between an independent variable and another variable 
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within a population. A variable that is a cause is known as an independent or 
predictor variable, because its value does not depend on any other variables.                      
A variable that represents an effect is called a dependent or outcome variable, 
because its value depends on the cause (independent variable) (Field, 2013).   
 
Given the research questions and the chosen research paradigm, gathering data 
through surveys or using secondary data sources are the principle methods of 
obtaining data that are available to the researcher. Both of them look for patterns 
and causal relations. For this research, interval or ratio variables are appropriate. 
These are variables where the distances between the categories are identical 
across the range of categories (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
 
In general, survey research denotes a cross-sectional design in relation to which 
data are gathered by self-completion questionnaires or by structured interviews on 
more than one case and at a single point in time. Quantitative data in connection 
with two or more variables are gathered in order to examine patterns in the 
relationship (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
 
First, survey data of grid owner companies can be gathered either through self-
completion questionnaires where respondents record their own answers, or 
administered by interviewers face-to-face or over the telephone (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012). On the one hand, postal questionnaire surveys are cheaper than any 
other method that requires face-to-face contact with individuals. On the other 
hand, response rates can be very low, because there is no personal contact with 
the respondents. Web-based surveys, located on a website, can be customised for 
individual respondents more easily than postal surveys (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012). Where postal addresses or other contact details are not available, 
structured interview surveys may be the most effective way to gather survey data. 
A structured interview is defined as “a research interview in which all respondents 
are asked exactly the same questions in the same order with the aid of a formal 
interview schedule” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 719). But they are more expensive 
than self-completion questionnaires as an interviewer has to be present. Finally, 
telephone interview surveys are cheaper than postal surveys and they also 
facilitate interactivity (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
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Second, to address the research questions, it could be useful to undertake some 
secondary analysis of data (Davies & Hughes, 2014). In general, secondary data 
are research information or data that already exist in the form of publications or 
other electronic media and that were gathered by other people (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012). Archival sources of secondary data, such as financial or statistical data, 
could be used to gather data on legal forms, ownership structure, firm size and 
firm performance of grid owner companies in Germany. Typical archival sources 
are annual financial statements including balance sheets or profit and loss 
accounts, particularly from the Federal Gazette in Germany or other databases, 
e.g. Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, etc. Furthermore, statistical data provided by 
the Statistical Offices of the German States in cooperation with the Federal 
Statistical Office are a frequently used archival source.  
 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), the most important factor affecting the 
quality of what can be done with secondary data is the design of the database. 
Davies and Hughes (2014) point out that the advantage of these databases can be 
seen in their size, because they include a large volume of cases. Economics and 
finance usually rely more on secondary data such as public or corporate financial 
data and statistics, because quantitative methods can be fast and economical 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Moreover, geographical variations or change over 
time could be analysed by combining datasets (Davies & Hughes, 2014). In 
Germany, almost every company is forced to disclose its financial data in the 
German Federal Gazette and in the German register of companies, depending on 
its size. The German Federal Gazette provides annual and quarterly income 
statements, balance sheets and supplementary data items for German companies 
(Bundesanzeiger, 2019). Thus, it is possible to compare absolute or relative 
figures from the annual financial statements. Furthermore, information about the 
legal form or the ownership structure of grid owner companies can be taken from 
the German register of companies. Being aware of the fact that balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts are influenced by earnings management and do not 
always show the “real picture of the world”, it is important to appreciate qualitative 
data in the annual reports. For example, the notes and the management reports 
have to be analysed with regard to the use of accounting discretion. Furthermore, 
the background of grid owner companies and the reasons of municipalities and 
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energy companies for founding grid owner companies have to be considered while 
analysing financial data. 
    
3.3.2 Choice and justification of method 
 
From the researcher’s point of view, using secondary data is the most suitable 
research method on German grid owner companies, although structured 
interviews and self-completion questionnaires have their specific advantages.   
 
First, secondary analysis offers the prospect of having access to high-quality data 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011) such as from the German Federal Gazette, the German 
register of companies or the GV-ISys. Depending on their size, ownership 
structure or legal form, the financial data of grid owner companies in Germany 
must be audited by an external auditor prior to disclosure and they are forced to 
disclose at least their balance sheet in the German Federal Gazette. GV-ISys 
contains official statistics that have been compiled in a neutral and professionally 
independent manner on every politically independent municipality in Germany 
(Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2019). The clear advantage of 
these databases is their size as they include a large volume of cases. Moreover, 
geographical variations or change over time could be analysed (Davies & Hughes, 
2014).  
 
Second, using secondary data offers the opportunity to have more time for data 
analysis. As data gathering is very time-consuming, it is possible to spend more 
time on analysing and interpreting data. It is fast and economical (Bryman & Bell, 
2011).  
 
Third, often the response rates of self-completion questionnaires can be very low, 
because there is no personal contact with the respondent (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012).   
 
Fourth, according to the positivist paradigm, science must be conducted in a way 
that is value free, i.e. objective (Bryman & Bell, 2011). As gathering data by                   
self-questionnaires and interviews with people could be influenced by subjective 
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human aspects, using secondary analysis of data rather corresponds to the 
principle of objectivity.   
 
Finally, people are often very reluctant to reveal confidential and sensitive 
information in questionnaires or surveys, so that even the most skilled interviewer 
cannot gather relevant data of grid owner companies (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012).  
 
However, the use of secondary data is contested in academia. For example, the 
researcher often does not have control over data quality. Therefore, the quality of 
data should never be taken for granted (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
 
To sum up, given the research questions to be addressed and the positivist 
research paradigm, using secondary data is the most suitable research method on 
grid owner companies in Germany.  
 
3.3.3 Ethical considerations 
 
The research will be undertaken in accordance with the requirements of “The 
University of Gloucestershire’s Handbook of Research Ethics”. The researcher has 
read and understood the underlying principles of research ethics. In general, 
secondary data from publicly available databases like the German Federal 
Gazette or the German register of companies will be used. As the researcher 
generates data in his accountant’s job by preparing financial statements of grid 
owner companies, primary data could also be taken. With regard to ethical issues, 
the possible use of primary data of grid owner companies by the researcher has to 
be approved by the general managers of the grid owner companies in advance. 
However, as long as no primary data of grid owner companies is used by the 
researcher, an approval is not necessary.    
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3.3.4 Data gathering 
 
3.3.4.1 Total population  
 
One of the greatest challenges of this research is the determination of the 
population of German grid owner companies as a basis for the sampling frame, i.e. 
the listing of all units in the population from which a sample of grid owner 
companies will be selected (Bryman & Bell, 2011). According to Field (2013), in 
statistical terms the expression population usually refers to the gathering of units 
to which researchers want to generalise a set of findings or a statistical model. In 
general, scientists are interested in finding results that apply to an entire 
population of entities. All individuals or objects within a certain population usually 
have a common characteristic or trait (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). In this 
research, the population is essentially the universe of grid owner companies in 
Germany about which the researcher wishes to draw conclusions. 
 
As the phenomenon of grid owner companies is relatively new and all grid owner 
companies in Germany are forced to disclose their financial statements, it is 
possible to gather data from the whole population of grid owner companies in 
Germany. For example, data from the financial statements for the years ending 
31st December 2010 to 2015 can be gathered. 
 
As grid owner companies in Germany are not obliged by law to provide information 
to the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and 
Railways like network operators or suppliers of energy, the determination of the 
population is not an easy task. Typical examples of financial databases like 
Bloomberg, Compustat or Thomson Reuters cannot be applied because of their 
design. Whereas they provide financial data on publicly listed companies, grid 
owner companies in Germany are usually not listed. As every German company, 
partnership and association must be officially registered in the Commercial 
Register according to the German Commercial Code, the Commercial Register is 
a suitable source of information to determine the population of grid owner 
companies in Germany. According to section 29 of the German Commercial Code, 
every business person is required to register its company, the place and domestic 
business address of its commercial establishment with the court in whose district 
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the place of business is located, for entry in the commercial register. The purpose 
of the companies’ registers, which are kept locally by the respective district courts, 
is to disclose the details on the legal status of companies. Thus, it serves to 
improve security in business transactions for business people. The publicly 
accessible registers contain information on the company, type of legal entity, 
subjects of its business activity, registered office, individuals with representative 
power as well as their personal details and if applicable registered capital of the 
company. Moreover, they are maintained in an electronic format, contain copies of 
the company statutes and are open to public inspection (Common Register Portal 
of the German Federal States, 2018; PwC, 2018). Therefore, information about the 
legal form or the ownership structure of grid owner companies can be taken from 
the German register of companies.  
 
Since 2007, German justice authorities through the Common Register Portal of the 
German Federal States offer the possibility to find an entry into the Commercial 
Register of any German state by using the website www.handelsregister.de.                    
The Company Registry is divided into two sections. Section A (HRA) comprises 
entries of retail salesmen, the general partnership, the limited partnership and the 
European Economic Interest Grouping. Section B (HRB) contains entries of the 
following organisations: the public limited company, the association limited by 
shares, the limited liability company, the European public company, the Insurance 
Society and the Pension Fund Society. Furthermore, data from the Cooperative 
and Partnership Registries and from some of the Registry of Associations is 
offered, too (Common Register Portal of the German Federal States, 2018).  
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Figure 3: Website of the Common Register Portal of the German Federal States 
 
The searches on the Common Register Portal of the States in Germany to 
determine the population of German grid owner companies were conducted 
between 1st May 2016 and 4th August 2017. Six key words comprising the nature 
of grid owner companies were applied. As a result, 1,385 entries have been found. 
All findings that did not refer to German electricity or gas grid owner companies 
were excluded.  
 
Table 3: Search results  
Key words Entries 
“Energiegesellschaft” 57 
“Energieversorgung” 251 
“Gasnetz” 27 
“Netz” 870 
“Netzgesellschaft” 143 
“Stromnetz” 37 
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Furthermore, the consolidated financial statements for the years ending                           
31st December 2015 and 31st December 2016 of the four largest energy 
companies in Germany, E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall, were reviewed for 
whether they contain grid owner companies in the list of shareholdings as part of 
the notes. 
 
In all cases, the findings were mirrored against comprehensive lists of the German 
electricity and gas network operators by the Federal Network Agency for 
Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways. They contain the name 
and the address of the network operator and the state in which the network 
operator is based. As the focus of the research is solely on grid owner companies 
and not on network operators, grid owner companies that are also network 
operators were excluded from the total population.  
 
Through the process of gathering data to determine the total population of German 
grid owner companies, 170 different German grid owner companies have been 
identified. The population of grid owner companies consists of 140 limited 
partnerships with limited liability companies as general partners, 27 limited liability 
companies and 3 limited partnerships with public limited companies as general 
partners. Thus, the most popular legal form is the limited partnership with a limited 
liability company as general partner at 82 percent and the limited liability company 
follows at 16 percent. The findings correspond to the reviewed literature and 
confirm the qualitative statements. In particular, Heim (2015a) points out that 
preferred legal forms for grid owner companies are limited liability companies or 
limited commercial partnerships with limited liability companies as general 
partners.  
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Figure 4: Population: List of grid owner companies (extract) 
 
 
With regard to the geographical distribution over Germany, the registered offices 
of grid owner companies can be found in 11 of the 16 German Federal States. It is 
remarkable that most of the German grid owner companies are located in the 
Federal state of Baden-Württemberg, followed by North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Lower Saxony. Concerning the regional concentration of established grid owner 
companies, most are located in the western part of Germany, although during the 
reunification in the 1990s large numbers of new rights-of-way contracts with a 
duration of 20 years were negotiated, too. To sum up, more than 94 percent of the 
German grid owner companies are located in former Western Germany. So a 
decline from west to east is apparent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company Name Legal Form Federal State Registered Office Register Court 
Abens-Donau Netz GmbH &Co. KG Bayern Mainburg Amtsgerlcht Regensburg 
Bingen Netz GmbH &Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz Bingen am Rhein Amtsgericht Mainz 
BrUggen.E-Netz GmbH &Co. KG Nordrheln-Westfalen BrUggen Amtsgerlcht Krefeld 
Cremlinger Energie GmbH Niedersachsen Cremlingen Amtsgericht Braunschweig 
Dorsten Netz GmbH &Co. KG Nordrheln-Westfalen Dorsten Amtsgerlcht Gelsenklrchen 
Elektrizitatsnetzgesellschaft Grunwald GmbH &Co. KG Bayern Grunwald Amtsgericht Munch en 
EMB Netz GmbH &Co. KG Hessen Marburg Amtsgerlcht Marburg 
Energie Dannstadter Hohe GmbH &Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz Dannstadt-Schauernheim Amtsgericht Ludwigshafen a. Rhein 
Energie Kirchheim unter Teck GmbH &Co. KG Baden-WUrttemberg Kirchheim unterTeck Amtsgericht Stuttgart 
Energie Mechernich GmbH &co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen Mechernich Amtsgericht Bonn 
Energie Region Kassel GmbH &Co. KG Hessen Vellmar Amtsgericht Kassel 
Energiegesellschaft Lei men GmbH &co. KG Baden-WUrttemberg Leimen Amtsgericht Mannheim 
Energienetz Neufahrn/Eching GmbH &Co. KG Bayern Neufahrn b. Freising Amtsgericht MUnchen 
EnergieRegion Tau nus - Goldener Grund - GmbH &Co. KG Hessen Bad Gamberg Amtsgericht Limburg 
Energieversorgung Denzlingen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-WUrttemberg Denzlingen Amtsgericht Freiburg 
Enerl!ieversorgunl! Horstmar/Laer GmbH &Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen Horstmar Amtsgericht Steinfurt 
Energieversorgung lmmenstaad GmbH & Co. KG Baden-WUrttemberg lmmenstaad am Bodensee Amtsgericht Ulm 
Enerl!ieversorj!Unl! Kranenburl! Netze GmbH &Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen Kranenburl! Amtsl!ericht Kleve 
Energieversorgung Niederkassel GmbH &Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen Niederkassel Amtsgericht Siegburg 
Energieversorgung Strohgfo GmbH &Co. KG Baden-WUrttemberg Gerlingen Amtsgericht Stuttgart 
Energieversorgung Timmendorfer Strand GmbH &Co. KG Schleswig-Holstein Timmendorfer Strand Amtsgericht LUbeck 
Enerl!ieversorl!Unl! Vechelde GmbH &Co. KG Niedersachsen Vechelde Amtsl!ericht Braunschweil! 
EVB Gasnetz GmbH &Co. KG Bayern Bobingen Amtsgericht Augsburg 
EVB Stromnetz GmbH &Co. KG Bayern Boblngen Amtsgerlcht Augsburg 
Gasnetz Bad Oeynhausen GmbH &Co. KG Nordrhein-westfalen Bad Oeynhausen Amtsgericht Bad Oeynhausen 
Gasnetz Bornheim GmbH &Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen Bornheim Amtsgericht Bonn 
Gasnetz Oillingen Lauingen GmbH &Co. KG Bayern Oillingen a. d. Oonau Amtsgericht Augsburg 
Gasnetz Ebersbach GmbH &Co. KG Baden-WUrttemberg Ebersbach an der Fils Amtsgerlcht Ulm 
Gasnetz GUnzburg GmbH &Co. KG Bayern Gunzburg Amtsgericht Memmingen 
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Table 4: Geographical distribution of grid owner companies 
State Region Number of companies 
Baden-Württemberg  West 60 
Bayern (Bavaria) West 13 
Brandenburg East 6 
Hessen (Hesse) West 9 
Niedersachsen                            
(Lower Saxony) 
West 25 
Nordrhein-Westfalen                
(North Rhine-Westphalia) 
West 44 
Rheinland-Pfalz                   
(Rhineland-Palatinate) 
West 7 
Sachsen (Saxony) East 2 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
(Saxony-Anhalt) 
East 1 
Schleswig-Holstein West 2 
Thüringen (Thuringia) East 1 
 
Referring to the time frame, the German grid owner companies, forming the total 
population, were founded between the years 2007 and 2016. Most of the grid 
owner companies in Germany were established in 2014. The entry of the date of 
incorporation in the Commercial Register is decisive for the year of foundation 
unless further information indicates an earlier date. For example, a grid owner 
company was founded in the year 2016, but the entry in the Commercial Register 
took place at the beginning of 2017. 
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Figure 5: Year of foundation 
 
 
3.3.4.2 Characteristics 
 
After having determined the population of grid owner companies in Germany and 
found some interesting characteristics, data on ownership structures, legal forms 
and size of grid owner companies in Germany have to be gathered to address the 
research questions.  
 
As companies in Germany are required by the German Commercial Code to 
disclose their annual financial statements in the German Federal Gazette, it 
provides a comprehensive source of data. The German Federal Gazette is the 
central platform for pronouncements and announcements, as well as for legally 
relevant company news. It provides annual and quarterly income statements, 
balance sheets and supplementary data items for German companies 
(Bundesanzeiger, 2019). Furthermore, it offers a fulltext search database but it is 
not possible to perform a fulltext search on the content of disclosed annual 
financial statements and publications pursuant to sections 264 (3) and 264b of the 
German Commercial Code. However, the relevant information can be retrieved 
from the comprehensive Company Register on the website 
http://www.unternehmensregister.de. The Company Register is the central 
platform for legally relevant company data. All important information required to be 
disclosed about companies is available and made electronically retrievable for the 
public.  
Number 
45 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Grid owner companies - founded 
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
  
 138 
Over the Company Register, the following information is provided 
(Unternehmensregister, 2019): 
 
• commercial, cooperative and partnership register with the documents 
submitted 
• publications from the German Federal Gazette 
• balance sheets deposited with the Federal Gazette 
• company-relevant messages from securities issuers 
• disclosures of the bankruptcy courts 
 
To sum up, in Germany almost every company is forced to disclose its financial 
data in the German Federal Gazette and in the German Register of Companies, 
depending on its size. Thus, it is possible to compare absolute or relative figures 
from the annual financial statements.  
 
Figure 6: Website of the Federal Gazette  
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The data on population (inhabitants) and area as proxies for firm size of German 
grid owner companies are taken from the German Community Directory 
Information System (GV-ISys). It is a database provided by the Statistical Offices 
of the German States in cooperation with the Federal Statistical Office and 
contains official statistics that have been compiled in a neutral and professionally 
independent manner on every politically independent municipality in Germany. 
Among other key figures, the GV-ISys provides the following characteristics 
(Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2019): 
• Official Regional Code 
• Official Municipal Code 
• Official name of municipality 
• Postal Code of municipality 
• Address of municipality 
• Area in square kilometres 
• Population (total, male, female) 
 
The data on area as well as on population (inhabitants) is provided as quarterly or 
annual output in Excel format or as GV100 in ASCII format with fixed sentence 
structure and corresponding data record description (Statistische Ämter des 
Bundes und der Länder, 2019). 
 
In the course of the determination of the population of German grid owner 
companies and the gathering of data from the German Federal Gazette, the 
German Company Register and GV-ISys, the following data on grid owner 
companies were gathered: 
 
• company/commercial business name: According to sections 17 and 18 of 
the German Commercial Code, the business name of a trading company is 
the name under which it carries out its business and can sue as well as be 
sued. It shall be suited to designate the company and shall have a 
distinctive character. Moreover, the business name shall not contain any 
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information which is apt to be misleading with respect to business 
circumstances that are of material relevance for the market groups 
concerned.  
• legal form: Reference to section 2.4.6. 
• federal state: Germany as a federal republic consists of 16 states with each 
having its own federal constitution and measure of sovereignty. Whereas 
Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen are city states, the other 13 federal states 
(see section 3.3.4.1) belong to the category of area states. 
• registered office: According to section 11 of the German Fiscal Code, 
corporations, associations of persons or conglomerations of assets shall 
have their registered office at a place which is determined by law, articles of 
partnership, statutes, acts of foundation or similar provisions.  
• register court: According to section 8 of the German Commercial Code, the 
commercial register is maintained in electronic form by the courts in 
Germany. 
• register number: The comprehensive commercial register number consists 
of the register court, the type of register and the individual number. The 
commercial register comprises two sections. Whereas limited liability 
companies and corporates are entered in section B, business partnerships 
can be found in section A (section 3 of the German Commercial Register 
Ordinance). 
• date of foundation:  The date of incorporation in the Commercial Register.  
• divisions: In general, a grid owner company could have three different 
divisions, i.e. electricity, gas or water. 
• shareholders and shareholding (in percent): The shareholders of the grid 
owner company and their shareholdings are identified. The ownership data 
provided in the German Register of Companies include the names of the 
shareholders and the percentage of shares owned. In this research, the 
focus is on the percentage of shares owned by local government, which is 
often the largest shareholder in a grid owner company due to municipal law 
in Germany. As the ownership structure could change during the year 
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(Boonyawat, 2013), the ownership structure at the balance sheet date, 31st 
December, has to be chosen.   
• private participation quota: Based on the information on shareholding, the 
shareholdings of private shareholders are summarised. The focus is on the 
participation quota of private energy companies. 
• group affiliation: If a grid owner company is an affiliated company and 
included in consolidated financial statements, the group parent company is 
determined.  
• balance sheet and profit and loss account items: As the research focuses 
on German grid owner companies, the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account items are presented according to the accounting principles of the 
German Commercial Code. Companies with a profit-and-loss transfer 
agreement that account for compensation payments to minority 
shareholders and profit and loss transfers are treated as if they account for 
net income 
• population: The data on the population or inhabitants, categorised by total, 
male and female, of each municipality are results of the population update 
as of 31st December 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, currently 
updated on the basis of the results of the last census (2011 census on the 
reference date 9th May 2011) or previous censuses (for example, 1987 
census).  
• area: The area specified for every municipality is basically the district area 
(cadastral area according to the German surveying authorities) measured in 
square kilometres as of 31st December 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 
2015. 
The data on German grid owner companies were gathered in a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. It serves as a simple database. In Excel the data are organised into 
tables using rows and columns of a worksheet. The grid owner companies can be 
found in rows and their characteristics or variables in columns. This corresponds 
to a rectangular layout for the data, i.e. a spreadsheet as a single rectangle with 
rows corresponding to subjects and columns corresponding to variables. The first 
row contains the names of the variables. Thus, the data could be analysed and 
  
 142 
visualised in a separate programme. It reduces the risk of contaminating the raw 
data in the spreadsheet (Broman & Woo, 2018). 
 
3.3.4.3 Limitations and sampling 
 
The required data on grid owner companies does not exist for the total population 
of grid owner companies. Thus, data have to be gathered from a small subset of 
the population known as a sample and to be used to infer information about the 
whole population (Field, 2013). In order to use a sample with the highest possible 
validity, the total population is adjusted.  
 
Inferential statistics are applied to make inferences or judgements about a larger 
population based on the gathered data from a sample (Davies & Hughes, 2014). 
When sampling is applied, hypothesis testing is used to make inferences about the 
population of grid owner companies based upon data drawn from the samples 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). In general, researchers are interested in finding 
results that apply to an entire population of entities (Field, 2013). Patterns in that 
sample data have to be identified and the conclusions drawn from those patterns 
are used to make claims that go beyond the sample itself (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012). Then, statistical tests are used to determine how likely it is that the pattern 
observed would occur if the hypothesis was not true (Davies & Hughes, 2014). 
The researcher has to make a decision about the sampling unit and on what basis 
sampling is to be undertaken. The random sample is the most basic form of 
sampling, i.e. random number tables are used to select sample units (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011). The bigger the sample, the more representative it is likely to be, 
regardless of the size of the population from which it is drawn (Bryman & Bell, 
2011).   
 
Before 2010 only a few rights-of-way contracts were phased out and only a few 
grid owner companies were established. As the annual financial statements of 
German companies have to be submitted to the Federal Gazette within twelve 
months of the balance sheet date, the effective disclosure is often made several 
months later. The researcher finished the data gathering in August 2017 and it 
comprises the annual financial statements of the years ending 31st December 
2010 to 2015. Moreover, firms with accounting periods that do not end on 31st 
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December will be excluded from the research. The reasons for these exclusions 
are that the data of grid owner companies with a short fiscal year will not be 
comparable to the data of the other grid owner companies with a full fiscal year. 
Thus, bias is avoided.  
 
In case the data could not been taken from the annual financial statements 
disclosed in the German Federal Gazette, the German Register of Companies or 
the German Community Directory Information System (GV-ISys), the following 
alternative sources were used, if applicable 
 
• consolidated financial statements of the parent company, 
• website of the company, 
• protocols of the municipal council. 
 
3.3.5 Data analysis procedures 
 
3.3.5.1 General remarks 
 
Based on a positivist approach, statistical techniques are used to understand 
causal relationships (Field, 2013), i.e. testing hypotheses involves building 
statistical models with regard to grid owner companies. Referring to the research 
questions, the appropriate data analysis methods, i.e. the methodical basis for the 
test of hypotheses, are presented in the following sections. Thus, the presentation 
comprises the definition of the statistical model and the applied measures and 
variables. Finally, bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses are used to test the 
data.  
 
3.3.5.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Analysing data also means that the general trends in the data are studied (Field, 
2013). On the one hand the average of a distribution of values can be examined 
and on the other, the amount of variation (Field, 2013). With regard to the 
measures of central tendency, there are three different forms of average. First, the 
arithmetic mean represents the total of a distribution of values divided by the 
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number of values. Second, the median is the mid-point of a distribution of values. 
Third, the mode denotes the value that occurs most in a distribution of values 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). To quantify the amount of variation in the data, measures 
of dispersion have to be applied (Field, 2013). The range is one way of measuring 
dispersion. It is “the value of the smallest score subtracted from the highest score” 
(Field, 2013, p. 882). Furthermore, the standard deviation is a common measure 
of dispersion. It is the average amount of variation around the mean (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011). 
 
Tables, diagrams or charts are common methods of displaying quantitative data.  
 
A frequency table presents the number or percentage of units in different 
categories of a variable in question. The categories have to be grouped when an 
interval or ratio variable is displayed. To analyse and display relationships, 
contingency tables seem to be very flexible. They are similar to frequency tables 
and allow for analysing two variables simultaneously. Thus, relationships or 
causalities between two variables can be examined. In general, users of 
contingency tables often present the presumed independent variable as the 
column variable and the presumed dependent variable as the row variable 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), diagrams are among the most frequently 
used methods of displaying quantitative data. They are rather easy to interpret and 
to understand. Scatter diagrams, also known as scatterplots, are useful to show 
relationships between pairs of interval or ratio variables. To display interval or ratio 
variables, a histogram (frequency distribution) is appropriate, too (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). It is a graph that plots values of observations on the horizontal axis; the bar 
shows how many times each value occurs in the data (Field, 2013). In contrast to 
a bar chart, there is no space between the bars (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, the boxplot (box-whisker diagram) is another way to display the data 
(Field, 2013). A boxplot displays central tendency, dispersion and it also indicates 
any outliers (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Depending on the position of the median, they 
vary in their shape as the median is at the center of the plot (Field, 2013). 
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3.3.5.3 Regression analysis  
 
As the researcher aims to analyse quantitative data on the firm performance of 
grid owner companies in Germany, and search for patterns or causal relationships 
in the data to create law-like generalisations (Saunders et al., 2011), regression 
analysis seems to be an appropriate analytical technique. In general, regression 
analysis is a set of statistical processes to estimate the relationships among 
variables; i.e. the focus of the analysis is on the relationships between one or more 
predictor variables and an outcome variable. Regression analysis means fitting a 
model to the data and using it to predict values of an outcome variable from one or 
more predictor variables (Davies & Hughes, 2014; Field, 2013). In other words, 
regression analysis is used to model the dependence of a variable on one or more 
explanatory independent variables (Davies & Hughes, 2014) Thus, the task is to 
find the mathematical formula that best describes the relationship between the 
relevant variables (Field, 2013). In contrast, correlation analysis as a method of 
statistical evaluation used to examine the strength of a relationship between two 
variables does not imply causality. In particular, correlation coefficients give no 
indication of the direction of causality. Hence, questions on the cause-effect-
relationships of variables are usually addressed by the application of regression 
analysis (Field, 2013). Overall, bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses are 
appropriate to test the data. Whereas “bivariate analysis is concerned with the 
analysis of two variables at a time in order to uncover whether or not the two 
variables are related” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 346), “multivariate analysis entails 
the simultaneous analysis of three or more variables” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 
350).   
 
There are several regression techniques, in particular linear, logistic and multiple 
regressions. According to Davies and Hughes (2014), the selection of a particular 
regression technique depends on the type of variables. Whereas linear regression 
models are based upon a straight line with regard to interval or ratio variables, 
logistic regression is a version of multiple regression in which the outcome is a 
categorical variable (Field, 2013).  
 
A simple regression is a linear model in which one variable or outcome is 
predicted from a single predictor variable. The formula is: Yi = (b0 + b1Xi) + εi.             
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Yi denotes the outcome variable, Xi the independent variable, b1 is the regression 
coefficient, b0 is the value of the dependent variable when the independent 
variable is zero and εi symbolises some error (Field, 2013). An extension of simple 
regression is multiple regression in which an outcome is predicted by a linear 
combination of two or more predictor variables (Field, 2013). 
 
In research on corporate governance, a lot of critical drivers that determine firm 
performance were already identified. For example, firm size, industry affiliation and 
debt ratio have an influence on firm performance. However, these influences could 
not be identified in univariate analyses. Multivariate analyses offer the opportunity 
to isolate effects and to minimise bias (Fessler, 2013). Hence, regression analysis 
is also preferred and supplemented by tests of robustness.  
The structure of the multiple linear model is as follows: 
Yi = (b0 + b1 * X1i + b2 * X2i + … + bn * Xni) + εi 
Y represents the outcome (dependent variable), and each predictor (independent 
variable) is denoted as X. b1 is the regression coefficient of the first predictor X1, b2 
is the regression coefficient of the second predictor X2, etc. In general, each 
predictor has a regression coefficient b associated with it that represents the 
gradient of the regression line in a simple regression model. The regression 
coefficients b estimate the relationship between predictors and the outcome, i.e. 
the value of b stands for the change in the outcome resulting from a unit change in 
the predictor (Field, 2013). b0 as the intercept of the regression line is the value of 
the outcome when all predictors are zero. The error term of a regression model is 
symbolised by ε. It summarises all those factors that have an influence on the 
dependent variables beyond the independent variables (Kohler & Kreuter, 2016). 
To assess the error in a regression model, the sum of squared errors is used, the 
so-called residual sum of squares (Field, 2013). In all cases, the sub-                           
script i denotes an individual item, for example a grid owner company.  
 
Applied to the phenomenon of grid owner companies, the ROA as the outcome 
(dependent variable) is denoted as Yi. X1 stands for the population or area as 
proxies for firm size, X2 symbolises the private participation quota and X3 refers to 
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the legal form of a grid owner company. Hence, the multiple linear regression 
model is suitable for the analysis.  
 
As the same German grid owner companies are observed over several years, i.e. 
from 2010 to 2015, the data have a temporal dimension and form a panel. 
Normally, panel data are analysed by panel data regression. However, the data on 
German grid owner companies from 2010 to 2015 are not enough to run a valid 
panel data regression. One main reason is that grid owner companies are a 
relatively new phenomenon and most of them were established in 2014. Thus, 
instead of panel data regression, multiple linear regression seems to be a suitable 
method.  
 
In order to find the regression model or the regression coefficients that fit best with 
the data, the OLS method is applied. OLS stands for ”Ordinary least squares” and 
is a method of regression in which the parameters of the model are estimated 
using the method of least squares. It is a method of estimating parameters, here 
regression coefficients, that is based on minimising the sum of squared errors. The 
parameter estimate will be the value out of all possible values that has the 
smallest sum of squared errors. The aim of a multiple linear OLS regression model 
is to determine the influence of at least two independent variables on a dependent 
variable (Field, 2013; Kohler & Kreuter, 2016). As the underlying analysis aims at 
determining the influence of firm size, private participation quota and legal form on 
firm performance of German grid owner companies, a multiple OLS regression 
model is chosen.  
 
To sum up, in the following regression analysis, the influences of population or 
area as proxies for firm size, private participation quota and legal form on ROA are 
investigated. Thus, a multiple linear regression is applied and an ordinary least 
squares estimation method is used. 
 
The estimation of regression coefficients of a regression model with the OLS 
method is determined by the assumption that the expected value of error terms is 
zero, formally E (ε) = 0. It means that all influences on the dependent variable that 
are not part of the model cancel each other out on average.  
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In other words, these other influences are zero over a large number or repetitions 
(Kohler & Kreuter, 2016). To avoid biased estimations, it has to be checked 
whether the requirements are met (Kohler & Kreuter, 2016).  
 
The assumption E (ε) = 0 is violated if 
 
(1) the relationship between the dependent and one of the independent 
variables is non-linear, 
 
(2) individual outliers excessively influence the regression outcomes and 
 
(3) multicollinearity between the independent variables exists. 
 
A violation of the requirements reduces the quality of the results. However, a full 
compliance of all assumptions is not possible in practice as this requires a pure 
linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Field, 2013; 
Kohler & Kreuter, 2016). 
 
Concerning the methods of predictor selection, i.e. the way in which variables can 
be entered into the regression model, different methods have to be distinguished. 
In order to obtain a robust regression model, only those predictor variables that 
account for a large proportion of the outcome variable should be included in the 
model. In general, stepwise regressions like the forward and the backward 
method, hierarchical (blockwise entry) method and forced entry are common 
methods. Whereas stepwise techniques are often influenced by random variation 
in the data, forced entry as a method in which all predictors are forced into the 
model simultaneously is seen as the only appropriate method for theory testing 
(Field, 2013). Thus, forced entry is chosen in this thesis. As a rule of thumb, the 
number of observations should be about 20 times larger than the number of 
variables studied (Schneider, Hommel, & Blettner, 2010). 
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The general procedure for conducting regression analysis and fitting a regression 
model is as follows (Field, 2013):  
 
(1) Producing scatterplots in order to check if the assumption of linearity is met, 
and also check for any outliers and obvious unusual cases. 
 
(2) Running initial regression and fitting a model.  
 
(3) Generalising the model beyond the sample by examining residuals to check 
for homoscedasticity, normality, independence and linearity.  
 
3.3.5.4 Significance and accuracy of the model 
 
In general, research has to be reliable and valid. On the one hand, reliability refers 
to the consistency of a measure of a concept. On the other hand, validity 
questions whether or not an indicator really measures a concept (Bryman & Bell, 
2011).    
 
In order to generalise the findings outside of the sample, the underlying 
assumptions of the linear model have to be met. The main assumptions of the 
linear model are as follows (Field, 2013; Gelman & Hill, 2007):   
 
(1) Additivity and linearity: The model is valid if it can be described by the linear 
model. In addition, the dependent variable is an additive, noninteractive 
function of two or more independent variables. 
 
(2) Independent errors: A lack of autocorrelation is aimed at, i.e. the residuals 
of two observations in a regression model are not correlated.  
 
(3) Homoscedasticity: The residuals at each level of the predictor variables 
have similar variances; i.e. the spread of residuals should be fairly constant. 
 
(4) Normally distributed errors: The residuals in the model are random and 
normally distributed variables with a mean of 0. 
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The validity of the results of a regression analysis requires that the assumptions of 
the linear model are met. Then, the estimated regression coefficients of the 
independent variables can be analysed. The null hypothesis assumes that the 
independent variables have no influence on the dependent variable: bi = 0. If bi is 
different from 0, the t-test is used to determine the significance of the influence. 
The t-statistic is the ratio of the departure of the estimated value of the regression 
coefficient from its hypothesised value to its standard error. A regression 
coefficient is significant at a level α if the probability of error in the case of a 
rejection of the null hypothesis is lower than α (Fessler, 2013; Field, 2013). 
 
The assessment of the accuracy of a model across different samples is called 
cross-validation. One common method of cross-validation is the adjusted R2. It is a 
measure of the loss of predictive power or shrinkage in regression. It measures 
how much variance in the outcome would be accounted for if the model has been 
derived from the population from which the sample was taken (Field, 2013). As the 
value of R2 always increases with any additional independent variable, the 
adjusted R2 considers the number of predictors, k, and the sample size, n (Kohler 
& Kreuter, 2016): 
adj. R2 = 1 –  * (1 - R2) 
Nevertheless, a high value of the adjusted R2 might indicate multicollinearity. It 
describes a situation in which two or more variables are very closely linearly 
related, i.e. a strong correlation between two or more predictors exists. That 
makes it difficult to assess the individual importance of a predictor (Field, 2013). 
Multicollinearity with regard to the independent variables is tested by variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for each independent variable. The VIF indicates whether a 
predictor has a strong linear relationship with other predictors in an ordinary least 
squares regression analysis. The formula of the VIF is as follows: 
 
As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 needs further 
investigation. A tolerance value (1/VIF) lower than 0.1 is comparable to a VIF of 10 
(Field, 2013).   
 
~
n - k 
1 
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In order to test the assumption that E (ε) = 0 in the regression model, the residual-
vs.-fitted-plot is applied. It denotes a scatterplot of the residuals of a linear 
regression against the predicted values (Kohler & Kreuter, 2016).  
 
3.3.5.5 Hypotheses 
 
3.3.5.5.1 Testing  
 
Being attracted to a positivist approach, statistical techniques are used to 
understand causal relationships (Field, 2013); i.e. testing hypotheses involves 
building statistical models with regard to grid owner companies. There are two 
types of hypotheses that are compared through statistical testing. The null 
hypothesis states that there is no relationship between the variables. It is needed 
as the hypothesis cannot be proved using statistics, but evidence can be gathered 
to reject the null hypothesis (Field, 2013). This is compared to the alternative 
hypothesis that states there is some kind of relationship. The null hypothesis can 
be tested and found to be false, which then implies there is a relationship between 
observed data. Falsification denotes the act of disproving a hypothesis or theory 
(Field, 2013). If the null hypothesis is supported, the alternative hypothesis is not 
upheld (Bryman & Bell, 2011). However, making decisions about whether to 
accept a hypothesis or not does nothing to explain why such a difference might 
occur (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
 
In order to perform the regression analysis, each of the hypotheses is restated in 
the null form.  
 
3.3.5.5.2 Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between firm size and firm 
performance of grid owner companies. 
 
Null hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between firm size and firm performance 
of grid owner companies. 
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 3.3.5.5.3 Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the percentage of private ownership, the higher the level 
of firm performance of grid owner companies. 
 
Null hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between the percentage of private 
ownership and the level of firm performance of grid owner companies. 
 
3.3.5.5.4 Hypothesis 3 
 
Hypothesis 3: Grid owner companies in Germany that are limited partnerships 
have a higher firm performance than grid owner companies that are limited liability 
companies.  
 
Null hypothesis 3: Grid owner companies in Germany that are limited partnerships 
do not have a higher firm performance than grid owner companies that are limited 
liability companies. 
 
3.3.5.6 Applied statistical software 
 
The process of analysing the data can be supported by analytical software. 
Therefore, the choice of appropriate statistical software, i.e. the computer 
programme for analysis in statistics, has to be made. There are several software 
tools that could be used to run the quantitative statistical analyses (Field, 2013). 
Applied to this research, IBM SPSS Statistics or Stata are selected for the shortlist 
as they constitute comprehensive statistics software packages. In both 
programmes, multiple regression analysis can be performed. IBM SPSS Statistics 
is known as “the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences”. It was launched in 
1989 and has become one of the standard analytical tools for quantitative 
researchers (Davies & Hughes, 2014). Whereas SPSS prevails in the social 
sciences and psychological research, Stata is common in the finance and 
econometrics research community (Kohler & Kreuter, 2016). Moreover, the 
command structures of Stata are more flexible in documenting the results. 
Therefore, Stata in the standard version Stata 15/IC is used for the empirical 
research. The name is a syllabic abbreviation of the words statistics and data. It is 
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a complete, integrated general-purpose statistical software package and includes 
data management, statistical analysis, graphics, simulations, and regression. The 
dataset is always rectangular in format, i.e. all variables hold the same number of 
observations. The gathered data of grid owner companies are imported from an 
Excel spreadsheet. Stata uses user-written commands created in a do-file (Kohler 
& Kreuter, 2016). 
 
3.3.6 Definition of variables 
 
3.3.6.1 Introduction 
 
This section covers the measures and variables applied in the statistical methods.              
It focuses on the dependent and independent variables that are used in the 
following statistical analyses. Whereas the ROA denotes the dependent variable, 
population and area as proxies for firm size, private participation quota and legal 
form represent the independent variables. In general, if a grid owner company has 
a missing value for any variable, then it is excluded from the whole analysis. The 
selection of the predictors is based on a sound theoretical rationale and well-
conducted past research that has demonstrated their importance (Field, 2013). 
 
3.3.6.2 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is a ratio whose size or variation should be explained with 
the regression model (Fessler, 2013). The return on assets ratio as the dependent 
variable in this thesis is defined as follows:  
 
 
 
The net income pursuant to section 275 (2) of the German Commercial Code is 
based on the operating result, i.e. operating income less operating expenses, less 
financial result and less taxes. According to section 266 (2) of the German 
Commercial Code, on the one hand total assets is the sum of the assets on the 
asset side of the balance sheet at the balance sheet date. Due to double-entry 
bookkeeping, total assets correspond to the sum of equity and debt capital on the 
net in.come ROA=----
total assets
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liabilities side of the balance sheet. With regard to the consistency of the ratio, the 
numerator should be represented by profit before interest and tax (Ryan & Collett, 
2017). However, as grid owner companies are not obliged to disclose profit before 
interest and tax in their financial statements, net income is chosen. In Stata, the 
abbreviation “ROA“ is used for the variable. 
 
3.3.6.3 Independent variables 
 
3.3.6.3.1 Population 
 
An important independent variable of interest in this thesis is firm size. According 
to section 2.4.2, a suitable proxy for the size of a grid owner company that is not 
implied in the measurement of firm performance is the population, i.e. the 
inhabitants. Not being implied in the measurement of firm performance means that 
the relevant variable or proxy is neither part of the numerator nor of the 
denominator of the dependent variable. In other words, the population is neither 
part of the net income nor of the total assets, so there is no mechanical correlation 
between population and ROA.  
 
The data on the population, categorised as total, male and female, of each 
municipality are results of the population update as of 31st December 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, currently updated on the basis of the results of the 
last census (2011 census on the reference date 9th May 2011) or previous 
censuses (for example, 1987 census).  
 
In Stata, the metric variable is denoted “einwohner“, the German translation for 
population. 
 
3.3.6.3.2 Area 
 
According to section 2.4.2, another suitable proxy for the size of a grid owner 
company is area. The area specified for every municipality is basically the district 
area (cadastral area according to the German surveying authorities) measured in 
square kilometres as of 31st December 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
As many grid owner companies own grids that are located in several 
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municipalities, the areas of each municipality have to be added up in order to 
determine the area of a grid owner company. In general, the larger the area of a 
municipality and ultimately of a grid owner company, the more grid facilities like 
house connections, distribution lines or local network stations are installed and 
owned by the grid owner company. The data on area are also taken from the 
German Community Directory Information System (GV-ISys).  
 
In Stata, the metric variable is denoted “flaeche“, the German translation for area. 
 
Furthermore, a logarithmic transformation (natural logarithm) shows a better 
approximation to the normal distribution. In case of right-skewed distributions, the 
natural logarithm of the relevant variable is often used. The underlying assumption 
is that a logarithmic relationship between the independent and the dependent 
variable exists. The higher the value of the independent variable, the smaller the 
variation of the dependent variable when the independent variable varies by one 
further unit (Field, 2013). In Stata, the abbreviation “ln(area)“ is used for the 
variable. 
 
3.3.6.3.3 Private participation quota 
 
The private participation quota denotes the percentage of participation of private 
companies in the registered capital of a grid owner company. If two or more 
private companies are shareholders or partners, their percentages are added up to 
determine the private participation quota. In this context, a private company is a 
company that is not owned by a municipality or municipal company. In Stata, the 
abbreviation “Beteiligung“ is used for the metric variable. 
 
3.3.6.3.4 Legal form 
 
The legal form of a grid owner company is not a financial figure. Rather, it is a 
string variable. As it is not possible to do calculations with strings, in particular in a 
regression model, they have to be converted into numerical variables. With the 
command “encode“ in Stata, numeric values for each string are generated and the 
text field itself is used as a value label. The command “encode“ assigns values in 
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alphabetical order, i.e. the value 1 for the first entry of the alphabetically sorted 
string variables (Kohler & Kreuter, 2016). 
 
As the total population of German grid owner companies contains just three limited 
partnerships with a public limited company as general partner (AG & Co. KG), they 
are excluded from the analysis. Due to the non-representativeness of this legal 
form, only limited liability companies (GmbH) and limited commercial partnerships 
with a limited liability company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG) are part of 
the analyses. In the regression analysis with Stata, limited partnerships with a 
public limited company as general partner (AG & Co. KG) are replaced with the 
relevant command: “replace Rechtsform = . if Rechtsform == 1“.  
 
With regard to the regression analysis, the variable “Rechtsform“ is prefixed with i. 
to specify indicators for each level (category) of the variable. Stata generates 
virtual dummy variables in the background, chooses a reference category and 
finally estimates the model with these dummy variables (Kohler & Kreuter, 2016).  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
In the following section, the main conclusions drawn from the statements above 
are summarised.  
• As the researcher aims to gather quantitative data on the financial 
performance of grid owner companies in Germany and search for patterns 
or causal relationships in the data to create law-like generalisations, the 
philosophical stance of positivism is most appropriate.  
• Given the research questions and the chosen research paradigm, gathering 
data through surveys or using secondary data sources are possible 
methods of obtaining data that are available to the researcher. 
• For several reasons, using secondary data is the most suitable research 
method on grid owner companies in Germany, although structured 
interviews and self-completion questionnaires have their specific 
advantages.   
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• Legal form, ownership structure and firm size are factors that drive firm 
performance of grid owner companies.  
• The research task comprises the gathering of data upon which to base 
generalisable propositions that can be tested (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
• Regression analysis and the statistics software Stata will be applied to 
analyse the data. 
• Better information of the cause and effects of grid owner companies is 
essential to private energy companies and local governments.  
• Due to the fact that large numbers of rights-of-way contracts between 
municipalities and energy companies contain options to found grid owner 
companies in Germany, the influence of several criteria on the firm 
performance has to be analysed; a theoretical basis of decision-making is 
needed.  
• To present the results of the analysis to others, tables, diagrams or charts 
are appropriate methods of displaying quantitative data on grid owner 
companies in Germany.  
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Table 5: Variables 
Variables Measurement 
Dependent variable  
firm performance ratio between net income 
and total assets at the 
balance sheet date 
Independent variables  
firm size population or natural 
logarithm of area 
private participation quota percentage of participation 
of private companies in 
the registered capital of a 
grid owner company 
legal form factor variable 
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4. Discussion and Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In accordance with the research questions concerning the firm performance of 
German grid owner companies, empirical analyses were carried out to test the 
relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The 
data analyses include summary descriptive statistics to describe data on German 
grid owner companies and inferential statistical tests to make inferences about the 
population of German grid owner companies.   
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics  
 
First, descriptive statistics are used to describe the relevant variables of the 
regression analysis. The descriptive statistics provide measures that can be used 
to examine and describe individual samples (Field, 2013). 
 
The statistical distributions of the metric variables ROA, population, area and 
private participation quota are presented together over all years and then 
separately for each year.  
 
The ROA varies between -1.03 and 0.34 and amounts to an average of 0.03. The 
standard deviation amounts to 0.099. Furthermore, the maximum ROA value is 
reached in 2015 with the minimum value in 2011.  
 
Table 6: Distribution of ROA 
Variable Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 302 0.032 0.099 -1.032 0.335 
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Table 7: Distribution of ROA per year 
Year Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 9 0.051 0.050 -0.001 0.156 
2011 12 -0.048 0.031 -1.032 0.099 
2012 25 -0.010 0.148 -0.684 0.113 
2013 48 0.027 0.073 -0.337 0.279 
2014 85 0.039 0.051 -0.042 0.255 
2015 123 0.043 0.079 -0.355 0.335 
 
Figure 7: Boxplot ROA per year 
 
 
The average population as a proxy for firm size is 33,160 with a standard deviation  
of 54,634. 
 
Table 8: Distribution of population 
Variable Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
population 1,020 33,159.67 54,633.61 1,081 623,738 
 
In 2015, the population has its highest value; its lowest value is realised in the year 
2010. The growing population of German municipalities with grid owner companies 
corresponds to the total population in Germany that has grown from 81.75 million 
in 2010 to 82.18 million in 2015 (Statista, 2019).  
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Table 9: Distribution of population per year 
Year Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 170 33,263.78 54,711.54 1,081 606,588 
2011 170 33,360.34 55,133.04 1,092 613,392 
2012 170 32,773.72 53,831.38 1,101 597,939 
2013 170 32,874.72 54,273,29 1,092 604,297 
2014 170 33,071.51 54,857.31 1,083 612,441 
2015 170 33,613.97 55,776.87 1,113 623,738 
 
Figure 8: Boxplot population per year 
 
The area varies between 6.5 square kilometres and 700.2 square kilometres and 
amounts to an average of 97.3 square kilometres. The standard deviation amounts 
to 127.1 square kilometres.  
 
Table 10: Distribution of area 
Variable Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Area 1,020 97.251 127.144 6.500 700.170 
 
The minimum value (6.5 square kilometres) and the maximum value (700.2 square 
kilometres) are almost constant over the years. 
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Table 11: Distribution of area per year 
Year Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 170 96.523 127.148 6.500 700.170 
2011 170 97.221 127.345 6.500 700.170 
2012 170 97.405 127.499 6.500 700.170 
2013 170 97.425 127.499 6.500 700.170 
2014 170 97.248 127.302 6.500 700.170 
2015 170 97.684 127.946 6.500 700.160 
 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of area. The blue line indicates the normal 
distribution. The lower level of area is more prevalent than the middle and the 
upper area. A logarithmic transformation (natural logarithm) shows a better 
approximation to the normal distribution (Figure 10). In the case of right-skewed 
distributions, the natural logarithm of the relevant variable is often used. The 
underlying assumption is that a logarithmic relationship between the independent 
and the dependent variable exists. The higher the value of the independent 
variable, the smaller the variation of the dependent variable when the independent 
variable varies by one further unit (Field, 2013). 
Table 12: Distribution of area (natural logarithm) per year 
Year Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 170 4.065 0.969 1.872 6.551 
2011 170 4.071 0.973 1.872 6.551 
2012 170 4.072 0.974 1.872 6.551 
2013 170 4.072 0.974 1.872 6.551 
2014 170 4.071 0.973 1.872 6.551 
2015 170 4.073 0.976 1.872 6.551 
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Figure 9: Distribution of area (original) 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of area (natural logarithm) 
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As expected, the values of the private participation quota lie between 0 and 100 
percent. The arithmetic mean amounts to 44.1 percent and does not vary over 
time, because the participations of the private energy company or the municipality 
are generally constant. 
Table 13: Distribution of private participation quota 
Variable Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
private participation quota 1,020 44.141 18.493 0 100 
 
Table 14: Distribution of private participation quota per year 
Year Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2010 170 44.141 18.493 0.00 100.00 
2011 170 44.141 18.493 0.00 100.00 
2012 170 44.141 18.493 0.00 100.00 
2013 170 44.141 18.493 0.00 100.00 
2014 170 44.141 18.493 0.00 100.00 
2015 170 44.141 18.493 0.00 100.00 
 
In more than 80 percent of cases, the legal form of the grid owner company is a 
limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner (GmbH & Co. 
KG). About 16 percent of the grid owner companies in the analysis are limited 
companies (GmbH). However, grid owner companies that have the legal form of a 
limited partnership with a public limited company as general partner (AG & Co. 
KG) are designated as missing values. With three companies all over Germany, 
the number of cases is simply too low. There is not enough data on grid owner 
companies with the legal form of a limited partnership with a public limited 
company as general partner to obtain a reliable regression model. 
Table 15: Distribution of legal form  
Legal form Freq. Percent Cum. 
AG & Co. KG 18 1.76 1.76 
GmbH 162 15.88 17.65 
GmbH & Co. KG 840 82.35 100.00 
Total 1,020 100.00   
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4.3 Regression analysis  
 
Regression analysis is a set of statistical processes to estimate the relationships 
among variables. It means fitting a linear model to the data and using it to predict 
values of an outcome variable from one or more predictor variables (Field, 2013). 
 
The researcher applies multiple regression analysis, i.e. an extension of simple 
regression in which an outcome is predicted by a linear combination of two or 
more predictor variables (Field, 2013). The structure of the linear model is as 
follows: 
 
Yi = (b0 + b1 * X1i + b2 * X2i + b3 * X3i) + εi 
 
The ROA as the outcome (dependent variable) is denoted as Yi, and each 
predictor (independent variable) is denoted as Xi: 
 
X1i = population or natural logarithm of area as proxies for firm size  
X2i = private participation quota 
X3i = legal form 
bi = regression coefficient 
εi = error term 
 
Depending on which variable is used as a proxy to measure firm size, X1i 
represents population or the natural logarithm of area. 
 
Each predictor has a regression coefficient bi associated with it that represents the 
gradient of the regression line in a simple regression. b1 is the coefficient of the 
first predictor X1, b2 is the coefficient of the second predictor X2, etc. The value of b 
stands for the change in the outcome resulting from a unit change in the predictor. 
b0 is the value of the outcome when all predictors are zero (Field, 2013). The error 
term of the regression model is symbolised by εi. To assess the error in a 
regression model, the sum of squared errors is used, the so-called residual sum of 
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squares (Field, 2013). In all cases, the subscript i denotes an individual German 
grid owner company. 
 
As the researcher is interested in the relationships between one or more predictor 
variables and an outcome variable (Field, 2013), the multiple linear regression 
model is suitable for the analysis. In order to find the optimal model, the OLS 
regression method is applied. Using the method of least squares means to 
estimate the values of b that describe the regression model that best fits the data 
(Field, 2013). 
 
In the following regression analyses, the influence of population or area as proxies 
for firm size, private participation quota and legal form on ROA is investigated. The 
selection of the predictors is based on a sound theoretical rationale and well-
conducted past research that has demonstrated their importance (Field, 2013). 
Thus, a multiple linear regression is applied and an OLS estimation method is 
used. With regard to the area, a new variable is created and applied, i.e. the 
natural logarithm of area: ln(area).  
 
A model that also contains the individual years as categorical variables, i.e. a 
variable made up of categories (Field, 2013), does not appear to be significant to 
the reference year of 2010. Thus, the year specification is neglected in the 
analysis.  
 
As the statistical model can be biased by unusual cases or by failing to meet 
certain assumptions, further examinations are necessary. In order to check 
whether the model is influenced by a small number of cases, outliers and 
influential cases have to be detected. An outlier denotes a case that differs 
substantially from the main trend of the data and affects the estimates of the 
regression coefficients. There are several residual statistics that can be used to 
assess the influence of a particular case (Field, 2013). 
 
In order to identify potential outliers in the values, a first model is calculated with all 
values. An outlier is a value that differs substantially from the main trend of the 
data and can affect the estimates of the regression coefficients (Field, 2013). After 
having applied Cook’s distance, critical values are identified, eliminated and the 
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model is calculated again. Compared to other measures, Cook’s distance 
measures the impact of a single case on the entire model, i.e. the impact that a 
case has on the model’s ability to predict all cases. Highly influential observations 
have an extraordinary value for the dependent variable and an extraordinary 
combination of values for the independent variables. Only if both aspects are 
present, will the estimation of coefficients be strongly influenced by the respective 
observation (Kohler & Kreuter, 2016). 
 
In general, values of Cook’s distance greater than 1 respectively 4/number of 
observations seem to be critical and may be cause for concern (Cook & Weisberg, 
1982; Field, 2013).  
 
Multicollinearity describes a situation in which two or more variables are very 
closely linearly related, i.e. a strong correlation between two or more predictors 
exists. That makes it difficult to assess the individual importance of a predictor 
(Field, 2013). 
 
Multicollinearity with regard to the independent variables is tested by variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for each independent variable. The VIF indicates whether a 
predictor has a strong linear relationship with other predictors in an ordinary least 
squares regression analysis. As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF values are 
greater than 10 needs further investigation. A tolerance value (1/VIF) lower than 
0.1 is comparable to a VIF of 10 (Field, 2013).  
 
Depending on which variable is used to measure firm size, Table 16 and Table 17 
show the variance inflation factors and the tolerance values of each variable:   
 
Table 16: VIF and tolerance - population 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
population 1.01 0.985342 
private participation 
quota 1.05 0.951550 
legal form 1.06 0.939262 
Mean VIF 1.04 
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Table 17: VIF and tolerance - area (natural logarithm) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ln(area) 1.00 0.997908 
private participation 
quota 1.05 0.955586 
legal form 1.05 0.954683 
Mean VIF 1.03 
 
 
Table 18 and Table 20 visualise the comparison between the model estimation 
with and without the 7 (population) and 13 (natural logarithm of area) outliers. In 
general, the higher the adjusted R2, the better the model fits with the data (Field, 
2013). It is shown that the adjusted R2 and the level of statistical significance are 
higher in the models without outliers. The application of the adjusted R2 is a 
method of cross-validation, i.e. the accuracy of the model is assessed across 
different samples. In general, the adjusted value of R2 measures how much 
variance in the ROA would be accounted for if the model had been derived from 
the population from which the sample was taken. It is the squared correlation 
between values of the outcome predicted by the model and the values observed in 
the data (Field, 2013). Furthermore, the values of significance are higher in the 
models without outliers. 
Table 18: Comparison of the models with and without outliers - population 
Variable with outliers  without outliers 
population    0.000     0.000** 
private 
participation quota        0.001***      0.001*** 
legal form 
  
GmbH & Co. KG  0.010      0.021*** 
Intercept -0.026   -0.012 
N    297      290 
adj. R2        0.025         0.097 
    legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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According to the regression model, the population as a proxy for firm size has a 
positive and significant influence on ROA. The influence of private participation 
quota on ROA is positive and even highly significant at the 0.01 level. 
Furthermore, limited partnerships with a limited liability company as general 
partner (GmbH & Co. KG) also have a positive and highly significant influence on 
ROA. This means that the ROA of grid owner companies with this legal form is 
0.02 higher on average than the ROA of companies with the legal form of a limited 
liability company (reference category). 
 
To sum up, the regression model with population as a proxy for firm size shows 
that 10 percent of the variation in ROA can be explained by population, private 
participation quota and legal form. 
 
The following table provides estimates of the model parameters and the 
significance of these values: 
 
Table 19: Estimation of coefficients (final model - population) 
ROA Coefficient Std. Err. robust T P>t 95%-Confidence interval 
population 0.000 0.000 2.31 0.022 0.000 0.000 
private participation quota 0.001 0.000 3.85 0.000 0.000 0.001 
legal form 
 
     GmbH & Co. KG 0.021 0.005 4.42 0.000  0.012 0.030 
Intercept -0.012 0.009 -1.39 0.166 -0.029        0.005 
adj. R2 = 0.097, N = 290 
 
If a variable significantly predicts an outcome, the value of the regression 
coefficient is different from zero. The t-test examines whether the values of the 
regression coefficients are significantly different from zero relative to the variation 
in b-values across samples. If the observed significance is less than 0.05, the 
result reflects a genuine effect (Field, 2013). Thus, in the underlying regression 
analysis, one cannot conclude that the relevant coefficients are 0. However, the 
regression coefficient of population is rounded towards 0 (0.000000168).  
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The t-test also serves as a measure of whether a predictor is making a significant 
contribution to the model. If the t-test associated with a predictor value is 
significant, i.e. the value of P>t is less than 0.05, the independent variable is 
making a significant contribution to the model. The smaller the value of P>t, the 
greater the contribution of the independent variable (Field, 2013). From the 
magnitude of the t-statistics one can see that all independent variables have a 
great impact on the ROA. 
 
The regression analysis in Stata has been conducted by using the vce(robust) 
option. In general, the vce option specifies how to estimate the variance-
covariance matrix (VCE) corresponding to the parameter estimates. The command 
vce(robust) uses the robust or sandwich estimator of variance. This estimator is 
robust to some types of misspecification as long as the observations are 
independent. The method is formally known as the Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator. The VCE obtained in this way is valid if the errors are independently 
distributed. It is neither required that the errors follow a normal distribution nor that 
they be identically distributed from one observation to the next. Overall, the 
variance-covariance matrix is robust to heteroscedasticity of the errors (Stata, 
2018). 
 
The confidence intervals for the regression coefficients are also given. The 
confidence intervals of the b-values are boundaries constructed such that in 95 
percent of samples these boundaries contain the values of b. A bad model has 
confidence intervals that cross zero, i.e. in the population the predictor could have 
a negative as well as a positive relationship to the outcome (Field, 2013). It is not 
the case in this model and this means that the estimates for the model are likely to 
be representative of the values.  
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Table 20: Comparison of the models with and without outliers - area (natural logarithm) 
Variable with outliers  without outliers 
ln(area)    0.015**     0.011*** 
private 
participation quota     0.001**     0.001*** 
legal form 
  
GmbH & Co. KG      0.012    0.017*** 
Intercept -0.079***   -0.047*** 
N 297   284 
adj. R2      0.038        0.146 
    legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
According to the regression model, the natural logarithm of area as a proxy for firm 
size has a positive and highly significant influence on ROA. Due to the 
transformation of the variable, one should pay attention when interpreting the 
coefficient. With a 10 percent increase in area, the ROA increases by b1* ln (1.10) 
= 0.001018542. Thus, with an increase in area of one percent, an increase in ROA 
of approximately 0.00011 is expected. This interpretation is true only if the other 
predictors are held constant (Field, 2013). 
 
The influence of private participation quota on ROA is also positive and highly 
significant at the 0.01 level.  
 
Furthermore, limited partnerships with a limited liability company as general 
partner (GmbH & Co. KG) have a positive and highly significant influence on ROA. 
This means that the ROA of grid owner companies with this legal form is 0.017 
higher on average than the ROA of companies with the legal form of a limited 
liability company (reference category). 
 
As a result, the regression model with the natural logarithm of area as a proxy for 
firm size shows that 15 percent of the variation in ROA can be explained by area, 
private participation quota and legal form. 
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The following table provides estimates of the model parameters and the 
significance of these values: 
 
Table 21: Estimation of coefficients (final model - areal (natural logarithm)) 
ROA Coefficient Std. Err. robust T P>t 95%-Confidence interval 
ln(area) 0.011 0.002 4.57 0.000 0.006 0.015 
private participation quota 0.001 0.000 4.03 0.000 0.000 0.001 
legal form 
 
     GmbH & Co. KG 0.017 0.004 4.12 0.000  0.009 0.025 
Intercept -0.047 0.011 -4.14 0.000 -0.069      -0.025 
adj. R2 = 0.146, N = 284 
 
The values of the t-test show that all relevant regression coefficients are 
significantly different from zero and all independent variables make a significant 
contribution to the model. Consequently, all independent variables have a great 
impact on the ROA. As the confidence intervals do not cross 0, the estimates for 
the model are likely to be representative of the values. 
 
Figure 11 shows the marginplots for all independent variables and the related 
confidence intervals. It is possible to see how the linear prediction of ROA 
behaves at different levels of the independent variables.  
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Figure 11: Distribution of margins 
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In order to support private energy companies and municipalities when they are 
faced with the strategic decision to establish a grid owner company, it is important 
to examine to what extent each of the variables has an impact on the ROA. The 
regression function is as follows:  
 
Yi = (-0.0468794 + 0.0106866 * X1i + 0.0006167 * X2i + 0.0169535 * X3i). 
 
Based on the regression function, one can estimate that Yi increases by 0.00011 
(= coefficient b1) when area, measured by X1, grows by 1 percent. The private 
participation quota, measured by X2, also has an impact on the ROA. Thus, with 
an increase in private participation quota of 1 percent, an increase in ROA of 
approximately 0.0006 (= coefficient b2) is expected. Moreover, the legal form of a 
limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner (GmbH & Co. 
KG) has a positive and significant influence on the ROA. The relevant coefficient 
b3 amounts to 0.0169535. In comparison, the regression coefficient b3 of the legal 
form (= X3) as one of the examined factors has the highest value.     
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Furthermore, the correlation between the independent variables X1, X2 and X3 has 
to be analysed. All pairwise correlation coefficients at a significance level of 0.05 
are as follows: 
 
Table 22: Pairwise correlation coefficients  
 
ROA population ln(area) 
private 
participation 
quota 
ROA 1.0000    
population 0.0835 1.0000   
ln(area) 0.1433* 0.4240* 1.0000  
private 
participation quota 0.1595* 0.0038 0.0926* 1.0000 
             * Significance level of 0.05 
The correlation matrix shows the value of Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
between every pair of variables. Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient 
denotes a standardised measure of the strength of relationship between two 
variables. Its values vary between -1 and +1. Whereas -1 means that if one 
variable changes, the other changes in the opposite direction by the same amount, 
+1 shows that if one variable changes, the other changes in the same direction by 
the same amount. A value of 0 indicates that there is no relationship between the 
variables at all (Field, 2013; Kohler & Kreuter, 2016).  
 
Along the diagonal of the matrix, the values of the correlation coefficients are 1 
and thus represent the positive perfect correlation of each variable with itself. 
There is a weak to moderate correlation between population and natural logarithm 
of area. However, both variables represent proxies of firm size in the two different 
regression models and not in the same regression model. As there are no 
substantial correlations between predictors in the regression models (correlation 
coefficient < 0.9), there is no multicollinearity in the data (Field, 2013).  
 
In order to test the assumption that E (ε) = 0 in the regression model, the residual-
vs.-fitted-plot is applied. It denotes a scatterplot of the residuals of a linear 
regression against the predicted values (Figure 12). Due to the definition of a 
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regression model, the mean of the residuals in these graphics is always zero 
(Kohler & Kreuter, 2016).  
 
Figure 12: Residual vs. fitted plot - population 
 
Figure 13: Residual vs. fitted plot - area (natural logarithm) 
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4.4 Conclusions 
 
4.4.1 General remarks 
 
In the following section, the question of to what extent each of the identified critical 
drivers of firm performance has an impact on the Return on Assets ratio of 
German grid owner companies is answered. The presentation is backed up with 
mathematical justification from the regression analysis. The focus is on the 
regression model with the natural logarithm of area as a proxy for firm size of 
German grid owner companies as it provides a better model fit than the regression 
model with population as a proxy for firm size.  
 
4.4.2 Area as a proxy for firm size 
 
First, the regression analysis has shown that there is a positive relationship 
between firm size and firm performance of grid owner companies in Germany. The 
natural logarithm of area, ln(area), as a proxy for firm size, has a positive and 
highly significant influence on ROA.  
 
Y = (-0.0468794 + 0.0106866 * X1 + 0.0006167 * X2 + 0.0169535 * X3) 
 
Based on the regression function, one can estimate that Y, symbolising the ROA, 
increases by 0.00011 (= coefficient b1) when area (X1 represents the natural 
logarithm of area) grows by 1 percent. This means that the bigger the grid owner 
company measured by the area, the higher its ROA. As a result, private energy 
companies and municipalities profit from grid owner companies with large grids.   
 
4.4.3 Private participation quota 
 
Second, the regression analysis has shown that the private participation quota, 
measured by X2, also has an impact on the ROA. The influence of the private 
participation quota on ROA is positive and highly significant at the 1 percent level. 
Y = (-0.0468794 + 0.0106866 * X1 + 0.0006167 * X2 + 0.0169535 * X3) 
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Based on the regression function, with an increase in the private participation 
quota of 1 percent, an increase in ROA of approximately 0.0006 (= regression 
coefficient b2) is expected. I.e. the higher the private participation in a German grid 
owner company, the higher its profitability or level of firm performance.  
 
4.4.4 Legal form 
 
Third, the regression analysis has shown that the legal form of a limited 
partnership with a limited liability company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG) 
has a positive and significant influence on ROA.  
 
Y = (-0.0468794 + 0.0106866 * X1 + 0.0006167 * X2 + 0.0169535 * X3) 
 
The relevant regression coefficient b3 amounts to 0.0169535. In comparison, the 
regression coefficient of the legal form (= X3) as one of the four examined 
regression coefficients has the highest value. The analysis has also shown that 
grid owner companies in Germany that are limited partnerships with a limited 
liability company as general partner have a higher firm performance than grid 
owner companies that are limited liability companies. At first glance, the result 
seems obvious as limited partnerships with a limited liability company as general 
partner have a lower overall tax burden than limited liability companies. Whereas 
limited partnerships with a limited liability company as general partner are only 
subject to trade tax and their partners are subject to income taxes, limited liability 
companies have to pay trade, corporate and solidarity tax. Trade tax amounts to 
14 percent on average, corporate tax amounts to 15 percent and solidarity tax 
represents a 5.5 percent surcharge on corporate tax. However, higher 
administrative expenses for tax advice and auditing of the limited liability company 
as general partner could have led to different results.  
 
Overall, the legal form of a limited partnership with a limited liability company as 
general partner seems an attractive financial option for municipalities and private 
energy companies when they are faced with the strategic decision of which legal 
form is suitable. Compared to a grid owner company with the legal form of a 
limited liability company, limited partnerships with a limited liability company as 
general partner realise higher returns on assets ratios. As grid owner companies 
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with the legal form of a limited partnership with a public limited company as 
general partner are underrepresented (with only three) in Germany, their influence 
on the ROA could not be analysed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 179 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the following chapter, the results are presented in sequence and relative to each 
research question and implications for the decision-making situation of 
municipalities and private energy companies are discussed. The outcomes of the 
analysis and their significance are summarised and related to the landscape of 
current practice. As regression analysis can be applied to test a model based on 
causal relationships among variables, but does not imply that the tested 
relationships are causal (Field, 2013), aspects on causes and effects are also 
covered. Furthermore, implications of the findings are contextualised and 
recommendations with regard to the decision-making situation of municipalities 
and private energy companies as well as the optimal design of German grid owner 
companies are made.  
 
5.2 Total population  
 
Through the process of gathering data to determine the total population of German 
grid owner companies, 170 different German grid owner companies have been 
identified. The findings were made on the basis of the comprehensive screening of 
newly established German grid owner companies.  
 
The population of grid owner companies consists of 140 limited partnerships with 
limited liability companies as general partners, 27 limited liability companies and 3 
limited partnerships with public limited companies as general partners. Thus, the 
most popular legal form is the limited commercial partnership with a limited liability 
company as general partner at 82 percent and the limited liability company follows 
at 16 percent. The findings correspond to the reviewed literature and confirm the 
qualitative statements. In particular, Heim (2015a) points out that preferred legal 
forms for grid owner companies are limited liability companies or limited 
partnerships with limited liability companies as general partners.  
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Referring to the time frame, the German grid owner companies, forming the total 
population, were founded between the years 2007 and 2016. Most of the grid 
owner companies in Germany were established in 2014.  
 
With regard to the geographical distribution over Germany, the registered offices 
of grid owner companies can be found in 11 of the 16 German Federal States. 
Most of the German grid owner companies are located in the Federal state of 
Baden-Württemberg, followed by North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony. 
Concerning the regional concentration of established grid owner companies, most 
are located in the western part of Germany, although during the reunification in the 
1990s large numbers of new rights-of-way contracts with a duration of 20 years 
were negotiated, too. To sum up, more than 94 percent of the German grid owner 
companies are located in the former Western Germany. So, a decline from west to 
east is apparent. 
 
5.3 Firm size 
 
First, the regression analyses have shown that there is a significant and positive 
linear relationship between the firm size and firm performance of grid owner 
companies. Such a significant relationship exists both with population and with the 
natural logarithm of area as proxies for firm size. However, the regression model 
with the natural logarithm of area provides a better model fit than the regression 
model with population as a proxy for firm size.  
 
With regard to the causes and effects, there are interesting aspects. The findings 
indicate that municipalities and energy companies as partners or shareholders of 
grid owner companies could increase ROA by increasing firm size.  
 
On the one hand, the more people live in the municipality and thus are connected 
to the grid of a grid owner company, the more grid facilities like house 
connections, distribution lines or local network stations are required to supply 
these people with utilities like electricity, gas or water. These grid facilities are in 
turn leased to the respective distribution network operator who actually supplies 
the population with the utility. While the lease payments increase the net income of 
a grid owner company, the depreciation expenses on grid facilities decrease it. 
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However, as the calculated depreciation is part of the lease payments (section 
2.4.2), the net income (numerator of the ROA) increases for example with every 
additional house connection installed that supplies the inhabitants. Moreover, 
every house connection, distribution line or local network station increases the 
total assets and hence the denominator of the ROA.  
 
On the other hand, the larger the area of a grid owner company, the more grid 
facilities like distribution lines or local network stations are required to distribute 
energy to the customers. As a result, more grid facilities owned by the grid owner 
company are leased to the distribution network operator and net income as well as 
total assets increase.  
 
However, the energy consumption of industrial companies depends less on the 
number of inhabitants or the area, and more on their power requirements. Hence, 
powerful grid facilities are required to supply industrial companies with energy. 
Both the grid facilities for the local residents and for the industrial companies are 
leased to the respective distribution network operators by the grid owner company. 
While the scope and the number of grid facilities increase the denominator of the 
ROA, the lease payments increase the net income of the grid owner company 
representing the numerator of the ROA.   
 
In the end, whether a single municipality has a large or a small municipal district 
mainly determines the size of a single municipal grid. As long as a municipal 
council does not decide on the expansion of the distribution network area 
according to the content of the rights-of-way contract, for example a new 
development area to be connected, the grid owner company mainly grows by 
replacement investments and thus its financial performance.   
 
The regulatory environment in Germany, in particular sections 4 to 10 of the 
German Electricity and Gas Network Charges Ordinances, ensures that 
investment in grids generates an adequate return, the calculated return on equity. 
Despite the German incentive regulation, the German energy grid sector remains 
a natural monopoly and grid investments are fostered by law (section 2.4.2). 
According to section 13 of the German Incentive Regulation Ordinance, the 
German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post 
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and Railways determines the efficiency value of the distribution network operators 
and forces them to reduce unnecessary costs. Concerning the determination of 
the efficiency value, the German Federal Network Agency has to consider 
structure parameters of the distribution network operators, in particular 
characteristics of the supply tasks like urban versus rural or regional 
characteristics like geography, geology or topology of the grid territory. It should be 
particularly emphasised that the structural parameters also include the supplied 
area (section 13 (3) German Incentive Regulation Ordinance). If the lease 
payment of the distribution network operator to the grid owner company is based 
on the German Incentive Regulation Ordinance, it increases with every square 
kilometre and thus so does the net income of the grid owner company 
representing the numerator of the ROA.   
 
The findings concerning the positive and significant relationship between firm size 
and firm performance correspond to some views in the literature. In particular, 
Heim (2015a) concludes that a minimum size of local grids is required and can be 
achieved by large grid owner companies consisting of the local grids of several 
municipalities. Thus, municipalities faced with the decision on the design of a grid 
owner company can be recommended to establish a grid owner company with a 
grid as large as possible.  
 
However, the cooperation of several municipalities with one or more private 
energy companies offers the possibility to establish grid owner companies that 
comprise more than one municipal grid and thus large profitable grid owner 
companies. For example, the Hessian Municipal Code encourages economic 
activities of several municipalities together as they may operate generation, 
storage, distribution and supply of electricity, heat and gas from renewable 
energies when the activities take place in the regional environment in the form of 
intermunicipal cooperations (section 121 (1a) Hessian Municipal Code). In 
addition, large grid owner companies might offer the possibility of a unitary 
regional infrastructure policy between municipalities in favour of the citizens.  
 
Moreover, the financing costs of loans in order to finance the grid acquisitions and 
the ongoing investments might be lower in a grid owner company with more than 
one grid as banks are faced with higher financing volumes. However, it has to be 
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considered that grid investments leading to a higher firm size of grid owner 
companies must be financed, either by operating cash flow, equity or debt. As 
municipalities and energy companies as partners or shareholders of German grid 
owner companies normally do not have unlimited capital and bank financing also 
has a finite nature, investments are restricted. Thus, the increase in firm size might 
be limited by the financial situation of a grid owner company and their partners or 
shareholders.   
 
In contrast to German distribution network operators (section 27 (2) German 
Electricity or Gas Network Charges Ordinances), German grid owner companies 
are neither obliged to report their data on grid structures to the German Federal 
Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways nor 
to disclose them in their annual reports. In order to enable even more precise 
analyses, comparisons and predictions of the impact of firm size on the financial 
performance of German grid owner companies, it is recommended that they report 
specific data on population and the area supplied to the German Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways. Furthermore, 
they should disclose them in their annual reports which in turn should be published 
in the German Federal Gazette.  
 
5.4 Private participation quota 
 
The descriptive statistics show that the mean of the private participation quota 
amounts to 44.1 percent. A municipality obtains the majority of shareholding or 
partnership with a participation quota of more than 50 percent, for example 50.1 
percent. In turn, this means a private participation quota of lower than 50 percent, 
for example 49.9 percent. The findings show that with 44.1 percent there is a lower 
private participation quota on average than 49.9 percent. The findings indicate that 
private energy companies as cooperation partners in German grid owner 
companies forgo the higher participation quota in favour of the participation quota 
of municipalities. A possible explanation could be that the probability of becoming 
the preferred cooperation partner in a grid owner company during the concession 
award procedure increases if the municipality is given a higher participation quota 
than 50.1 percent. As the annual payout of a grid owner company normally 
depends on the participation quota, the municipality benefits financially from a 
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higher participation quota. Thus, any percentage of participation quota increases 
the financial scope of a municipality, for example to reduce budget deficits. The 
findings also correspond to the opinions expressed in the literature. In particular, 
Heim (2015a) argues that the preferred organisational structure of a grid owner 
company is a municipal majority interest and a minority interest of the chosen 
cooperation partner.      
 
Moreover, the regression analysis has shown that the higher the percentage of 
private ownership, the higher the level of firm performance of grid owner 
companies. It means that the private participation quota, measured by X2, also has 
a positive and highly significant impact on the ROA. The influence of the private 
participation quota on ROA is significant at the 0.01 level.  
 
Further reflecting on the causes and effects, the findings generally indicate that the 
participation of private energy companies might have an important influence on the 
performance of German grid owner companies, measured by ROA. Basically, 
private energy companies provide professional business and technical experience 
as well as operational know-how to German grid owner companies (Wagner & 
Berlo, 2017). 
 
Compared to municipalities, private energy companies are used to own, to plan 
and to operate grids. Their influence in the shareholders’ meeting or meeting of 
partners might contribute to investment and financing decisions that lead to 
profitable results. In his daily business, the researcher experienced that 
investment and financing decisions in grid owner companies are part of the overall 
planning of private energy companies. Whereas municipalities often base their 
investment and financing decisions on political reasons, private energy companies 
strongly adhere to profitability aspects. For example, a decision in favour of the 
citizens could be the cabling of a whole municipality instead of overhead lines just 
for aesthetical reasons. Group affiliation of private energy companies and grid 
owner companies reinforces the adherence to profitability, in particular if the group 
is geared to the capital market. In contrast to municipal requirements that mainly 
refer to liability issues (section 122 of the Hessian Municipal Code), private energy 
companies often must fulfil economic goals like maximising ROA, etc. 
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In contrast, large numbers of German municipalities have neither capital to finance 
significant investments in grids nor know-how or experience to operate grids 
(Heim, 2015a). As the operating and investment expertise as well as the economic 
power of private energy companies to finance significant grid investments seem to 
be important requirements for the profitability of grid owner companies, 
municipalities seem to choose experienced private energy companies when they 
found a grid owner company together with a private partner. An appropriate 
influence at the operational level as well as in the bodies of a grid owner company 
is normally ensured by an adequate level of shareholder participation of the private 
energy company. Besides, economic activity or participation of the municipality 
must be particularly subject to the economic principle (section 121 (1a) Hessian 
Municipal Code). Although section 122 (1) of the Hessian Municipal Code requires 
municipalities to ensure an appropriate influence on the grid owner company in 
order to inform the municipal council with regard to the fulfilment of the public 
purpose, it does not mean that the influence has to be ensured only by the level of 
participation quota. Moreover, an adequate level of influence of the municipality 
can also be achieved by a disproportionate representation on the supervisory 
board of a grid owner company (Dietlein & Ogorek, 2018). In short, the result of 
the regression analysis that the higher the percentage of private ownership, the 
higher the level of firm performance of grid owner companies indicates that 
municipalities might increase ROA by increasing the participation quota of private 
energy companies.  
 
However, another interpretation might be that in general private energy companies 
apply for more profitable cases of grid owner companies and municipalities are 
better off if they limit private participation. Thus, ROA might increase from the 
perspective of a municipality. Undoubtedly, with their engagement in grid owner 
companies, private energy companies aim at maximising profit. This implies that 
they apply for and engage in grid owner companies that meet a certain level of 
return. Nevertheless, the economic activity or participation of a municipality must 
be particularly subject to the economic principle (section 121 (1a) Hessian 
Municipal Code), too. It is known that municipalities not only pursue economic 
interests, but also social and political interests like influence on local infrastructure, 
supporting renewable energies, etc. If municipalities find financially well-equipped 
private energy companies with operating, investment and economic expertise, it 
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cannot be ruled out that municipalities deliberately limit the private participation 
quota in grid owner companies to gain more payout based on the participation 
quota.  
 
5.5 Legal form 
 
The regression analysis has demonstrated that the legal form of a limited 
partnership with a limited liability company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG) 
has a positive and significant influence on ROA. The analysis has also shown that 
grid owner companies in Germany that are limited partnerships with a limited 
liability company as general partner have a higher firm performance than grid 
owner companies that are limited liability companies (GmbH). As grid owner 
companies with the legal form of a limited partnership with a public limited 
company as general partner are represented by three firms in Germany, their 
influence on the ROA could not be validly analysed. 
  
In general, the high penetration of limited partnerships with a limited liability 
company as general partner, exactly 140 grid owner companies, corresponds to 
the finding that grid owner companies with this legal form realise a high ROA. 
Moreover, the findings correspond to and confirm the views in the literature. For 
example, Heim (2015a) points out that the preferred legal form of remunicipalised 
companies is the grid owner company with the legal form of a limited liability 
company or limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner. 
Both legal forms enable private energy companies to participate in companies 
together with municipalities (Heil, 2018).  
 
Apart from the financial influence on the ROA, the establishment of a cooperation 
model in the form of a grid owner company facilitates the consolidation of 
municipal enterprises into fiscal units (“steuerlicher Querverbund”) (Fellenberg et 
al., 2012). The income of profitable grid owner companies is offset with the losses 
of other municipal activities (public transportation, energy supply, port and airport) 
(Rosenberger, 2012), and reduces the tax burden of the municipality (Wagner & 
Berlo, 2015). Often, municipal swimming baths and public transport belong to 
important infrastructures and services that can be offered to the public in spite of 
significant losses (Wagner & Berlo, 2015). 
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According to section 8b of the German Corporate Income Tax Act, 95 percent of 
the expenses are tax-free when a limited liability company pays dividends to 
another corporation. In turn, borrowing costs in conjunction with the investment in 
the limited liability company cannot be claimed (section 8b (5) German Corporate 
Income Tax Act). Thus, municipalities that participate in grid owner companies 
with the legal form of a limited liability company receive income from grid owner 
companies at 95 percent tax free, but cannot claim borrowing costs in conjunction 
with the investment in the grid owner company. However, grid owner companies 
with the legal form of a limited partnership with a limited liability company as 
general partner make it possible to claim borrowing costs in conjunction with the 
investment in the grid owner company by supplementary tax balance sheets. Due 
to budget deficits, municipalities often take up loans in order to participate in grid 
owner companies, i.e. to finance shareholders’ equity (DStGB, 2017).  
 
Concerning the question of causality, i.e. what may be the cause and the effect, 
the question asks whether it is the form that causes the ROA advantage or the 
investment and financing requirements of the grid owner company. The 
assumption might be that grid owner companies having considerable investment 
and financing requirements choose limited partnerships with limited liability 
companies as general partners while grid owner companies that do not invest do 
not choose limited partnerships with limited liability companies as general 
partners, but other legal forms and thus accept a lower level of ROA.  
 
In general, the decision on the legal form is a fundamental decision that is made 
by the shareholders or partners of a grid owner company at the beginning of the 
operating activities. At that time, regular investment and financing decisions over 
the whole lifetime of a grid owner company are not certain or not known at all. For 
example, the establishment of development areas and investment in new grid 
technologies like smart meters or electric vehicle charging stations are often not 
known at that stage. Consequently, due to the uncertainty about future investment 
and financing conditions of a grid owner company, these factors might not 
primarily determine the choice of the legal form of a grid owner company. 
However, the decision on the initial purchase of the grid might have an impact on 
the choice of the legal form as grid owner companies with the legal form of a 
limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner make it 
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possible to claim borrowing costs in conjunction with the investment in the grid 
owner company. Due to budget deficits, municipalities often take up loans in order 
to participate in grid owner companies, i.e. to finance shareholders’ equity (DStGB, 
2017). Although municipalities that participate in grid owner companies with the 
legal form of a limited liability company receive income from grid owner companies 
at 95 percent tax free, but cannot claim borrowing costs in conjunction with the 
investment in the grid owner company, it does not mean that municipalities and 
private energy companies as shareholders of grid owner companies with the legal 
form of limited liability companies invest less than grid owner companies with the 
legal form of a limited partnership with a limited liability company as general 
partner. The level of investment of a grid owner company also depends on the 
decisions of municipal councils to connect development areas, etc. Furthermore, a 
certain level of investment in grids is necessary in order to guarantee the security 
of supplies (section 11 of the German Energy Industry Act). Thus, it is not 
consistent that grid owner companies that do not invest at a certain level choose 
other legal forms than limited partnerships with limited liability companies as 
general partners and suffer from an ROA disadvantage. To sum up, the 
assumption that grid owner companies having considerable investment and 
financing requirements choose limited partnerships with limited liability companies 
as general partners while grid owner companies that do not invest do not choose 
limited partnerships with limited liability companies as general partners, but other 
legal forms and thus accept a lower level of ROA, is rather doubtful.  
 
Overall, grid owner companies with the legal form of limited partnerships with a 
limited liability company as general partner, unlike limited liability companies, offer 
the possibility for municipalities to participate in grid owner companies without 
having equity by taking up loans and reducing tax burden. Thus, municipalities that 
are faced with the strategic decision of which legal form they should choose could 
be recommended to establish grid owner companies with the legal form of limited 
partnerships with a limited liability company as general partner.  
 
5.6 Significance of the findings 
 
To the researcher’s best knowledge, this thesis is the first comprehensive 
theoretical and practical study that is solely dedicated to the new phenomenon of 
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grid owner companies in Germany. It provides fundamental financial insights as no 
one has studied financial aspects and causal relationships of German grid owner 
companies before. Whereas several authors have described German grid owner 
companies, studied their legal foundations and compared different cooperation 
models, it is the first time that the financial dimension of German grid owner 
companies has been empirically researched. An empirical analysis was conducted 
that addresses the relationships between firm size, ownership structure, legal form 
and firm performance of German grid owner companies. Although for example the 
Hessian Municipal Law requires municipal participation in grid owner companies to 
adhere to the economic principle, no one has analysed the influence of firm size, 
ownership structure and legal form on the financial performance of German grid 
owner companies.    
 
In general, the findings of the thesis are not only unique, they also have significant 
practical and policy implications.   
 
First, the result that there is a significant and positive relationship between firm 
size and firm performance of grid owner companies might reinforce the efforts to 
focus on large grid owner companies in favour of profitable German grid owner 
companies. The findings of this thesis correspond to the statements of Heim 
(2015a) who concludes that a minimum size of local grids is required and can be 
achieved by large grid owner companies consisting of the local grids of several 
municipalities. In general, the qualitative statements of Heim (2015a) as well as 
the empirical findings of this thesis provide the German legislature and the 
supervision of local authorities with the fundamental insight that large grid owner 
companies result in higher firm performance. They should determine that German 
grid owner companies require a certain size and promote large grid owner 
companies. A means to promote large grid owner companies is to support the 
cooperation of municipalities, so that local grids of several municipalities can be 
combined in a single grid owner company. Administrative expenses can be 
reduced and finally the distribution and supply of energy to the customers remains 
reasonably-priced according to the aims of section 1 of the German Energy 
Industry Act.            
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While distribution network operators have to report data on their grid structures like 
population or area to the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways (section 27 (2) German Electricity or Gas 
Network Charges Ordinances), there is no corresponding obligation for grid owner 
companies. In order to enable further analyses, comparisons and predictions of 
the impact of firm size on the financial performance of German grid owner 
companies, the German legislature should oblige German grid owner companies 
to report specific data on population and the area supplied to the German Federal 
Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways. 
Furthermore, grid owner companies should disclose them in their annual reports 
which in turn should be published in the German Federal Gazette.  
 
The findings indicate that the larger the population or the area of a grid owner 
company, the more grid facilities like distribution lines or local network stations are 
installed and owned by the grid owner company. These grid facilities are in turn 
leased to the respective distribution network operator who actually supplies the 
population with the utilities. Thus, firm performance of grid owner companies 
increases.  
 
However, beyond the size or scope of the grid facilities, the aging structure of the 
grid facilities could be a crucial factor for the firm performance of grid owner 
companies. First, the regulatory framework stipulates different return on equity 
rates for new and old grid facilities (section 1.4.6). Second, the low-interest 
environment in the eurozone economy as a consequence of the low-interest-rate 
policy of the European Central Bank led to a significant decline in return on equity 
rates of the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommuni-
cations, Post and Railways. Whereas the pre-tax rates of the second regulatory 
period (electricity from 2014 to 2018 and gas from 2013 to 2017) were 9.05 
percent for new facilities and 7.14 percent for old facilities, the current rates are 
6.91 percent for new facilities and 5.12 percent for old facilities. The rates reflect 
the interest rates in the capital markets and consist of a base rate (2.49 percent), 
based on the ten-year average for risk-free investments, and an appropriate risk 
premium as a compensation for the risk that arises from the investment in grids 
(3.15 percent). The application of the return on equity rates is limited to a 
maximum of 40 percent of the value of operating assets. Exceeding amounts are 
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subject to the base rate (Bundesnetzagentur, 2018c). In case the low-interest 
environment in the eurozone economy as a consequence of the low-interest-rate 
policy of the European Central Bank continues and leads to a further decrease in 
interest rates in future regulatory periods, the profitability of grid owner companies 
might be affected, too. Thus, the economic principle or profitability of German grid 
owner companies is even more in focus. As rights-of-way contracts or grid owner 
company models are normally negotiated with a duration of 20 years (section 46 
(2) German Energy Industry Act), municipalities and private companies as 
shareholders or partners of grid owner companies have to take long-term 
determinations of the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways into account. In particular, they have to 
anticipate future decisions of the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, 
Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways in their business cases. In general, 
the determinations of the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways have to take into account that the 
distribution network operators and grid owner companies are in a position to take 
on the large investments required for the energy transition in Germany.  
 
However, while distribution network operators have to report data on their grid 
aging structure, i.e. the regulated asset base of new facilities and old facilities 
(section 1.4.6), to the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railways (section 6 German Incentive Regulation 
Ordinance and section 28 German Electricity or Gas Network Charges 
Ordinances), there is no corresponding obligation for grid owner companies. In 
order to enable analyses of the impact of grid aging structures on the financial 
performance of German grid owner companies, the German legislature should 
oblige German grid owner companies to report data on their grid aging structure to 
the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, 
Post and Railways. In addition, grid owner companies should disclose them in 
their annual reports. 
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Second, the finding that the higher the percentage of private ownership, the higher 
the level of firm performance of grid owner companies, shows that the participation 
of energy companies in grid owner companies increases firm performance. It 
indicates that the influence of energy companies on the performance of German 
grid owner companies results in better financial results. On the one hand, energy 
companies provide professional experience and operational know-how to German 
grid owner companies compared to municipalities (Wagner & Berlo, 2017). On the 
other hand, large numbers of German municipalities have neither capital nor 
know-how or experience to operate a grid (Heim, 2015a). As the expertise to 
operate a grid and the economic power of the energy company are important 
requirements for the profitability of a grid owner company, the German legislature 
and the supervision of local authorities should support the participation of energy 
companies in German grid owner companies. However, according to section 122 
(1) of the Hessian Municipal Code, the municipality has to ensure an appropriate 
influence on the grid owner company in order to inform the municipal council with 
regard to the fulfilment of the public purpose. Whether the degree of influence of 
the municipality is appropriate or not must be determined on the basis of a case-
by-case assessment. In any case, an appropriate influence of the municipality 
requires sufficient influence and control over a grid owner company. This 
comprises an adequate level of shareholder participation at the operational level 
according to the participation quota and the participation of the municipality in 
supervisory and control bodies like a supervisory board. Thus, the required 
influence of the municipality can be achieved by a disproportionate representation 
in the supervisory board of a grid owner company (Dietlein & Ogorek, 2018). As 
long as the shareholder participation of the municipality at the operational level 
corresponds to the participation quota and the influence of the municipality in the 
supervisory board of the grid owner company is ensured, it is not necessary that 
the municipality becomes majority shareholder of a grid owner company. 
Moreover, the energy company might even become majority shareholder of a grid 
owner company and provide its operational know-how and professional 
experience in planning, building and maintaining grids. One way to support the 
participation of energy companies in German grid owner companies could be the 
legal obligation to involve energy companies when municipalities decide upon the 
establishment of a grid owner company. A suitable source is the municipal law of 
the sixteen German federal states. Another possible solution to involve private 
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energy companies as shareholders or partners in German grid owner companies 
could be the gradual increase of their participation quota, depending on the firm 
performance of the relevant grid owner company. The better the firm performance 
of a grid owner company becomes over a certain time, the higher the participation 
quota of the private energy company. The idea is that although the participation 
quota of the municipality decreases at the same time, the level of firm performance 
might increase with the participation of the private energy company, so that the 
payout level remains at a similar level. Nevertheless, the trade-off between the 
appropriate influence of municipalities on the grid owner company and the level of 
participation of private energy companies remains challenging. 
 
Third, the outcome that grid owner companies in Germany that are limited 
partnerships have a higher firm performance than grid owner companies that are 
limited liability companies leads to further policy implications. Although 
municipalities must be guaranteed the right to regulate all local affairs on their own 
and the right of self-government, within the limits prescribed by the laws (article 28 
of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), the German legislators 
might oblige municipalities to establish grid owner companies only with the legal 
form of limited partnerships. By this means, the probability to meet the economic 
principle, for example according to 121 and 122 of the Hessian Municipal Code, 
might increase. Comparable to section 122 (3) of the Hessian Municipal Code, 
after that a municipality shall only establish a public limited company if the public 
purpose cannot be fulfilled equally well in another legal form; a municipality shall 
only establish, take over, substantially expand or participate in a grid owner 
company with the legal form of a limited partnership unless another legal form is 
more appropriate to meet the economic principle or other public purposes (Dietl, 
2018).   
 
For the first time, the total population of German grid owner companies has been 
determined and data on important characteristics of grid owner companies have 
been gathered. This comprises federal state, legal form, date of foundation, 
divisions, balance sheet and profit and loss account items as well as other 
characteristics. Thus, the distribution and regional concentration of grid owner 
companies in Germany as well as comparisons between different types of grid 
owner companies are possible. According to German municipal law, for example 
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section 121 (1a) of the Hessian Municipal Code, economic activity or participation 
of the municipality must be particularly subject to the economic principle. Hence, 
profitability of grid owner companies is not only an important aspect for private 
energy companies, but also for municipalities. As a violation of the economic 
principle might result in a violation of municipal law, the findings of the thesis are of 
high importance for municipalities and their supervisory authorities. Overall, the 
knowledge of the population of German grid owner companies facilitates further 
research on German grid owner companies.  
 
The performance of grid owner companies was the object of research. Especially 
the relationships between critical drivers and the performance of grid owner 
companies, which were analysed by regression analyses. For the first time, 
statistical methods have been applied to German grid owner companies. Based on 
the philosophical stance of positivism, for the first time an existing technique, 
namely multiple linear regression analysis using ordinary least squares, has been 
applied to sample data from 2010 to 2015 in order to analyse the relationships 
between the firm size, the ownership structure, the legal form and performance of 
German grid owner companies. An existing technique was applied to a new 
context and the applicability of regression techniques to the new phenomenon of 
German grid owner companies was shown.  
 
Better and comprehensive information about the population as well as on the 
causes and effects with regard to the financial performance of grid owner 
companies are essential to municipalities when they are faced with the strategic 
decision of whether to renew their rights-of-way contracts or to establish a grid 
owner company. As many recently renewed rights-of-way contracts between 
municipalities and energy companies contain options to establish grid owner 
companies (Kunze, 2012), a quantitative aid to the decision-making of 
municipalities as well as energy companies has been made by regression 
analyses.  
 
The knowledge of the population, their characteristics and the relationships 
between firm size, legal form, ownership structure and firm performance of 
German grid owner companies enables municipalities and energy companies to 
take well-informed decisions on the foundation and the design of grid owner 
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companies. In this thesis, they are provided with an analysis of the impacts of their 
choices of firm size, legal form and ownership structure on the financial 
performance of German grid owner companies. Moreover, the knowledge of 
critical drivers of firm performance of German grid owner companies facilitates the 
approval decisions of regulatory authorities. According to German municipal law, 
for example section 127a of the Hessian Municipal Code, municipalities have to 
submit their decisions on the establishment, the first-time participation as well as 
the substantial increase in participation in an enterprise to the supervision of local 
authorities. The written notification has to be made without delay no later than six 
weeks before the realisation. From the notification, the supervision of local 
authorities has to identify whether the relevant legal requirements are met (section 
127a Hessian Municipal Code). Therefore, the notification has to contain the 
relevant supporting documents, for example whether the requirements of sections 
121 and 122 of the Hessian Municipal Code are met. As these sections require 
that economic activity or participation of the municipality must be particularly 
subject to the economic principle (sections 121 and 122 Hessian Municipal Code), 
the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis may support municipalities in 
preparing the notification and demonstrating that the economic principle is met. 
Furthermore, it might be necessary to include decisions of municipal bodies, draft 
contracts or advisory opinions (Dietlein & Ogorek, 2018). Likewise, advisory 
opinions can be based on the findings of this thesis and finally supervision of local 
authorities can be convinced of the financial performance of relevant German grid 
owner companies. In general, the findings of the thesis support legislators and 
supervision of local authorities in assessing whether a grid owner company meets 
the economic principle or not. By the ROA a valid measure of financial 
performance is given and by the firm size, ownership structure and legal form 
three critical drivers or indicators are presented.  
 
As an original contribution to knowledge, the findings of this thesis also create 
transparency and reveal which models of German grid owner companies currently 
prevail. The chronological development of established grid owner companies has 
been presented. Moreover, the geographical distribution of German grid owner 
companies shows which grid owner companies already exist in the respective 
region. This knowledge offers the possibility to think about cooperations with 
existing grid owner companies in order to establish large grid owner companies.  
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Beyond academic interest, the research on grid owner companies might provide 
municipalities, energy companies, business associations, research institutes, 
managers, consultants and policymakers with meaningful information on the new 
phenomenon. As the economic principle plays an important role with regard to grid 
owner companies, the question of what factors determine profitability might be one 
of high importance for researchers and practitioners like investors, managers, etc. 
In particular, municipalities that are faced with the strategic decision of whether 
they should renew their rights-of-way contracts or establish a grid owner company 
will profit from the findings. The research supports their decision-making 
processes. Furthermore, energy companies could profit from the findings of the 
thesis as they also adhere to the economic principle. 
 
The findings on grid owner companies might also accelerate current policy 
debates. Local distribution networks are essential for the integration of renewable 
energies and other decentralised energy types such as electricity produced from 
combined heat and power units. The development of renewable energies and the 
atomic disaster in Fukushima in 2011 led to further political initiatives to phase out 
the use of nuclear energy, to increase the percentage of renewables in energy 
consumption and to remunicipalise energy activities (Becker, 2017). By the end of 
the year 2050, 80 percent of the German energy consumption should be provided 
by renewables (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2013). More 
than 95 percent of the electricity produced by renewable energies is supplied with 
local grids and therefore a critical factor of success (Kinkel, 2014). Therefore, local 
distribution networks owned by grid owner companies are the backbone of a turna-
round in German energy policy towards sustainable energy systems (Wagner & 
Berlo, 2015). 
 
Overall, the thesis provides municipalities and energy companies with the 
necessary information to assess which model of grid owner company suits them 
best and what their financial impacts are. Municipalities and energy companies 
that are faced with the strategic decision of how to design a grid owner company 
could be recommended to found a large grid owner company with as much private 
participation quota as possible and with the legal form of a limited partnership with 
a limited liability company as general partner. 
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Furthermore, the researcher of this thesis gained new and valuable insights for his 
professional practice and for his personal development. Having studied Business 
Administration, Economics and Corporate Law and worked for more than 14 years 
in the accounting and auditing sectors, the researcher is used to the concepts of 
firm size, ownership structure, legal form and firm performance. Moreover, he has 
taken part in the foundation of more than 10 German grid owner companies. The 
empirical findings of the thesis sharply expand his individual experience as well as 
the problem-solving and consulting abilities. The entire research process has 
helped him to better understand the new phenomenon of German grid owner 
companies and to question his experiences and thoughts on grid owner 
companies. He is now better prepared to analyse different structures of grid owner 
companies, to examine relationships between different critical drivers and firm 
performance and to recommend an optimal design of German grid owner 
companies to a variety of addressees. In particular, the research on grid owner 
companies led to the awareness that the economic principle is relevant not only to 
private energy companies but, according to German municipal law, also to 
municipalities (section 121 (1a) Hessian Municipal Code). Hence, profitability of 
grid owner companies is not only an important aspect for private energy 
companies, but also for municipalities. This is especially relevant for the decision 
to establish a grid owner company. Moreover, as municipalities have to submit 
their decisions on the establishment to the supervision of local authorities (section 
127a Hessian Municipal Code) that has to identify whether the relevant legal 
requirements are met, a thorough proof of legal compliance is facilitated. In view of 
the findings, consultants of municipalities and private energy companies are 
required to pay more attention to the economic aspects. Political aims of the 
municipalities do not lose their meaning, but the focus on financial aspects might 
objectify the relevant decision-making processes and discussions on grid owner 
companies. The establishment of a grid owner company exclusively due to political 
motives might be prevented. Financial aspects are becoming more important, so 
that the goal of a reasonably-priced public supply of electricity and gas according 
to section 1 of the German Energy Industry Act is approached. In addition, the 
clear focus on the performance of grid owner companies could help grid owner 
companies become more important when other municipal projects are launched. 
For example, the financial results of grid owner companies from the lease of the 
electricity or gas grids could be taken to finance the expansion of broadband 
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supply and the connection of renewable energies. In the end, positive financial 
results might contribute to the achievement of political goals, too. In general, every 
municipal project has to be financed.  
 
The findings on important characteristics of grid owner companies like regional 
concentration, firm size, ownership structure, legal form, etc. facilitate comparisons 
among grid owner companies. For example, the findings enable the researcher to 
better assess whether the establishment of a grid owner company in a certain 
region corresponds to the existing types or leads to advantages or disadvantages. 
As municipalities normally exchange their experiences before the establishment of 
a grid owner company and also during the terms of the contracts, conflicts or 
disadvantages might be avoided. By knowing such characteristics and specialities 
of grid owner companies, negotiations between municipalities and private energy 
companies as well as between these parties and their consultants are put on a 
firm footing. Furthermore, negotiations might be more goal-oriented and faster. 
Overall, it helps with behaving even more law-abiding.  
 
With regard to the accounting of grid owner companies, the researcher also has 
learnt a lot. The most important insight is that the accounting of all identified grid 
owner companies is very similar as all of them have to meet the requirements of 
the German Commercial Code. However, there are peculiarities as different grid 
owner companies apply different nomenclatures for the accounting of the 
advances and contributions in aid of construction and building connections.  
  
From the perspective of the researcher of this thesis, the following quotation of 
Jarvis (2006, p. 50) summarises best his development: 
 
“The wider our experience of life and the more we learn to reflect on it and not take 
it for granted, the more we learn and the more we become whole people.”  
 
5.7 Limitations 
 
For the first time, a comprehensive study is dedicated to the new phenomenon of 
German grid owner companies. To the researcher’s best knowledge, no one 
before has examined the phenomenon of German grid owner companies from a 
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financial perspective. The thesis contributes to the understanding of the practical 
phenomenon of grid owner companies from a financial and legal perspective by 
analysing the relationship between the legal form, ownership structure, firm size 
and performance, measured by the ROA of these companies. However, as with all 
new phenomena, there are also limitations to the study.  
 
As there is no single database that contains the total population by selection, the 
determination of the total population of German grid owner companies was not an 
easy task. Depending on the date and the databases of the research, the total 
population of German grid owner companies could vary. Every day, a new grid 
owner company could be established and become part of research on grid owner 
companies. Hence, the total population and the samples taken from that 
population are subject to variation and possible outcomes may differ. Furthermore, 
it cannot be ruled out that not all legal forms were identified. In Germany, a variety 
of private and public legal forms exist and by the choice of the databases for the 
search, in particular the German Federal Gazette, the Common Register Portal of 
the German Federal States or the German Company Register, individual grid 
owner companies and their legal forms were detected. However, there might be 
other grid owner companies with different legal forms like joint municipal 
enterprises that are not part of any public register.   
  
Another type of limitation is that of statistical or data limitations. Due to the novelty 
of the phenomenon of grid owner companies in Germany, i.e. most of the German 
grid owner companies were established in 2014, the researcher is not able to 
gather enough financial data on grid owner companies in order to conduct a panel 
data analysis. Thus, the findings of the thesis only result from a multiple linear 
regression model.  
 
The data gathered on German grid owner companies from different sources like 
the German Federal Gazette, Common Register Portal of the German Federal 
States, etc. represents secondary data. It has been gathered by those other than 
the researcher and might also be influenced by the accounting policy of the 
management of grid owner companies. Although all figures of the annual financial 
statements found must comply with the German Commercial Code and lots of 
annual financial statements were audited by independent German auditors, it is 
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not ruled out that the annual financial statements contain errors or are biased by 
accounting discretion or even management fraud. Official statistical data provided 
by the Statistical Offices of the German States or the Federal Statistical Office also 
constitutes secondary data. Although statistical data have been compiled in a 
neutral and professionally independent manner (Statistische Ämter des Bundes 
und der Länder, 2019), it cannot be ruled out that they contain errors or bias. For 
example, municipalities may have incorrectly submitted data on population or area 
to the Statistical Offices of the German States or the Federal Statistical Office.                      
In general, any ratio is necessarily dependent on the accuracy of the data and also 
on the fairness with which the data represent the relevant economic reality (Ryan 
& Collett, 2017).   
 
Concerning the specific independent variables or proxies applied, there are also 
limitations. First, the population of a grid owner company is not an established 
figure. The population of each municipality has to be added up in order to 
determine the population of a grid owner company. The more people supplied by a 
grid owner company, the larger its own infrastructure or facilities should be. 
However, in contrast to a specifically determined population of a grid owner 
company, there could be bias. For example, the determined population of a grid 
owner company is large, but there is more than one grid owner company in the 
relevant municipality and the grid facilities are owned by these grid owner 
companies. This could be the case if there are several rights-of-way contracts for 
individual districts. Second, the area of a grid owner company is also not an 
established figure. It may be that the area of one or more municipalities is large, 
but the grid owner company owns only a few grid facilities. This could occur if an 
area is governed by more than one rights-of-way contract, so there is more than 
one distribution network operator and thus more than one grid owner.  
 
The ROA as a traditional financial figure does not measure non-financial 
performance. This means that there are other indicators of performance that go 
beyond ROA such as environmental issues, outages and corporate social 
responsibility. Therefore, modifications to the traditional ROA have to be made or 
other measures have to be used in order to take into account the non-financial 
performance of German grid owner companies.  
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Moreover, since one cannot handle all the variables that could possibly influence 
firm performance of German grid owner companies in one thesis, the scope of the 
thesis is restricted to firm size, ownership structure and legal form as independent 
variables and firm performance as the dependent variable. 
 
Overall, the limitations of the thesis provide a starting point for future research 
directions with regard to German grid owner companies. 
 
5.8 Future research directions 
 
When breaking new ground with a topic like German grid owner companies, it is 
likely that there are lots of new research directions that need to be discovered.  
Based on the results of this thesis, there are several starting points for further 
research directions with regard to the interesting topic of grid owner companies. In 
the following section, ideas for further research directions are discussed. 
 
First, according to the regression analysis, 15 percent of the variation in ROA can 
be explained by the natural logarithm of area as a proxy for firm size, private 
participation quota and legal form. Although it is a significant result, there must be 
other drivers that determine the profitability of German grid owner companies. The 
determination of other drivers of firm performance of grid owner companies 
provides an interesting research direction for the research on German grid owner 
companies. However, it requires that there is sufficient data to perform appropriate 
analyses. In particular, the analysis of relationships between these factors and the 
performance of German grid owner companies still remains an interesting field of 
research. The more factors or critical drivers of firm performance of German grid 
owner companies that are identified, the more profound the recommendations to 
municipalities and private energy companies as shareholders or partners of grid 
owner companies.  
 
Second, a panel data analysis in the form of a longitudinal time-series data 
analysis of grid owner companies could be conducted. The financial or statistical 
data of grid owner companies are observed across time and analysed. As the 
phenomenon of German grid owner companies is relatively new and most of the 
grid owner companies were established in 2014, at the moment there are not 
  
 202 
enough data to conduct a valid and reliable panel data analysis. However, with 
every further year, the database grows and provides financial or statistical data to 
be analysed. Then, the relationships between firm size, ownership structure, legal 
form and firm performance of German grid owner companies could be analysed 
across time.  
 
Third, the impact of the capital structures of grid owner companies on their firm 
performance could be subject to forthcoming studies. The capital structures of 
German grid owner companies have to be identified and then analysed with regard 
to the impact on firm performance. The capital structures consist of a combination 
of debt and equity. This requires a profound gathering of equity and debt data on 
German grid owner companies, for example from the German Federal Gazette. In 
particular, the research question of whether bank loans or shareholder loans result 
in higher firm performance could be of high interest for municipalities and private 
energy companies. In this context, the analysis of the sale of a grid or the 
contribution of a grid in exchange for shares of a grid owner company might be 
interesting, too. If the private energy company contributes a grid in exchange for 
shares in a grid owner company, the equity ratio can amount to 100 percent. As 
the sale of a grid to a grid owner company by a private energy company or the 
former concessionaire might be financed with equity and/or debt capital, the equity 
ratio of a grid owner company will be different from the situation of a contribution in 
exchange for shares. Overall, a comparative analysis of the financial impacts on 
firm performance of German grid owner companies would be revealing for all 
parties concerned.      
 
Fourth, the impact of composition and size of the supervisory board on firm 
performance of grid owner companies is an interesting field of research. 
Unfortunately, the data gathered by the researcher is not enough to conduct a 
valid and reliable regression analysis on this issue. Due to the novelty of the 
phenomenon of grid owner companies, there are not enough units to examine the 
relationship between the structure of the supervisory board and the firm 
performance of a grid owner company. The question whether a supervisory board 
of a grid owner company consists of members that are appointed by the 
municipality or of members that are appointed by the private energy company 
could have an influence on the firm performance of a grid owner company. 
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Furthermore, the qualifications or the tenure of a member of the supervisory board 
seem to be critical drivers of firm performance of grid owner companies. 
 
Fifth, being aware of the fact that balance sheets and profit and loss statements 
are influenced by earnings management and do not always show the “real picture 
of the world”, it is important to acknowledge qualitative data in the annual reports. 
For example, the notes and the management reports have to be analysed with 
regard to the use of accounting discretion. In general, the management reporting 
of a grid owner company could be an interesting future research direction. In 
particular, different risk management and corporate governance procedures might 
also have an impact on the performance of German grid owner companies.   
 
Sixth, non-financial measures, i.e. measures expressed in non-monetary units, 
could also be important in assessing firm performance of German grid owner 
companies. For example, key indicators of service performance like efficiency, 
quality and effectiveness might be applied to German grid owner companies 
(Bradbury & Hooks, 2015). In this context, the measurement of motives and 
objectives of municipalities with regard to their engagements in German grid 
owner companies could also be part of the research (section 1.3.3.2). 
Furthermore, opinions of other stakeholders of grid owner companies could be 
analysed.  
  
Seventh, the number of different divisions of a grid owner company, i.e. electricity, 
gas, water, street lighting, etc. also might have an influence on the firm 
performance of grid owner companies. On the one hand, the profitability of each 
division could be analysed with regard to the performance of a grid owner 
company. On the other hand, profitability comparisons between different divisions 
and between different grid owner companies could be conducted. As in the cases 
before, the financial data of each division has been insufficient to conduct a 
thorough regression analysis due the novelty of the phenomenon of grid owner 
companies. This might be a good basis for further research.  
 
Eighth, with the establishment of grid owner companies, municipalities also pursue 
the goals of regaining influence on local infrastructure and generating financial 
profits for the municipal budgets (Groneberg, 2018). Moreover, municipalities 
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might use grid owner companies as a vehicle or starting point for entry into other 
areas along the energy industry value chain like generation of renewable energies, 
electromobility, smart metering, etc. (Heil, 2018). As the underlying thesis solely 
focuses on pure grid owner companies, research on grid owner companies with 
other divisions and the influence of different critical factors on their financial 
performance might be a fruitful future research direction.  
 
Ninth, with the establishment of a grid owner company a variety of different 
contracts typically have to be negotiated: in particular the rights-of-way contract, 
the consortium agreement, the company agreement, the lease contract, etc. As 
German grid owner companies normally do not have employees, commercial 
management contracts are concluded between the grid owner company and the 
private energy company or the municipality. The optimal design of contracts of grid 
owner companies is also an interesting field of research. In this context, the design 
of contracts and their influence on the financial performance and other parameters 
of grid owner companies might be objects of research.  
 
Tenth, as a grid owner company is a common business enterprise, further 
decisions on the operating business of a grid owner company might be 
investigated. This could comprise the interactions between the company meeting, 
the supervisory board and the management of a grid owner company. Classical 
principal-agent problems resulting from asymmetric information could be analysed, 
new insights could be gained and recommendations could be made. In particular, 
conflicts between the involved actors of a grid owner company could be analysed. 
Beyond quantitative research, qualitative research in the form of interviews, etc. 
could be applied. 
 
Eleventh, as grid owner companies generally lease grids to private energy 
companies, the phenomenon is suitable for an analysis of the new accounting 
lease standard IFRS 16. According to this new accounting standard on leases, in 
general all leases are to be reported on the balance sheet for reporting periods 
beginning on or after 1st January 2019 (IFRS 16). From the perspective of the grid 
owner company as the lessor, the accounting remains similar to current practice 
according to IAS 17. It means that the lessor has to classify leases as finance and 
operating leases (IFRS 16.61). However, the private energy company as the 
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lessee has to recognise a right-of-use-asset as well as a liability (IFRS 16.22). 
Overall, the new lease accounting standard affects various key figures of a 
company and the research on its application to German grid owner companies 
might be an interesting future research direction.  
 
After all, a considerable amount of research must be conducted before we are 
able to gain a full understanding of the process of remunicipalisation and the 
fascinating phenomenon of German grid owner companies. 
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5.9 Summary of conclusions 
 
• In Germany, electricity and gas distribution are regularly governed by rights-
of-way contracts. A process began ten years ago to phase out more than 
20,000 rights-of-way contracts throughout Germany. Often, a grid owner 
company is established whose shareholders are the current distribution grid 
operator and the municipality. 
 
• A systematic literature review on the new phenomenon known as grid 
owner companies demonstrated that grid owner companies in Germany are 
already the subject of research by academics and practitioners, but 
principally from a narrative or qualitative perspective and with regard to the 
advantages and disadvantages of the process of remunicipalisation of 
public services. Empirical data is rarely used. The research on critical 
drivers determining firm performance provides an extensive body of 
knowledge. The relationships between firm size, ownership structure or 
legal form and firm performance have been examined empirically from a 
number of theoretical perspectives. However, there is no consensus on the 
effects as they are complex and empirically ambiguous: positive linear, 
negative linear, curvilinear or there is no relation at all. 
 
• In general, the research contributes to the understanding of grid owner 
companies in Germany. For the first time, the total population of German 
grid owner companies has been determined and important characteristics 
and causal relationships have been identified. Better information on the 
causes and effects of grid owner companies are essential to private energy 
companies and municipalities when they are faced with the decision of 
whether to renew their rights-of-way contracts or to establish a grid owner 
company.  
 
• According to German municipal law, for example section 121 (1a) of the 
Hessian Municipal Code, economic activity or participation of the 
municipality must be particularly subject to the economic principle. Hence, 
profitability of grid owner companies is not only an important aspect for 
private energy companies, but also for municipalities. 
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• Through the process of gathering data to determine the total population of 
German grid owner companies, 170 different German grid owner 
companies that were founded between the years 2007 and 2016 and can 
be found in 11 of the 16 German Federal States have been identified. 
 
• As many recently renewed rights-of-way contracts between municipalities 
and energy companies contain options to establish grid owner companies 
(Kunze, 2012), a quantitative aid to decision-making has been made by 
regression analyses: 
 
1) There is a significant and positive relationship between firm size and the 
firm performance of grid owner companies. 
 
2) The higher the percentage of private ownership, the higher the level of 
firm performance of grid owner companies. 
 
3) Grid owner companies in Germany that are limited partnerships have a 
higher firm performance than grid owner companies that are limited 
liability companies. 
• Municipalities and private energy companies that are faced with the 
strategic decision of how to design a grid owner company could be 
recommended to found a large grid owner company with as much private 
participation quota as possible and with the legal form of a limited 
partnership with a limited liability company as general partner. 
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Appendix 1: Total Population 
 
company name legal form federal state date of 
foundation 
private 
participation 
quota 
Abens-Donau Netz GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 02.11.2016 50,00 
Bingen Netz GmbH & Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz 07.01.2016 49,00 
Brüggen.E-Netz GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 20.01.2015 25,10 
Cremlinger Energie GmbH Niedersachsen 02.06.2015 49,00 
Dorsten Netz GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 17.12.2013 49,00 
Elektrizitätsnetzgesellschaft Grünwald GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 22.12.2015 49,00 
EMB Netz  GmbH & Co. KG Hessen 29.10.2015 39,00 
Energie Dannstadter Höhe GmbH & Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz 04.11.2013 35,00 
Energie Kirchheim unter Teck GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 14.11.2013 25,10 
Energie Mechernich  GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 16.01.2014 49,00 
Energie Region Kassel GmbH & Co. KG Hessen 14.12.2011 49,00 
Energiegesellschaft Leimen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 26.08.2011 74,90 
Energienetz Neufahrn/Eching GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 17.11.2016 49,00 
EnergieRegion Taunus - Goldener Grund - GmbH & Co. KG Hessen 14.10.2014 49,00 
Energieversorgung Denzlingen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 14.01.2010 49,90 
Energieversorgung Horstmar/Laer GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 27.01.2015 49,00 
Energieversorgung Immenstaad GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 13.01.2014 25,10 
Energieversorgung Kranenburg Netze GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 24.02.2015 25,10 
Energieversorgung Niederkassel GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 14.01.2014 49,00 
Energieversorgung Strohgäu GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 27.02.2015 49,00 
Energieversorgung Timmendorfer Strand GmbH & Co. KG Schleswig-Holstein 22.12.2014 51,00 
Energieversorgung Vechelde GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 23.05.2013 49,00 
EVB Gasnetz  GmbH & Co. KG  Bayern 05.02.2013 49,00 
EVB Stromnetz GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 05.02.2013 49,00 
Gasnetz Bad Oeynhausen GmbH & Co. KG  Nordrhein-Westfalen 03.02.2016 49,00 
Gasnetz Bornheim  GmbH & Co. KG  Nordrhein-Westfalen 24.06.2014 49,00 
Gasnetz Dillingen Lauingen GmbH & Co. KG  Bayern 17.04.2014 49,00 
Gasnetz Ebersbach GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 27.09.2013 25,10 
Gasnetz Günzburg GmbH & Co. KG  Bayern 01.08.2013 49,00 
Gasnetz Löhne GmbH & Co. KG  Nordrhein-Westfalen 21.12.2015 49,00 
Gas-Netzgesellschaft Elsdorf GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 11.07.2016 49,00 
Gas-Netzgesellschaft Kolpingstadt Kerpen GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 22.10.2014 49,00 
Gasnetzgesellschaft Laatzen-Nord GmbH Niedersachsen 09.04.2013 49,00 
Gasnetzgesellschaft Laatzen-Süd GmbH Niedersachsen 20.12.2012 49,00 
Gasnetzgesellschaft Laupheim  GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 21.12.2011 50,10 
Gasnetzgesellschaft Schorndorf  GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 07.01.2014 25,10 
Gasnetzgesellschaft Winnenden GmbH Baden-Württemberg 23.10.2012 25,10 
Gasnetzgesellschaft Wörrstadt GmbH & Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz 17.07.2013 49,00 
Gasversorgung Unterschleißheim GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 28.02.2014 49,00 
Gemeindewerke Bad Sassendorf Netze GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 20.01.2015 25,10 
Gemeindewerke Bissendorf Netze GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 16.02.2015 49,00 
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Gemeindewerke Bodanrück GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 09.05.2014 49,00 
Gemeindewerke Brühl GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 28.11.2013 74,90 
Gemeindewerke Gräfelfing GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 08.08.2013 49,00 
Gemeindewerke Plüderhausen GmbH Baden-Württemberg 22.01.2013 25,10 
Gemeindewerke Wallenhorst Netz GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 01.03.2016 15,00 
Gemeindewerke Wedemark  GmbH Niedersachsen 27.11.2009 49,00 
Gemeindewerke Wietze GmbH Niedersachsen 10.12.2007 49,00 
Gemeinsame Netzgesellschaft SWLB/STWWN GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 29.07.2014 0,00 
GrundNetz  GmbH Hessen 09.02.2012 0,00 
HaseNetz  GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 26.01.2016 25,10 
HCL Netze  GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 26.01.2016 25,10 
Hochsauerland Netze GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 20.01.2015 25,10 
Infrastrukturgesellschaft Plochingen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 03.04.2014 25,10 
KAWAG AG & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 20.03.2012 49,00 
KAWAG Netze GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 18.04.2012 49,00 
Kommunale Energienetze Rielasingen-Worblingen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 12.02.2015 49,00 
Kommunale Netzgesellschaft Steinheim a. d. Murr GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 09.04.2014 49,00 
Kommunalwerk Rudersberg GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 12.07.2012 49,90 
Stromnetz Gersthofen GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 07.04.2015 49,00 
LEO Energie GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 13.08.2012 49,00 
Lohmar Netzeigentumsgesellschaft GmbH Nordrhein-Westfalen 01.09.2015 0,00 
MN Münsterland Netzgesellschaft GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 16.12.2014 49,00 
MNG Stromnetze GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 20.01.2015 25,10 
Murrhardt Netz AG & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 22.09.2015 49,00 
Neckar Netze GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 28.03.2012 49,00 
Netze Pforzheim-Region GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 05.01.2016 60,00 
Netzeigentumsgesellschaft Dettighofen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 13.12.2013 49,00 
Netzeigentumsgesellschaft Mörfelden-Walldorf GmbH & Co. KG Hessen 29.12.2014 49,90 
Netzeigentumsgesellschaft Rheinstetten GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 01.08.2013 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Auetal GmbH Niedersachsen 12.01.2012 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Bad Münder GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 27.02.2013 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Barsinghausen GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 31.10.2013 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Besigheim GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 24.06.2013 25,10 
Netzgesellschaft Bühlertal GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 15.09.2011 49,90 
Netzgesellschaft Edingen-Neckarhausen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 21.05.2014 48,00 
Strom-Netzgesellschaft Elsdorf GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 29.09.2014 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Elz-Neckar GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 28.11.2011 50,10 
Netzgesellschaft Ennepetal GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 19.11.2015 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Erwitte GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 09.06.2016 51,00 
Netzgesellschaft Espelkamp GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 04.03.2016 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Gehrden GmbH Niedersachsen 09.12.2008 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Grimma GmbH & Co. KG Sachsen 18.12.2013 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Hemmingen GmbH Niedersachsen 15.01.2009 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Hennigsdorf Gas GmbH Brandenburg 30.01.2017 50,00 
Netzgesellschaft Hennigsdorf Strom GmbH Brandenburg 11.11.2016 50,00 
Netzgesellschaft Hildesheimer Land GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 14.12.2012 49,00 
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Netzgesellschaft Hohen Neuendorf Gas GmbH & Co. KG Brandenburg 10.07.2014 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Hohen Neuendorf Strom  GmbH & Co. KG Brandenburg 27.06.2014 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Hüllhorst GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 10.01.2017 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Korb GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 14.10.2011 49,90 
Netzgesellschaft Kreisstadt Bergheim GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 30.09.2014 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Laatzen GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 24.01.2007 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Lauf GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 13.09.2011 49,90 
Netzgesellschaft Leinfelden-Echterdingen GmbH Baden-Württemberg 07.12.2012 25,10 
Netzgesellschaft Leutenbach GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 28.01.2013 49,90 
Netzgesellschaft Maifeld GmbH & Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz 16.12.2014 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Marbach GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 13.12.2012 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Ottersweier GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 26.09.2011 49,90 
Netzgesellschaft Oyten GmbH Niedersachsen 18.03.2014 0,00 
Netzgesellschaft Rehburg-Loccum  GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 14.02.2017 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Rheda-Wiedenbrück GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 28.01.2013 51,00 
Netzgesellschaft Ronnenberg  GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 24.03.2014 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Salach GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 17.05.2013 25,10 
Netzgesellschaft Schwetzingen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 19.02.2015 35,10 
Netzgesellschaft Sontheim GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 15.10.2009 74,90 
Netzgesellschaft Steinheim GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 22.09.2009 74,90 
Netzgesellschaft Südwestfalen GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 14.03.2016 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Syke GmbH Niedersachsen 25.06.2014 49,00 
Netzgesellschaft Tuttlingen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 15.01.2015 50,00 
Netzgesellschaft Vaihingen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 04.12.2013 25,10 
Netzgesellschaft Wenden GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 27.10.2014 49,00 
NG Netzgesellschaft Schmalkalden GmbH & Co. KG Thüringen 05.08.2013 74,90 
NGK Netzgesellschaft Kyritz GmbH Brandenburg 14.04.2014 49,00 
NHG Netzgesellschaft Herrenwald GmbH & Co. KG Hessen 25.08.2011 51,00 
NiersEnergieNetze  GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 19.03.2013 51,00 
Niestetal Netz GmbH Hessen 13.05.2014 99,00 
Oschatz Netz GmbH & Co. KG Sachsen 08.05.2012 74,90 
Rathenower Netz GmbH Brandenburg 29.01.2013 35,00 
Recklinghausen Netzgesellschaft  GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 27.12.2013 50,10 
Regionalwerk Hochrhein GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 28.12.2012 25,10 
Remstalwerk Netzgesellschaft GmbH Baden-Württemberg 23.12.2015 0,00 
Sandersdorf-Brehna Netz GmbH & Co. KG Sachsen-Anhalt 28.11.2011 49,00 
Scharbeutzer Energie- und Netzgesellschaft GmbH & Co. KG Schleswig-Holstein 16.01.2015 51,00 
Selm Netz  GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 20.07.2015 25,10 
Stadtversorgung Pattensen GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 18.11.2011 49,00 
Stadtwerke Geseke Netze  GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 20.01.2016 25,10 
Stadtwerke Goch Netze GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 19.01.2015 25,10 
Stadtwerke Lippe-Weser GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 26.05.2014 0,00 
Stadtwerke Waltrop Netz GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 04.12.2015 25,10 
Stadtwerke Wiesloch - Gas -  GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 12.07.2016 0,00 
Stadtwerke Wiesloch - Strom -  GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 17.09.2015 25,10 
Stauferwerk Netzgesellschaft GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 15.07.2013 16,60 
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Stauferwerk-EVF-Gasnetz GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 28.01.2016 0,00 
Stromgesellschaft March GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 18.03.2015 25,10 
Stromnetz Blaubeuren GmbH Baden-Württemberg 10.05.2010 49,90 
Stromnetz Bornheim GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 07.03.2014 49,00 
Stromnetz Diez GmbH & Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz 02.08.2012 25,10 
Stromnetz Euskirchen GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 22.07.2015 100,00 
Stromnetz Günzburg GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 23.07.2013 49,00 
Stromnetz Hofheim GmbH & Co. KG Hessen 29.07.2014 49,00 
Stromnetz Langenau GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 12.12.2011 50,10 
Stromnetz Neckargemünd GmbH Baden-Württemberg 24.06.2014 0,00 
Stromnetz Verbandsgemeinde Katzenelnbogen GmbH & Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz 09.10.2013 49,00 
Stromnetz VG Diez  GmbH & Co. KG Rheinland-Pfalz 22.03.2013 49,00 
Stromnetz Würmtal GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 15.09.2016 100,00 
Stromnetze Peiner Land GmbH Niedersachsen 29.06.2016 49,00 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Albershausen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 24.05.2013 50,10 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Bad Salzdetfurth - Diekholzen GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 02.09.2014 49,00 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Barsinghausen GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 13.10.2015 49,00 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Ebersbach GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 21.05.2013 25,10 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Gescher GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 29.02.2016 25,10 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Hechingen GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 15.02.2011 74,90 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Heilbronn GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 05.05.2014 100,00 
Strom-Netzgesellschaft Kolpingstadt Kerpen GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 29.09.2014 49,00 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Laupheim   GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 19.12.2011 50,10 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Neuenhaus GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 12.03.2015 49,00 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Neunkirchen-Seelscheid GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 08.08.2013 49,00 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Östlicher Schurwald GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 04.07.2013 25,10 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Schwalmtal GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 10.02.2014 51,00 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Winnenden GmbH Baden-Württemberg 20.08.2014 25,10 
Stromnetzgesellschaft Wunstorf GmbH & Co. KG Niedersachsen 11.02.2016 49,00 
Stromversorgung Unterschleißheim GmbH & Co. KG Bayern 29.01.2014 49,00 
Stuttgart Netze GmbH Baden-Württemberg 01.11.2014 25,10 
Netzgesellschaft Südwestfalen GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 14.03.2016 49,00 
SWTE Netz GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 19.08.2014 85,00 
Taubernetze GmbH & Co. KG Baden-Württemberg 07.12.2015 33,00 
Untermain EnergieProjekt  AG & Co. KG Hessen 10.04.2013 49,00 
Wadersloh Netz  GmbH & Co. KG Nordrhein-Westfalen 05.01.2017 25,10 
WVG Netz  GmbH Nordrhein-Westfalen 18.12.2014 100,00 
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Appendix 2: Stata Do-File 
 
cls 
set more off 
clear 
version 15.0 
cd "/Users/OP/Documents" 
import excel "Daten_NetzG_29082017_BKZ_ergaenzt.xlsx", sheet("Daten") firstrow 
 
capture mkdir Grafiken  
capture mkdir Tabellen  
capture mkdir Logfiles  
 
ssc install corrtable 
ssc install outreg2 
ssc install log2html 
 
foreach v of varlist A-G K { 
   local x : variable label `v' 
   rename `v' `x' 
} 
 
foreach v of varlist _all { 
   capture rename `v' `=lower("`v'")' 
 } 
 
keep pj ng ky io gb dl pi nf kx IN ga dk rd rc rb ra qz qy rk rj ri rh rg rf rm rn ro rp rq rr rs rt 
ru rv rw rx rechtsform j  
order pj ng ky io gb dl pi nf kx IN ga dk rd rc rb ra qz qy rk rj ri rh rg rf rm rn ro rp rq rr rs rt 
ru rv rw rx rechtsform j  
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rename (pj-dl) (roa2010 roa2011 roa2012 roa2013 roa2014 roa2015) 
rename (rm ro rq rs ru rw) (einwohner2010 einwohner2011 einwohner2012 
einwohner2013 einwohner2014 einwohner2015) 
rename (rn rp rr rt rv rx) (flaeche2010 flaeche2011 flaeche2012 flaeche2013 flaeche2014 
flaeche2015) 
rename j beteiligung 
replace rechtsform = "GmbH & Co. KG" if rechtsform == "GmbH & Co. KG " 
gen id = _n 
 
reshape long roa einwohner flaeche, i(id) j(jahr) 
 
encode rechtsform, gen(rechtsform2) 
drop rechtsform 
rename rechtsform2 rechtsform 
tab rechtsform 
replace rechtsform = . if rechtsform == 1 
 
gen flaeche_ln = log(flaeche) 
 
label variable roa "ROA" 
label variable einwohner "Einwohnerzahlen" 
label variable flaeche_ln "Flächen (log.)" 
label variable flaeche "Flächen" 
 
log using "Logfiles/log_file", replace 
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************************ 
* Descriptive statistics 
************************ 
 
* AV: ROA Werte  
su roa 
histogram roa, title("ROA") 
graph export Grafiken/01_roa_hist.png, replace 
 
table jahr, contents(n roa mean roa sd roa min roa max roa)  
graph box roa, over(jahr) ytitle("ROA") title("ROA nach Jahr") 
graph export Grafiken/01_roa_box.png, replace 
 
* UV1: Einwohnerzahlen   
su einwohner 
histogram einwohner, title("Einwohnerzahlen") 
graph export Grafiken/01_einwohner_hist.png, replace 
 
table jahr, contents(n einwohner mean einwohner sd einwohner min einwohner max 
einwohner) 
graph box einwohner, over(jahr) ytitle("Einwohnerzahlen") title("Einwohnerzahlen nach 
Jahr") 
graph export Grafiken/01_einwohner_box.png, replace 
 
* UV2: Flächen 
su flaeche flaeche_ln 
histogram flaeche, title("Flächen") 
graph export Grafiken/01_flaeche_hist.png, replace 
 
histogram flaeche_ln, title("Flächen log.") 
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graph export Grafiken/01_flaeche_hist_ln.png, replace 
 
table jahr, contents(n flaeche mean flaeche sd flaeche min flaeche max flaeche) 
table jahr, contents(n flaeche_ln mean flaeche_ln sd flaeche_ln min flaeche_ln max 
flaeche_ln) 
graph box flaeche_ln, over(jahr) ytitle("Flächen log.") title("Flächen log. nach Jahr") 
graph export Grafiken/01_flaeche_box.png, replace 
 
hist flaeche, freq normal 
graph export Grafiken/01_flaeche_normal.png, replace 
hist flaeche_ln, freq normal 
graph export Grafiken/01_flaeche_ln_normal.png, replace 
 
* UV: Beteiligungsquote (Prozentsatz Privat) (J) 
su beteiligung 
table jahr, contents(freq mean beteiligung sd beteiligung min beteiligung max beteiligung) 
hist beteiligung, freq normal title("Beteiligungsquote") 
graph save Grafiken/01_beteiligung, replace 
 
* UV: Rechtsform 
tab rechtsform 
graph bar, over(rechtsform) ytitle("Prozent") title("Rechtsform") 
graph save Grafiken/01_rechtsform, replace 
 
******************** 
** 2. Simple tests 
******************** 
 
pwcorr roa einwohner flaeche_ln beteiligung, star(.05) 
corrtable roa einwohner flaeche_ln beteiligung 
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graph export Grafiken/01_corrplot_spezial.png, replace 
 
****************** 
** 3. Regression 
****************** 
 
global kv beteiligung i.rechtsform 
 
*** 
* Model1: Einwohnerzahlen   
 
qui: reg roa einwohner $kv 
outreg2 using Tabellen/m1b, replace ctitle(alle Fälle) label word excel dec(3) adec(3) 
fmt(f) addstat(adj. R2, e(r2_a)) 
predict cook, cooksd  
local N = e(N) 
reg roa einwohner $kv if cook <= 4 / `N', vce(robust) 
outreg2 using Tabellen/m1b, append ctitle(ohne Ausreißer) label word excel dec(3) 
adec(3) fmt(f) addstat(adj. R2, e(r2_a)) 
 
* Final Model 
reg roa einwohner $kv if cook <= 4 / `N', vce(robust) 
vif  
rvfplot 
graph export Grafiken/04_m1_rvfplot.png, replace 
predict r, resid  
hist r, normal 
graph export Grafiken/04_m1_resplot.png, replace 
 
qui: reg roa einwohner $kv if cook <= 4 / `N', vce(robust)  
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outreg2 using Tabellen/Gesamt_ohneSparten, replace ctitle(Modell 1) label word excel 
dec(3) adec(3) fmt(f) addstat(adj. R2, e(r2_a)) 
 
drop cook r 
 
*** 
* Model2: Flächen  
 
qui: reg roa flaeche_ln $kv 
outreg2 using Tabellen/m2b, replace ctitle(alle Fälle) label word excel dec(3) adec(3) 
fmt(f) addstat(adj. R2, e(r2_a)) 
predict cook, cooksd  
local N = e(N) 
reg roa flaeche_ln $kv if cook <= 4 / `N', vce(robust) 
outreg2 using Tabellen/m2b, append ctitle(ohne Ausreißer) label word excel dec(3) 
adec(3) fmt(f) addstat(adj. R2, e(r2_a)) 
 
* Final Model 
reg roa flaeche_ln $kv if cook <= 4 / `N', vce(robust) 
vif  
rvfplot 
graph export Grafiken/04_m2_rvfplot.png, replace 
predict r, resid  
hist r, normal 
graph export Grafiken/04_m2_resplot.png, replace 
 
qui: reg roa flaeche_ln $kv if cook <= 4 / `N', vce(robust) 
outreg2 using Tabellen/Gesamt_ohneSparten, append ctitle(Modell 2) label word excel 
dec(3) adec(3) fmt(f) addstat(adj. R2, e(r2_a)) 
 
drop cook r 
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capture log close  
log2html "Logfiles/log_file", replace  
 
cd "Grafiken" 
shell ls *.gph 
shell rm *.gph   
 
